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Power and Insight in Jain Discourse*
PETER FLÜGEL
In contrast to earlier Jainological emphasis on the unchanging and dogmatic na-
ture of doctrinal Jainism, recent historical-philological and anthropological scholar-
ship focuses predominately on historically changing, syncretic and hybrid features
of Jain beliefs and practices, and on the role of agency in the construction of
socioreligious identity.1 Contrary to culturalist self-images and academic represen-
tations, it is widely recognised that the ‘differences which separate Jainism from
Hinduism and Buddhism … are largely differences of emphasis for all are built from
common material’ (WILLIAMS (1983: xxii));2 and that ‘even though Jainism is a
distinct religion and not a sect of Hinduism, still it is a fact that in the past [and pre-
sent] many Jains used to regard themselves as Hindus and were also regarded by
others as Hindus’ (SANGAVE (1980: 3)). This raises questions about the characteris-
                                             
* This essay was originally conceived as a prolegomenon to my paper Worshipping the Ideal
King: On the Social Implications of Medieval Jain Conversion Stories, which will be published
under this title. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the ‘Hindu Studies Seminar’ at the
School of Oriental and Africa Studies in London, 25 November 1992, and to the ‘Jains in Indian
History and Culture Workshop’ at Amherst College, 25 June 1993. A version of the prolegomenon
written up for publication in 1996 was presented, essentially unchanged but updated and ex-
panded, to the Conference ‘Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy’ in Bialowieza, Warsaw Univer-
sity, 5 May, 2006. I am indebted to the participants of these fora for feedback, and particularly to
Kornelius Krümpelmann, who commented on the manuscript. I also wish to express my gratitude to
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and the Arts and Humanities Research Board (AHRB)
in Britain for supporting my participation in the conferences in Amherst and Bialowieza.
1 It is impossible to define a religious tradition, such as Jainism through a list of unchanging attrib-
utes. LÉVI-STRAUSS (1970: 3 ff.) prefers to talk about crystallisation of secondary differences within
syncretic fields. Another viable strategy is to analyse contextually changing self-attributions. FOUCAULT
(1981: 69) investigates discourse diachronically as a ‘regular and distinct series of events’ rather than
positing a ‘tradition’ which might be ‘behind discourse’. See also LUHMANN (1982). CARRITHERS
(1990) and GOMBRICH (1996: 7), similarly, opt for the study of religious tradition as ‘a chain of events’.
2 Because of this common heritage, contemporary Jain ‘orthodoxy’ classifies only originally non-
Indian traditions, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as truly heretical. See JAINI (1979: 314, n.
63). In the following I will focus on the relationship between ‘Hindu’ religions and Jainism only.
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tic features and the politics of Jain discourse, the principle medium of Jain cultural
synthesis.3 DUMONT (1980: 210) once stated that the Jains, like any non-Hindu
group in India, ‘cannot be regarded as independent of the environment in which it is
set, as really constituting a society by itself, however strongly its own values push it
in this direction.’ Yet, whether, or to what extent, the Jains ‘derive their raison
d’être from their distinctive ways of manoeuvring within a [hierarchical] structure
that they share with the whole society’ (MARRIOTT (1976: 131)) needs further
research.4 LAIDLAW (1985), (1995: 95), in one of the few studies of Jain discourse
to date,5 argues that ‘Jain cultural distinctiveness does not rest on rituals or practices
in which people are marked as different and counted in or out’ but on ‘a range of
practices and relationships through which Jains participate in Hindu public culture
in India, and do so as Jains.’ Jain culture is defined as a shared ethical life-style, or
‘class psychology’, grounded in ‘a set of processes and practices which cluster
around the ownership, management, funding, and use of property’ (LAIDLAW (1985:
147, cf. 349 f.)). Socioreligious group formations beyond the institutions of family,
caste and religious trusts are seen as ephemeral and dependent on instrumental proc-
esses of strategic mass mobilisation by individual lay leaders. CARRITHERS (1992:
118) studied how in conventional settings Jain public speakers ‘create, manipulate,
and transform’ connections between listeners (œrâvaka), in particular through the
narration of religious stories in communal rhetoric.6 LAIDLAW’s (1985: 55 f.) theory
                                             
3 The single defining criterion that is universally accepted within the Jain tradition is the ref-
erence to the Jinas, especially Mahâvîra. To a lesser extent, the notions of practising ahiôsâ and
vegetarianism, which is nowadays shared with many ‘Hindus’ and Buddhists, are used as refer-
ence points. On problems of Jain identity see FLÜGEL (2005), (2006a), (2006b).
4 In spite of their differences, DUMONT and MARRIOTT both rely on the code-model of classical
structuralism. However, MARRIOTT (1976) and his followers posit a multiplicity of incongruent cul-
tural codes and/or rule-oriented strategies in order to investigate ‘surface’ phenomena as products of
their interaction. The unity of ‘Hindu society’ or ‘culture’ is no longer presupposed, ‘rather it is an
empirical observation to be analyzed’ (BURGHART (1978b), (1978a: 38)) in terms of competing
groups which ‘regulate their interaction on the basis of their own code of hierarchy’ (BURGHART
(1978a: 36)). The essentialism of ‘society’ is thus replaced by the essentialism of competing ‘strategic
groups’ or ‘(sub-) cultures’ (within a territorial state).The unity of a system as a whole is then gener-
ated through (a) mutual incorporation of elements of other codes, and (b) temporary agreements on
the code of interaction (BURGHART (1978a: 37)). BURGHART (1983), (1985), in his outline of the study
of intra-cultural ‘arenas of interpretation’, first noted points of transition between the multiple code-
model and HABERMAS’ (1980–81) theory of communicative action (which however avoids a priori
reification of ‘groups’ altogether by merely presupposing universal interactional competencies).
5 LAIDLAW (1985) offers an analysis of the relationship between Jain ‘mokša-discourse’ and
‘puòya-discourse’, on which see CORT (1989) and BABB (1996), who do not explicitly use dis-
course-analytical approaches.
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of the Jain ‘language game’ and CARRITHERS’ (1991: 262) work on the ‘rhetoric of
samâj’ both successfully move away from essentialist notions of communal identity.
But they achieve this only at the price of recurring to instrumentalist definitions of
community formation, disregarding the key dimensions of felt togetherness and
shared belief and custom.7
In this essay, I propose to avoid both a priori definitions of socio-cultural identity
and instrumentalist theories of community formation by analysing the stated princi-
ples of Jain religious discourse itself. I will compare and contrast these principles
with the categories of Jürgen HABERMAS’ (1980–81), who in his Theory of Commu-
nicative Action offers a seemingly non-reductionist interpretation of linguistically
mediated processes of socio-cultural synthesis. In contrast to the explicit normative
ideals of the Jains, rooted in an ontology of karman, Habermas’ theoretical investi-
gation presents itself as a non-ontological reconstruction of regulative ideals im-
plicitly presupposed by all actual human discourse.8 Some preliminary remarks on
the architecture of his theory are necessary.
Habermas’ model seeks to transcend the false alternative of ‘community’ and
‘society’—which still dominates the sociology of Indian religions—by focusing on
the relationship between ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ instead, as differentiated in con-
temporary modern society. ‘Lifeworld’, a term imported from phenomenology, is
defined as the horizon or context of linguistically mediated communicative action.9
                                                                                                               
6 See CARRITHERS (1992: 106) on the importance of the setting for processes of negotiation of
Jain identity through the medium of cultural narratives; and FLÜGEL (1993) on the significance of
self-referentiality in conversion stories narrated in settings, such as sermons, similar to those de-
scribed in the narrative itself, thus generating self-verification. BOURDIEU (1991a), in FAUCONNIER
(1981: 202 n. 8), demonstrated that self-verification must be distinguished from the success of an
intended perlocutionary effect. See also FAUCONNIER’s (1981: 185) analysis of the ‘principle of
incorporation’, the description of a rite within the rite.
7 See TÖNNIES’ (1887) classical work on community and society.
8 HABERMAS’ analysis of discourse is influenced by the work of Karl-Otto APEL (1973) and
the analysis of the 'colonisation' of discourse by generalised media of communication by the neo-
Parsonian social systems theory of LUHMANN (1979) , etc. ‘Discourse’ is here used in the general
sense of a set of verbal or written statements. HABERMAS (1980: 71) / (1984–1987 I: 42), (2005:
20) understands ‘discourse’ in a more restricted (and old-fashioned) sense as ‘reasoning’, i.e. the
rational exchange of arguments for or against contested claims. In his terms, ‘discourse’ is the
reflective form of ‘communicative action’ which is distinguished from mere ‘communication’.
LUHMANN (2002: 42 n. 37) points out that ‘capacity for reasoned elaboration’ is a traditional defi-
nition of ‘authority’. See infra 106 f.
9 Following Peirce and Royce, Apel and Habermas presuppose the ideal of an ‘infinite com-
munity of interpretation’ as the ‘collective subject’. The resulting contrast between the ‘real com-
munity of communication’ and an implicitly presupposed ‘ideal community of communication’
has been criticised, for instance by WELLMER (1986: 68 f., 81–102) and ALBERT (2003: 30, 50
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It is, in his view, constituted by language and has three components or actor-world
relations, in which communications are simultaneously embedded: cultural symbols,
social norms, and personal aims. Lifeworlds are conceived as thematic resources for
the intersubjective construction of social situations though symbolic or communica-
tive action.10 In case of disagreement, situations are ideally defined rationally and
consensually, through co-operative processes of interpretation based on the rejection
or acceptance of claims of objective truth (cognition oriented), normative rightness
(action oriented), and subjective sincerity (person oriented). The limited explanatory
scope of the lifeworld perspective conceded, HABERMAS (1981: 180) / (1984–1987
II: 118) defines society as a whole ‘simultaneously as a system and a lifeworld’:
‘societies are systematically stabilised complexes of action of socially integrated
groups’ (1980–1981: 228) / (1984–1987 II: 152). This definition acknowledges that
society is not constituted through symbolic or communicative action alone, but
also—and increasingly so—through systemic processes, i.e. the unintended conse-
quences of action and interaction mediated by ‘steering media’ such as money or
power rather than by language. Habermas thus situates the social role of discourse
within a theory of differentiation of system and lifeworld. The degree of differentia-
tion determines the extent to which social integration can / must be achieved through
symbolic or communicative action alone.11 Habermas argues that lifeworld and
system perspectives are mutually incompatible. His proposed synthesis (chided as
‘eclectic’ by his critics) prescribes a systematic alternation of the two perspectives,
thus addressing the problem in a similar way as Jain perspectivism. Within this
framework, Habermas’ contribution to discourse analysis results from a single con-
ceptual move: the substitution of the pivotal concept of subjective ‘intentionality’
                                                                                                               
Royce ff.), who advocate for a fallibilistic notion of consensus and deny a general interest in infi-
nite discussion (ALBERT (2003: 70)). For a similar conceptual structure see, however, the Buddhist
(and Jain) distinction between ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ saógha, analysed for instance by BECHERT (1961:
23 f., 35). HABERMAS (1991: 133) conceded that the normative content of universal pragmatic
presuppositions can not be equated with obligatory norms of interaction. Anticipating presupposi-
tions are normative in ‘a wider sense’, enabling practice, without regulating it. In his recent revi-
sion of his epistemic universal pragmatic concept of truth, HABERMAS (2004: 50–55, 256 f.) re-
nounced the concept of a ‘final consensus’, because it is beyond the necessity and problems of
discourse, and distinguishes now between truth and legitimation.
10 Communicative action is defined as the reflexive form of symbolic interaction .
11 HABERMAS (1981: 219) / (1984–1987 II: 145): ‘Universal discourse points to an idealized
lifeworld reproduced through processes of mutual understanding that have been largely detached
from normative contexts and transferred over to rationally motivated yes/no positions. This sort of
growing autonomy can come to pass only to the extent that the constraints of material reproduc-
tion no longer hide behind the mask of a rationally impenetrable, basic, normative consensus, that
is to say, behind the authority of the sacred.’
POWER AND INSIGHT IN JAIN DISCOURSE 89
                                                                                                                                        
(championed by Weberian, Husserlian or Wittgensteinian variants of interpretive
sociology)12 with the notion of intersubjective ‘communication’ (Verständigung),
which in his view is the inherent telos of human language.13 The intersubjective
alternative to conventional subject-philosophical approaches14 enables Habermas to
criticise empirical discourses of power, based on ‘instrumental action’, as
‘deviations’ from an ‘original’ mode of unconstrained ‘communicative action’, im-
plicitly presupposed by all interlocutors.
Habermas’ characterisation of the constitutive role of implicit idealisations for
linguistically mediated interaction by the term ‘ideal speech situation’ has been
widely criticised (in similar ways as Chomsky’s ‘ideal speech community’), since,
by definition, ideal situations are rarely, if ever, empirically encountered, and not
even consciously contemplated by the majority of interlocutors.15 Though it is a
truism that ideals can only influence behaviour if they differ from it, a society which
relies entirely on explicit consensus is both a modern utopia and a nightmare, since
everything can become problematic under the imperative of rational control in an
ideal world of unconstrained intersubjectivity. To avoid the ‘cost’ of social reflexiv-
ity, social life has to rely on traditions, habits, routines and systemic processes
(mediated by institutions or markets) which are taken for granted, until questioned.
This is recognised by the model. Habermas insists, however, that the fundamental
unspoken expectations underlying all social interaction can be analytically recon-
structed. Conflict, for instance over values, can only be peacefully resolved if the
normative presuppositions of communicative action, such as common interest in the
avoidance of violence, are implicitly observed.16 Hence, rather than dismissing
Habermas’ ‘utopianism’ outright,17 it may be more fruitful to ask whether the prin-
                                             
12 See HABERMAS (1984: 35–82, 307–50) on three types of intentionality: fundamental intentional-
ity of consciousness, strategic intentionality, and intentionality of non-deliberate actions. Phenomenolo-
gical ‘intentionality of consciousness’ (not to be confused with Weber’s ‘strategic intentionality’ or Searle’s
concept of subjective ‘meaning intentionality’) can be usefully compared with Jain concepts of con-
sciousness and intentionality. An intentionalist stance alone can, however, not account for social proc-
esses of acceptance or definitions of acceptability of actions or arguments. APEL (1993: 41) stressed,
rightly in my view, the ‘reciprocal dependence of a priori of consciousness and linguistic a priori’.
13 HABERMAS (1984: 461). Verständigung is itself an ambiguous word, combining
‘understanding’ (something, someone) and ‘coming to an agreement’ or ‘reaching understanding’.
14 See HABERMAS (1985) for an analysis of the aporias of 20th century philosophy.
15 E.g. ALEXY (1996: 155 ff., 412 ff.).
16 HABERMAS (1991: 169) derives the normative presuppositions of communicative action from
the notion of ‘common interest’. In (neo-)Parsonian sociology, the condition that the interacting
units know that both could also act differently is known as ‘double contingency’.
17 ALBERT (1994: 259) chides the analytical projection of such an ideal into ‘pre-theoretical
knowledge’ as ‘normative essentialism’.
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ciples of discourse identified by Habermas function indeed as universal presupposi-
tions of communicative action or are merely one set of possible idealisations
amongst many. The question is pertinent, since ‘communicative action’, according
to Habermas, is predicated on the implicit recognition of the values of individual
autonomy and equality, and the existence of domination-free social spaces and
interactional competencies, which are rarely given in any concrete situation. Does
Habermas’ model, then, merely impose modern European ideals or is his theory
indeed of universal relevance?18
This question can be explored by comparing Habermas’ dialogical model of the
‘ideal speech situation’ with other models of highly idealised speech situations of a
similar level of abstraction, such as the Jain theory of speaking, which, at first sight,
seems to be predicated on hierarchical, or subject oriented, rather than egalitarian, or
intersubjective, normative presuppositions.19 From Habermas’ perspective, the prin-
ciples informing hierarchical systems, even if culturally dominant, cannot be univer-
salised, since they themselves are predicated on the principles of communicative
action which are (from the perspective of analytical reconstruction) consciously or
unconsciously presupposed in all linguistically mediated interaction. Conversely,
from a Jain perspective, the ontology of soul, non-soul, karman and the principle of
non-violence are implicitly presupposed in all universally acceptable actions. In
                                             
18 KEENAN’s (1976) ethnographic critique of the postulated universality of Grice’s conversa-
tional maxims has been extended to Habermas by PRATT (1986: 70). Disregarding criticism of
Keenan’s arguments, for instance by PRINCE (1982), she argues that Habermas’ ‘ideal speech act’
merely reflects dominant Western standards of normality used to criticise ‘deviations’ as ‘systemic
distortions’. Following Nietzsche, FOUCAULT (1981: 56) had earlier criticised the ‘will to truth’ as
a ‘machinery of exclusion’ of ‘false discourses’. See also LINKENBACH’s (1986: 108 n. 43) anthro-
pological critique of Habermas ‘objective hermeneutics’. HABERMAS (1983: 88 ff.) / (1990: 78 ff.)
responded to objections to his ‘ethnocentrism’ in his work on discourse ethics, distinguishing
‘moral’ questions of ‘common interest’ or ‘justice’, orienting his own work, from ‘ethical’ ques-
tions of ‘the good life’ or ‘self-realisation’ which are culturally specific (HABERMAS (1983: 118).
19 Normative presuppositions in Indian theories of language have been discussed by GANERI
(1999: 17), who pointed to differences between the subject-centred epistemological conception of
language in Nyâya and information transmission theories which, in contrast to the Nyâya theory of
‘direct, non-inferential assent’, assume that ‘assenting to another’s utterance is never direct, but
always depends on the hearer’s awareness of the speaker’s intentions.’ The proposal that the
‘normativity of meaning’ by divine decree in Gadâdhara’s (Navya-nyâya) semantics can
‘partially’ be defended in terms of the notion of tacitly shared ‘conventional semantic theories’ as
‘the standard of correctness’ within a specific linguistic community, rather than recurring to
Matilal’s ‘ideal hearer’ concept (GANERI (1999: 44)), presupposes an intersubjective solution of
‘the co-ordination problem’. For the use of ‘optimal standpoints’ for reconstructing the presuppo-
sitions of Jain many-valued logic see also GANERI (2002: 271).
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both cases, moments of ‘insight’ can be generated through the acceptance20 and
situational projection of the respective model.21 It is debatable whether any com-
parison between contrasting philosophical or religious models implies a dialectical
third perspective which will ‘always be more general than the most general postu-
lates of a religion and the most general rules of investigation itself’ (PIATIGORSKY
(1985: 210)) or is simply an addition without being ‘higher or lower’ (MURTI (1955:
127)). Frequently cited examples of overarching perspectives that are not predicated
on specific comparisons are the dialectic of the categories of reflection (Hegel), the
politics of cultural hegemony (Gramsci), or indeed the Jaina conception of a dis-
junctive synthesis of differences or alternatives (anekânta-vâda), which according to
MURTI (1955: 128) is ‘more a syncretism than a synthesis’. A non-relativistic
scenario is plausible if one model is able to reconstruct another on its own terms in
a non-reductive way, or if it improves the other model, without losing information,
while the reverse is not possible. In such a case, the analytical superiority of one
model over the other must be conceded in principle.
A peculiar feature of Habermas’ universal pragmatic theory is that it can only be
operationalised by ‘reversing step by step the strong idealisations’ of the concept of
                                             
20 See for instance the extensive literature in analytical theology, following WITTGENSTEIN
(1953), on the role of models for religious insight. For example RAMSEY’s (1967: 37) analysis of
the ‘disclosure situation’, based on religious commitment: ‘So we see religious commitment as a
total commitment to the whole universe; something in relation to which argument has only a very
odd function; its purpose being to tell such a tale as evokes the “insight”, the “discernment” from
which the commitment follows as a response. Further, religious commitment is something bound
up with key words whose logic no doubt resembles that of words which characterise personal
loyalty as well as that of the axioms of mathematics, and somehow combines the features of both,
being what may be called “specially resistant” posits, “final” endpoints of explanation, key-words
suited to the whole job of living—“apex” words.’ See further SMART (1965), HICK (1969), and others.
21 The concept of ‘insight’ is used somewhat ambiguously in this article, referring both to cog-
nitive insight in the sense of Habermas (Einsicht) and to Jain religious insight (samyaktva or
samyag-darœana). This can be justified by pointing to similar ambiguities (a) in Habermas’ use of
Einsicht referring both to understanding and acceptance (close to Skt. saôjñâ, agreement, under-
standing, harmony), and (b) in the Jain usage of samyaktva which can refer to cognitive insight
and acceptance of the ‘rightness’ of Jain doctrine, but mainly describes the ‘direct experience’ of
the soul/self; see JAINI (1979: 80). The understanding of doctrine and self may or may not be
linked, for instance in conversion experiences (FLÜGEL (1993)), which can be interpreted as a
‘realization and internalization of important dogmatic subjects’ (BRUHN (1997–1998, V.1)),
though this conception does not account for the ‘self-reported’ enlightenment experiences of the
Jinas. See SCHMITHAUSEN (1981: 199 n. 3) on similar ambiguities of the term ‘insight’ in early
Buddhist scriptures. Generally on the problem of communicating ‘experience’ in Buddhist con-
texts see SCHMITHAUSEN (1981: 200 ff.), and for ideological uses FAURE (1991) and SHARF (1995).
On Buddhist insight meditation, see GRIFFITHS (1981) and HOUTMAN (1999), amongst others. For
observations on Buddhist and Jain meditation see BRONKHORST (1993b).
92 PETER FLÜGEL
                                                                                                                                        
communicative action to approximate the complexity of natural situations. Because
most methodological provisions and theoretical assumptions have to be dropped in
this process, universal pragmatics becomes, for all practical purposes, indistinguish-
able from empirical pragmatics, except for the additional conceptual sensitivity
‘needed to recognise the rational basis of linguistic communication in the confusing
complexity of the everyday observed’ (HABERMAS (1980: 444) / (1984–1987 I:
331).22 What is gained is the ability to discover different levels of the linguistically
represented reality, and communicative pathologies, such as veiled power relation-
ships or systemic distortions of rational communication through the use of general-
ised media of communication.23 For formal pragmatic investigations of South Asian
discourse the fundamental empirical question is not whether, for instance, man-
tras or ritual language can be considered as ‘speech acts’, or in which sense.24 The
question is rather, as Richard BURGHART (1996: 301) put it, ‘how does non-dis-
torted speech communication take place in hierarchical structures’? BURGHART
(1983), (1985) was the first South Asianist to tentatively explore the possibilities of
the theory of communicative action for an understanding of religious and political
discourse in South Asia. Since his premature death, few advances have been made
in rendering Habermas’ highly abstract theory fruitful for South Asian studies.
In this essay, I make a fresh attempt in exploring the analytical potential of
Habermas’ communication theoretical approach for South Asian Studies by con-
trasting Habermas’ discourse ethics, the reflective form of communicative action,
with Jain discourse ethics, a reflective form of non-violent action. I will focus par-
ticularly on their respective theorisation of the subtle role of power in processes of
indirect communication. Habermas opened up a new critical perspective by studying
the constitutive role of idealisation in discourse and its exploitation. Alternative
approaches, such as FOUCAULT’s (1981) and BOURDIEU’s (1991a), by contrast,
emphasise the ubiquity and institutionalised nature of power. This view exerts a
strong influence on current empirical investigations of Jain processes of social self-
                                             
22 On the difference between formal and empirical pragmatics see HABERMAS (1980: 440–52) /
(1984–1987 I: 328–37).
23 Talcott Parsons was the first to argue that symbolically generalised media of communica-
tion, steering media, such as power, money, status and value commitment, are the functional
equivalents of sacred symbols in co-ordinating actions in societies not dominated by tradition:
‘Instead of negotiating to consensus … men rely on symbols <promising> the experience of
meaning as a statistical probability over many acts. They are freed from the efforts to negotiate
basics all the time’ (BAUM (1976) on Parsons, cited by HABERMAS (1981: 393) / (1984–1987 II:
262).
24 The potential of speech-act theory for South Asian studies has been explored by POTTER
(1970), (1984), WHEELOCK (1982), DESHPANDE (1990), FINDLEY (1989), TABER (1989), GÖHLER
(1995a), (1995b), amongst others.
POWER AND INSIGHT IN JAIN DISCOURSE 93
                                                                                                                                        
identification.25 In comparing Habermas’ and Jain theories of discourse, I pursue
three main arguments as far as the principles of Jain discourse is concerned:
(a) Despite being differently constructed, the Jain theory of speech plays a similar
role within Indian philosophy as Habermas’ theory of communicative action
does within Western philosophy. Both aim at the integration of a variety of
perspectives, proclaim the primacy of morality over truth and logic, and
predicate critical analysis of typical speech acts, especially latent strategic
speech acts (perlocutions), on idealised normative presuppositions.26
(b) The orientation towards, and mastery of, the principles of Jainism generates
interactional competencies regarding the non-violent resolution of conflicts,
and cognitive distancing effects, which enable competent agents to intention-
ally create ambiguous symbols (utterances and gestures), and to manipulate
identities through the re-interpretation of culturally normative or conventional
presuppositions. The same can be said of the cognitive functions of modern
theories of communication.
(c) The perceived plurivocality or multifunctionality of symbols—one of the main
features of syncretism and socio-cultural synthesis in general—is in the Jain case
not only a feature of rule-application, or a consequence of external imposition or
extrinsic borrowing etc.,27 but also a consequence of religious knowledge, which
can generate effects of insight qua (re-) interpretation of any given content.
From the conventional point of view of communicative action, the principles of
Jain hermeneutics produce systematically distorted communication, albeit one
that is ideally oriented to salvific rather than material ends.
My basic contention is that philosophy (and logic), whether preoccupied with
questions of universal validity, scepticism or pluralism, is always embedded in
socio-cultural milieus which it both reflects and influences in varying degrees. Phi-
losophy is always not ‘merely philosophy’, but a form of social discourse with so-
cial functions, manifest or latent. Philosophy does not merely consist in sets of
propositions and logical or argumentative procedures but has also, directly or indi-
rectly, pragmatic and expressive dimensions, and presupposes matching lifeforms
                                             
25 See LAIDLAW (1985), (1995), and CORT (1989), (2001: 11, 171), who invokes Eliade’s rather
then Foucault’s theory of power. See FLÜGEL (1997), (2006b: 108 f.).
26 Citing examples, GÖHLER (1995b: 66) noted, similarly, the ‘überraschende Gegenstands-
gleichheit der Untersuchungen der Mîmâôsâ und der “Sprechakttheoretiker”’ Austin and Searle:
‘In etwas anderer Fassung finden sich diese Kategorien auch in der Mîmâôsâ’ (GÖHLER (1995b: 69)).
27 On extrinsic borrowing see DUMONT (1980: 194). For a Jain example see MISRA (1972: 16)
on the merely ‘nominal adoption’ of the local South Indian culture by (Râjasthânî) Œvetâmbara
Jain merchants in Bangalore.
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and institutions for its social recognition.28 The comparison between two expressly
non-absolutist universalist theories, the theory of communicative action and the Jain
theory of language usage, in my view, demonstrates that philosophies are intrinsically
connected with a selective range of matching life-forms, while recognising that most
socio-cultural milieus are culturally hybrid and contain elements which are universally
acceptable. To what extent procedures and contents of ‘rational inquiry’29 are influ-
enced by and influence social context is a question for empirical research.
The aim of this essay is to outline a new approach for the analysis of religious dis-
course in South Asia, and to prepare the ground for future critical sociolinguistic stud-
ies of Jain discourse. For this purpose key theoretical issues of philosophical pluralism
and cross-cultural comparison are explored in a heuristic way. The essay is in eight
parts. First, I am going to review the general problematic of Jain syncretism (I) and the
existing academic literature on Jain rhetoric and discourse (II), followed by an over-
view of Habermas’ theory of communicative action (III) and aspects of the work of
Grice and Brown and Levinson, which will prove useful for operationalising Haber-
mas’ theory (IV). To prepare the ground for empirical investigation, I will then pro-
pose a typology of characteristic social settings of Jain religious discourse, and discuss
their normative implications (V). Thereafter, I analyse the key features of the Jain
theory of speech (VI), and of Jain discourse ethics in form of the Jain tetrad of the
modes of speech (VII). Finally, I draw some general conclusions by comparing and
contrasting the normative presuppositions of the theory of communicative action and
the Jain theory of speech, which both in their own way offer critical analytical per-
spectives on the role of power and violence in human communication (VIII).30
— I —
One of the key arguments of this essay is that Jainism, as a meta-philosophy
whose social efficacy is predicated on the systematic reinterpretation of conven-
tional perspectives, constitutes a form of discourse which produces syncretic pat-
terns. At present, syncretism is predominantly understood as a transitional phase
                                             
28 See LUHMANN (1990). HABERMAS (1991: 25): ‘Moralische Einsichten müßten für die Praxis
in der Tat folgenlos bleiben, wenn sie sich nicht auf die Schubkraft von Motiven und auf die
anerkannte soziale Geltung von Institutionen stützen könnten. … jede universalistische Moral ist
auf entgegenkommende Lebensformen angewiesen.’
29 BRONKHORST (1999: 23 f.).
30 Readers who are not interested in the discussion of the relevant theoretical context and lit-
erature are advised to move straight to section V.
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within an overall dialectical process of religio-historical development—
syncretisation or acculturation—which often involves parallel processes of linguistic
syncretism and/or group formation.31 PYE (1994: 220), for instance, defines the
‘syncretic situation’ as ‘the temporary ambiguous existence of elements from di-
verse religions and other contexts within a coherent religious pattern.’ He locates
syncretism between a ‘mere mixture’ and a ‘coherent mixture’ or ‘synthesis’:
‘If coherent mixture, or synthesis, represents the conclusion to a proc-
ess which is thereby completed, syncretism by contrast is to be under-
stood as dynamically open and indeed patent of resolutions other than
synthesis. These might be, in particular, the outright dominance of one
strand of meaning by another (assimilation), or the avoidance of syn-
thesis through the drawing apart of the distinct elements and the con-
sequent collapse of the syncretism (dissolution).’32
Earlier, BECHERT (1978: 20–3) had proposed a similar typology of syncretic phe-
nomena, i.e. of ‘the different forms in which religious traditions have influenced
each other’, associating them with particular ideological or cultural systems: (1) The
marginal acceptance of single elements (e.g. Jains), (2) proper syncretism ‘where
elements from different religious traditions gain equal weight’ (e.g. Nepal, Bali, Sri
Lanka), (3) full integration (Neo-Hinduism), (4) perfect synthesis (e.g. Sikhs). Ac-
cording to Bechert, Jainism (in general) is an example of type one, because its
‘essential characteristics’ are not touched by the assimilation of new elements.
Bechert’s assessment of Jainism was probably influenced by BRUHN’s (1954: 136)
remarks on the lacking ‘mixture of traditions’ and the prevalence of a combinatorial
coexistence of elements from diverse traditions in Jain literature. BRUHN (1987a:
109) later pointed to the frequent co-occurrence of various syncretic phenomena
within a single tradition. He distinguished, for instance, between ‘syncretism’ and
‘import’ in Jain literature. In contrast to Bechert and Pye, in his view ‘syncretism’
denotes the end product of the process of syncretisation, i.e. a ‘real’ synthesis of
elements (from the participants point of view), whereas ‘import’ describes a situa-
tion of ‘unreal’ synthesis, where new elements are incorporated but not yet properly
integrated (danger of disintegration). Bruhn also suggested distinguishing more
clearly between different sources and periods, in order to achieve greater realism. In
this context belong analytical distinctions between (a) the ‘hinduised’ (WILLIAMS
                                             
31 COLPE (1987: 220 f., 226).
32 PYE (1994: 220). Structural-functionalist models of acculturation artificially limit the role of
ambiguity and change to a ‘liminal’ phase between presumably static extremes (e.g. TURNER
(1986: 93)). So called post-modern approaches try to invert this scheme by defining identity itself
as a limit case.
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(1983: xx)) or ‘pseudo-jainised’ (JAINI (1974: 335), (1979: 291–4) ritual and litera-
ture of (post-) medieval temple-worshipping Jain traditions, (b) the ‘islamicised’
(JAINI (1974: 314 n. 63)) iconoclastic reform movements which emerged in the
Mughal period, and (c) contemporary ‘westernised’ developments.33 Whatever the
merit of such typologies, which contrary to WEBER (1988) are often based on the
supposition of ‘essential characteristics’, it is apparent that one of the main ambi-
tions of present research is the construction of comprehensive classifications of
various forms of syncretisation and their strategic uses.34
An important debate between GOMBRICH (1971: 49) and BECHERT (1978: 20–4)
on the question of the relation between literary syncretism (eclecticism) and the
syncretism of popular religious practice in contemporary (Theravâda) Buddhism is
also relevant for the understanding of similar phenomena amongst the Jains. Gom-
brich describes non-monastic forms of Buddhism as ‘accretive’ or corrupted forms.
Bechert, on the other hand, criticises his devaluation of popular beliefs and of the
political role of religion as ‘elitist’. Instead, he interprets Buddhist ‘cultures’ as
‘systems’ or organic totalities, encompassing both saógha and society. TAMBIAH
(1977), too, focuses less on Buddhist doctrine and the saógha and more on cultural
history, emphasising especially the constitutive role of local cosmologies
(‘pantheons’) which are implicated in the cults of Buddhist kingship. This approach,
which favours a typified ‘common man’s’ view from within and privileges
‘hierarchisation’ (‘hegemony’ or ‘totalisation’) as the most important strategy of
acculturation, was pioneered by DUMONT (1980: 427 n. 6, 433 n. 19), who argued
that historically the ‘worldly religion’ of ‘Hinduism’ emerged as a product of cu-
mulative interactive processes between the ‘two ideal types’ of Brâhmaòism and
Jainism / Buddhism which superimposed an ‘individual religion … on to the religion
of the group [caste]’ (DUMONT (1980: 275)).35 From the perspective of an individ-
                                             
33 See the somewhat different ideal-typical distinction between ‘canonical’, ‘classical’, ‘protes-
tant’ and ‘modern’ types of Jainism in FLÜGEL (2000: 37–40), to which ‘mystical’ Jainism (Dig-
ambara Mysticism) needs to be added.
34 The following strategies have been suggested for instance: addition, parallelism, identification,
hierarchical subordination (inclusion), re-interpretation. See HACKER (1985: 12), DUMONT
(1980: 260), COLPE (1987: 223), PYE (1994: 222), BECHERT (1978: 23), BRUHN (1993: 38). With few
exceptions, research on syncretism has been restricted to the comparative study of the semantics of
cultural ideologies. This article, by contrast, utilises the analytical tools of rhetorics and pragmatics.
35 The theoretical appropriation of ‘the participant’s point of view’ generated much confusion
in South Asian Anthropology because of the ambiguous status of the key Neo-Kantian concept of
‘value-realisation’, which, on the one hand, reifies culture, and, on the other hand, claims to
achieve greater empirical adequacy by representing the ‘native’s point of view’ (HABERMAS
(1981: 340–3, 351) / (1984–1987 II: 226–8, 234)). DUMONT (1980) oscillates ambiguously be-
tween two interpretations: Hinduism (1) as a mixture between two literary ideal types, and (2) as a
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ual, GUMPERZ (1972: 230 f.) pointed out, superposed structures demand a wider
socioreligious repertoire, including role compartmentalisation and perspective
variation. Dumont’s view that, from a lay participant’s point of view, soteriological
cults appear as religions of individual choice which are superimposed upon worldly
religion, lends support to both accretionary and syncretistic interpretations. It also
highlights the marginal historical role of Jainism in India, which, for want of politi-
cal support, was nowhere able to achieve a culturally dominant position comparable
to Buddhism in the countries of Theravâda Buddhism, and consequently not forced
to develop its own (hegemonic) social system. Jainism always remained primarily a
monastic religion which relied on the institutions of Hinduism and the state to leg-
islate for society. Jain philosophical syncretism conceives merely of a negative to-
tality based on the disjunctive synthesis of differences within an infinite horizon of
plural perspectives. Yet, negative philosophical forms of syncretism are to be dis-
tinguished from positive linguistic or socioreligious forms of syncretism, which are
less prominent in Jain discourse, but dominant in practice.36
The Jain case shows that it is an empirical question whether a given form of
popular religion appears to be predominantly accretic or syncretic. It also underlines
the crucial importance of configurations of power for competitive processes of doc-
trinal syncretism and socio-cultural synthesis. The religious status of ‘popular Jain-
ism’—‘deviation’, ‘cultural bedrock’ or ‘modern political essentialisation’—is the
subject of ongoing disputes between rivalling Jain leaders. Epistemologies and re-
ligious rituals for Jain laity were constructed intentionally by Jain monks. Yet, the
                                                                                                               
form of popular religious practice, resulting from the hierarchical incorporation of tribal cults,
textual Brâhmaòism, and ‘the great heresies’ (cf. DUMONT (1980: 428 f. n. 10)), through
(a) Brâhmaòic mediation, and/or (b) popular extrinsic borrowing of social signs from superiors
without functional transformation (DUMONT (1980: 194)). The elitist Brâhmaòa-centredness of
this approach has attracted much criticism. Dumont himself indicated that his approach is not
much different from the one of the philologist (DUMONT (1980: 433 n. 19)). The problem is that
the ‘common man’ is usually treated as a literary type—‘the Buddhist king’ (Tambiah) or ‘the
Brâhmaòic householder’ (Dumont)—which mediates between doctrine and practice in a
normatively prescribed way. By contrast, GLUCKMAN (1955: 128), for instance, appeals to the
universal rationality or ‘reasonableness’ of common sense: ‘The concept of the “reasonable”
measures the range of allowed departure from the highest standards of duty and absolute confor-
mity to norm, and the minimum adherence which is insisted on.’ ‘Reasonability’ can be normal-
ised, but, strictly speaking, it refers to empirical conditions.
36 On the Jain philosophical ‘syncretism’ of anekânta-vâda and syâd-vâda see for instance
MURTI (1955: 127 f.) and GANERI (2001: 147), (2002: 279): ‘In moving from pluralism to syncre-
tism, the Jainas commit themselves to the claim that we are led to a complete account of reality by
integrating of all the different points of view’ (ib. GANERI (2002: 279)). It has to be noted, though,
that this approach does not tolerate ‘invalid’ (apramâòa) points of view. Hence, not every state-
ment is conditionally true.
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extent to which social life is regulated by Jain social philosophy varies locally and
from sect to sect, and from caste to caste. Iconoclastic Jain sects rely on the Hindu
social system alone, whereas temple-worshipping sects accept the ‘hinduised /
jainised’ practices of popular Jainism as an integral part of Jain religion,37 while
communal reformers demand the ‘eradication of every non-Jain element from the
Jaina community’ (SANGAVE (1980: 410)) in order to form entirely new social enti-
ties. Present political attempts to ethnicise the ‘Jain community’ by propagating
intra-religious, trans-sect and trans-caste marriages are unlikely to succeed, how-
ever, because of ongoing internal sectarian rivalries, exclusive caste and class af-
filiations of the laity, and the continuing existence of mixed religious castes. Effec-
tively, Jain communalism contributes to the strengthening of the cultural self-con-
sciousness of an important faction of the new Indian business class, but does not
alter the hierarchical structure of the society itself.
Jain laity usually practises ‘Jain’ and ‘Hindu’ rituals side by side, combining sote-
riological religion with worldly religion without mixing the two, as described by
Dumont.38 Even the lay followers (œrâvaka) of contemporary Jain reformist groups
(e.g. ‘Jain communalists’) cannot avoid combining ‘Jain’ and ‘Hindu’ religious
practices, because of lacking Jain life-cycle rituals.39 Sometimes popular practices
are ‘jainised’ by ascetics, and in this way legitimately incorporated into Jain relig-
ion. ‘Jain marriages’ for instance, and similar life-cycle rituals, are created simply
by adding a Jain mantra to customary local procedures; and ‘Jain pûjâs’ are ren-
dered possible if interpreted as forms of dâna, i.e. without expectation of return etc.
(WILLIAMS (1983: xx–xxv, 216)). Re-interpretation and modification through addi-
tion etc., are essential techniques for incorporating elements from other traditions
and for constructing cosmologies and embryonic Jain social systems along the lines
of pre-existing Hindu and Buddhist models. Yet, only few elements of ‘Hindu’
popular religion have been fully integrated, predominantly into the ritual corpus of
                                             
37 See JAINI (1991: 187).
38 MAHIAS (1985: 96 f., 287), GOONASEKERE (1986: 185 f.), CORT (1989: 433), and others, talk
about the Jain layman’s ‘oscillation’ between ‘alternative’ Jain (or Jain and Hindu) ‘realms of value’.
The social function of Jain practices for legitimising status-mobility within Indian society remains to
be studied.
39 ‘Jain practices’ are considered to be forms of temporary renunciation which are derived
from the code of conduct for individual Jain mendicants, like the six obligatory rites (âvaœyaka),
asceticism (tapas), meditation (dhyâna), plus, for the laity, the obligatory giving of alms to the
ascetics (dâna); whereas all social rituals mediated by the Brâhmaòas, such as life-cycle rituals
(saôskâras) or the worship (pûjâ) of gods other than the Jinas, are regarded as ‘Hindu practices’.
Of course, ‘Jain practices’ are considered to be hierarchically superior by Jains, although ‘Hindus’
regard them as ‘heretical’ deviations from standard practice, because they are neither predicated
on the authority of the Vedas nor on the mediation of the Brâhmaòas.
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temple-worshipping sects. Aniconic Jain sects do not practice socioreligious rituals
to the same degree as image-worshipping sects, and thus have a less clearly defined
socioreligious identity. Structure and semantics of the ritual terminology correspond
to socioreligious structure. The paradigmatic case of an apparently ‘non-Jain’ popu-
lar ritual which was appropriated and re-interpreted by medieval Jain ascetics to
build up a Jain system of lay rituals is pûjâ.40 Its ambiguous status between soteri-
ological and world-affirming orientations is reflected in the intentional multivocality
of the religious terminology employed in this and similar lay rituals, as WILLIAMS
(1983), LAIDLAW (1985) and CORT (1989), (1991) demonstrated.41 The socio-
religious dimension constituted by a system of jainised lay rituals seems to be predi-
cated on generalised indirectness.
— II —
Modern writers on Jainism have often noted the abundance of similes and double
meanings (œleša) in Jain narrative and ritual literature,42 and their strategic use to
infuse conventional language and popular stories with different meanings, derived
from Jain ethics.43 WILLIAMS (1983: xviii–ix) was the first scholar to highlight the
ways in which medieval Jain writers, such as the Digambara âcârya Jinasena
(9th CE), instrumentalised œaivaite terms (amongst others) as ‘vehicles’ for the indi-
rect communication of their own religious views:
‘Jain writers have shown a remarkable aptitude for the subtle handling
of words … The polyvalence of certain expressions even within the
limits of the same text is often disconcerting: guòa in particular is
greatly overworked and so are kriyâ and karman. Indeed one is led to
wonder whether the double meanings given to many words and their
                                             
40 It is an open question whether Hindus or indeed Jains or Buddhists first introduced pûjâ ritu-
als in Indic religion. Jain pûjâ manuals are comparatively late.
41 The fact that the status of pûjâ as a ‘Jain ceremony’ is disputed within the Jain tradition di-
minishes the relevance of HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW’s (1994: 41 f.) ‘cognitive-psychological’ analysis
of Jain pûjâ, as they point out themselves (LAIDLAW (1994: 137)). See FLÜGEL (2006b) for a re-
view of this issue.
42 E.g. WINTERNITZ (1920 II: 303–5), BLOOMFIELD (1923: 262 f.), SCHUBRING (2000: 268,
§ 150), BALBIR (1983), BRUHN (1993: 36) etc.
43 E.g. HERTEL (1922: 8), JAIN (1981: 11), MONE (1987: 324 f.) etc. The social implications of
the possibility that the multivocalities in Jain texts are intentional have, however, only reluctantly
been considered by textual scholars to date, not least because of the unclear status of the element
of necessary violence it implies (cf. BALBIR (1984: 37), GRANOFF (1992)).
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formal identity with Hindu terms may not be voluntary. Examples of
such coincidences (with the Jaina meanings noted in parentheses) are:
œiva (mokša), lióga (the monks symbols such as the rajo-harana), guòa-
traya (the ratna-traya), paœupati (the Jina) mahâ-deva (the Jina) whilst
on the other hand the word Digambara itself can be an epithet of Œiva.’
WILLIAMS (1983: xix) sees the reasons for the intentionally multivocal use of
terms in the political assertiveness of ‘Hinduism’ in medieval South Indian society
which forced the Jains to conceal their ‘heterodox’ beliefs behind a conformist pub-
lic facade as a way of social self-protection:
‘It may be that such resemblances were intended to render Jaina doc-
trines attractive to œaivas or that œaiva persecution made it desirable to
give to certain Jaina texts an innocuous aspect. Certainly the Jaina’s
concept of asatya44 would make it easy for them to adopt an attitude
similar to that of those Shiite sectarians who in the early days of Islam
maintained an outward conformity by concealing their real beliefs un-
der forms of words.’
Numerous studies on diglossia, multilingualism / multifaithism and code-switching
demonstrated in the meantime that the strategy of ‘outward conformity and inward
dissent’, based on the method of differentiating hierarchical levels / media of dis-
course, is not limited to a certain historical period in South Asia or to the Jains in
particular, but a universal feature, especially of dependent subaltern groups, minori-
ties, or elites. DUMONT (1980: 194) analysed the method of ‘extrinsic borrowing’
‘from superiors of certain features as social signs and not as functional features’ in
terms of a theory of acculturation, which distinguishes three contemporary types of
cultural interaction:45 ‘rejection, mixture, in which traditional and modern features
exist happily side by side, and combination, which unites them intimately in new
forms of a hybrid nature and ambiguous orientation’ (DUMONT (1980: 229)).46 Oth-
                                             
44 See infra (p. 194) on satyâsatya: something may be true as well as false (satya-måšâ) or
neither true nor false (a-satya-måšâ).
45 Cf. FERGUSON’s (1972: 244 f.) definition of diglossia: ‘DIGLOSSIA is a relatively stable
language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may in-
clude a standard or regional standard), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammati-
cally more complex) superimposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written
literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by
formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any
sector of the community for ordinary conversation’ [author’s italics].
46 See FLÜGEL (1995–6: 170 f.) on the relationship between conventional indirectness and
‘mixed’ and ‘combined’ strategies of integration.
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ers emphasised the political implications of counter-hegemonic adaptive strategies.
SEAL (1968), RUDOLPH–RUDOLPH (1984), HAYNES (1991), and JAFFRELOT (1993),
for instance, investigated the paradoxical effects of double-strategies employed by
political mediators in (colonial) South Asia, which used ‘modern language’ in the
public sphere, i.e. institutions of the state and print media, and ‘traditional language’
within their own community. Sociolinguistic theories of discourse and
multilingualism will prove useful for the future study of the interaction of different
levels within Jain religious language and of Jain discourse being superimposed on
different contexts.47 In Jain literature, DERRETT (1980: 144) identified ‘double stan-
dards’. CARRITHERS (1991: 266 f.) showed how the multivocal ‘political rhetoric’ of
the leaders of Jain lay communities (samâja) gains persuasive force only if indi-
rectly tapping into a ‘diffuse realm of religious sentiments’. LAIDLAW (1985: 60)
and CORT (1989: 449–70) suggested, conversely, that the official renunciatory
‘religious ideology’ of the Jains implicitly relies on a ‘diffuse Jain ideology of
wellbeing’, and how ‘symbolically rich’ multivalent concepts, such as lâbha or
maógala which can mean either ‘profit’ or ‘power’ both in the world and in the
religious sphere, ‘bridge the two ideologies’ (CORT (1989: 465)). The merit of
Carrithers’, Laidlaw’s and Cort’s approaches lies in the attempt to interpret the im-
plicit links between the Jain religious discourse and the socio-economic sphere in
terms of a theory of symbolisation.48 But they suffer from an exclusive focus on the
                                             
47 GUMPERZ (1972: 225) distinguishes two types of relationships between variants: ‘dialectal
and superposed’. On ‘seemingly intentional processes of distortion’ by argots and on the use of
implicit language to claim in-group membership and to maintain group boundaries see GUMPERZ
(1961), (1972: 221–3, 227 f.). Most authors in a recent volume on religious discourse edited by
OMINIYA and FISHMAN (2006) derive their inspiration from the classic papers of FERGUSON
(1959/1972: 232 f.) and FISHMAN (1967) on diglossia and bilingualism in exploring situational
uses of either two varieties of a (religious) language, or of two distinct (related or unrelated) lan-
guages side by side throughout a speech community, each with a clearly defined role. Jain
heteroglossia is discussed, with varying success, by PANDHARIPANDE (2006), with the additional
help of BOURDIEU’s (1991: 107) institutional theory of the power of language. See also
DESHPANDE (1979) on Jain claims of Ardhamâgadhî being a prestigious ‘Âryan’ language.
48 Cf. STRECKER (1988). For similar descriptions of the ‘dual purposes’ of the Jain cult, see
WEBER (1920/1978: 217), HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW (1994: 171 f.), LAIDLAW (1995: 354), JOHNSON
(1995b: 310), and BABB (1996: 98–101). However, as WILLIAMS (1983) indicated, there is nothing
particularly ‘Jain’ about the ‘undefinable symbolic realm of wellbeing’ (CORT (1989: 455)). Well-
being as a religious value is generally associated not with Jainism but with ‘Hinduism’ or inter-
preted as a general social value (CORT (1989: 458)), SANGAVE (1980: 409), MAHIAS (1985: 109,
287), GOONASEKERE (1986: 185 f.)). In the Jain context it might as well be interpreted as a mere
contextual condition of success of ascetic life. FLÜGEL (2006b: 104), therefore, proposed to distin-
guish between well-being A (socioreligious) and well-being B (material). See also contemporary
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laity and from the artificial treatment of Jain communities as quasi-ethnic groups
isolated from the wider context of Indian society, which makes a critical analysis of
the contextual relationships between Jainism and society, Jainism and power etc.—
masked by the use of multivalent symbols—virtually impossible.49 ‘Clearly’,
writes CORT (2001: 11), ‘most scholars of ideology view power as ubiquitous.’
LAIDLAW (1995), following Foucault, shares this view. However, while Williams’
remarks need to be qualified, I think he and his successors posed the crucial question
for an understanding of the characteristic ‘syncretic’, ‘hybrid’ or ‘parasitic’ form of
much Jain narrative literature and lay ritual, by pointing to the intentional
multivocality of basic concepts of popular Jainism, invented by ascetics, and their
political-rhetorical function within contexts of competitive religious proselytisation.
Williams did not pursue this line of research further, but confined himself to the so-
ciologically less interesting search for the precise entailments of single terms. In order
to handle the potentially boundless increase of investigations of such terms, BRUHN
(1983: 61) proposed to limit ‘rhetorical studies’ to specific Jain genres, and most of
Williams’ successors followed this path.
I chose a different strategy in this article, turning away from the description and
analysis of literary genres and doctrinal semantics (a task for the philologist) to the
investigation of the pragmatics of Jain discourse. The limited aim of this study is to
explore the methodological preconditions for an investigation of contextual impli-
cations of intentional multivocal utterances in Jain religious language. To accom-
plish this, a prior comparative analysis of the constitutive principles of Jain dis-
course and its typical normative contexts is required. Particularly significant is the
question of the ways in which the specific ethical principles of Jain discourse
interlink both with contextual norms and with universal moral presuppositions of
communication per se, upon which intentional language usage indirectly relies, if
Habermas is to be believed. I will seek to demonstrate that critical reflection on
language usage on a level of abstraction similar to universal pragmatics is doctri-
nally prescribed for Jain ascetics, who need to consider the ethical implications of
their own religious rhetoric in different contexts.50 Because the social implications
                                                                                                               
Terâpanth reformist attempts to disambiguate the concepts of Jain popular religion, i.e. to separate
clearly between religion and society.
49 See the first principle of FISHMAN’s (2006: 14) decalogue of theoretical perspectives for the
sociology of language and religion: ‘The language (or ‘variety’) of religion always functions
within a larger multilingual / multivarietal repertoire.’ The notion of ‘religious repertoire’ is derived
from GUMPERZ’s (1972: 230) definition of the ‘verbal repertoire’ of a speech community (or indi-
vidual) as ‘the totality of dialectal and superposed variants regularly employed.’
50 The notion of univocality has to be used with great care, because of its association with
positivistic ideal language theories. In practice, perceived univocality is always relative to a his-
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of the Jain rules of speech themselves are hardly illuminated in Jain hermeneutical
literature,51 I will start my investigation with a theoretical analysis of characteristic
Jain hermeneutical procedures and discursive strategies in typical situations of lin-
guistically mediated interaction.
The social function of Jain theories of speech, I argue, can be understood from the
perspective of a theory of interactional competence. The term interactional compe-
tence encompasses cognitive, linguistic and rhetorical ability, and hence the capac-
ity to use language both for the pursuit of power and insight. Interestingly enough,
the use of mental and linguistic violence is a necessary requirement for accom-
plishing both aims. Power and influence are intrinsically connected with violence. It
is one of the most intriguing questions how power works through discourse. Power
has been defined by Max WEBER (1972: 28), from an intentionalist perspective, as
the ‘opportunity existing within a social relationship which permits one to carry out
one’s own will even against resistance and regardless of the basis on which this
opportunity rests.’52 Rhetoric has similarly been characterised as a competence-
based social technique by means of which a minority, or an elite, may gain or exer-
cise social influence, personal prestige or persuasive power, over a majority. Its
capacity to influence is often predicated on the measured violation of a conventional
structure by means of the manipulation of linguistic and non-linguistic media of
communication; i.e. it presupposes a ‘deviance’ from what is culturally felt as being
‘normal’ without threatening the co-operation of the listeners. Influence is further
                                                                                                               
torical background of implicit contextual knowledge and cannot be explicated merely by referring
to logical or grammatical rules. Strictly speaking, common-sense knowledge cannot be described
exhaustively at all, because ultimately the whole world is implicated in every expression.
51 See in particular the canonical Aòuogaddârâiô (AòD).
52 HABERMAS (1981: 400–12) / (1984–1987 II: 267–77) adopts both Weber’s definition of
power as ‘instrumental action’ and Parsons’ theory of money and power as ‘codes’ or ‘generalised
media of communication’, distinguished from the codes of influence and value commitments.
Parson’s theory of power was further developed by LUHMANN (1975) / (1979) and HABERMAS
(1981) / (1984–1987 II). Power as code is explained as follows: ‘The power code schematises
alter’s possible responses in a binary fashion: he can either submit to or oppose ego’s demands. A
preference for compliance is built into the code through the prospect ego holds out for sanctioning
later in case the latter fails to carry out orders. Under those conditions, the person in power can
condition the responses of those subordinate to him, without having to depend primarily on the
willingness to co-operate. From both sides is expected an objectivating attitude toward the action
situation and an orientation to the possible consequences of action’ (HABERMAS (1981: 401) /
(1987: 268)). Habermas thus implicitly operates with two notions of power: power as a code in the
sense of Parsons and Luhmann, and as instrumental action in the sense of Max Weber. In this
article the instrumental definition of power is predominately referred to. For a discussion of Jain
conceptions of power, see FLUGEL (forthcoming).
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strengthened through commitment and dogmatism on the side of the proponent.53
By such means, a speaker may exert a disproportionate influence on individuals and
society at large and stimulate changes in a pre-meditated direction. Social influence
is rooted in conflict and striving for a new consensus: ‘Conflict is … at the root
of influence, either because it arises from the presence of a difference or because
the existence of a disagreement brings it into the open’ (MOSCOVICI (1985: 353)).
Rhetoric has another, ethical-pedagogical, side: it may not only serve as an instru-
ment of power and manipulation, but (from the perspective of the addressee) also as a
critical analytical method of truth-finding and insight. Both aspects are often intrinsi-
cally related and can only be dissected analytically.54 The ways in which Jain ascetics
play with the two aspects of rhetoric, how they use multivocal language strategically
as a means of normative influence and religious conversion, are interesting questions
for sociological research.55 If, as Williams argued, the multivocal categories of/for
popular Jainism are intentionally constructed by proselytising ascetics, and if this is
done to generate effects of religious insight (samyag-darœana) in the audience, for
instance through the rhetorical provocation of vairâgya-shocks (aversion leading to
renunciation),56 how then does Jain philosophy account for the element of violence
which is necessarily implied in acts of persuasion? In other words, if social influence
can only be achieved through strategic acts of violence, how do ascetics conceive of
the moral paradox involved in the violent production of non-violent attitudes?
— III —
For the analysis of the role of violence in rhetoric, or speech acts in general, a
standard of non-violent speech is required. Such a standard is offered in the Jain
scriptures. It will be discussed in Chapters V–VII. Comparable paradigms in con-
temporary Western philosophy are the conversational maxims of GRICE (1975) and
the universal pragmatic validity claims of HABERMAS (1980), both echoing Kant
rather than Carnap. A comparison with the Jain model promises to elicit key differ-
ences and highlight the specific nature of the principles of Jain discourse. In the
following discussion of the two models, I adopt HABERMAS’ (1980–1981: 440 ff.) /
                                             
53 LUHMANN (1982) and ALEXY (1996: 326 ff.).
54 See HABERMAS (1981: 270 ff., 414–18/1984 II: 181 ff., 280) on trust (based on possession of
valid knowledge and autonomy), and punishment and reward (based on property and means of in-
ducement and deterrence) as distinct—rational and empirical—sources of generalised acceptability.
55 SONTHEIMER’s (1991: 201) observation that codified ‘Hinduism had [has] only persuasive
power and was no law in the western sense’ equally applies to doctrinal Jainism.
56 BRUHN (1983: 32).
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(1984–1987 I: 328 ff.) suggestion to treat empirical pragmatic models as if they
were conscious operationalisations of universal pragmatics.57 The latter claims to be
a more general than the former since it does not only theorise principles of linguistic
exchange but also the morally binding force of rational argument and the socially
constitutive function of rationally constituted consensus. Contrasting claims to uni-
versality of the models of Habermas and the Jains, the former would claim (on de-
batable grounds), can be tested through comparative analysis.
In his Theory of Communicative Action, HABERMAS (1980: 384–88) / (1984–1987
I: 284–89) distinguishes between ‘communicative’ and ‘strategic’ types of linguisti-
cally mediated interaction to be able to discriminate between consensus-oriented
and manipulative forms of language usage. The key variable in his model is the
dominant social orientation informing language usage.58 Communicative action is
orientated towards consensus through rational argumentation, understanding and
insight, whereas strategic action (success-oriented action) is orientated towards
power and the pursuit of self interest through the manipulative use of speech.59 De-
spite the ambiguity of his key terms Verständigung (‘communicative understand-
ing’) and Einsicht (‘insight’),60 Habermas differentiates clearly between linguistic
and normative aspects of communicative action, that is, the understanding of the
meaning of a speech act and the acceptance of implicit validity claims. In contrast to
speech act theoreticians such as Austin, Grice, and others, Habermas does not
privilege the intention of the speaker as determinative of the social meaning of a
                                             
57 This approach goes back to Pierce, Royce and Mead, and was revived by Apel.
58 HABERMAS (1980: 442 n. 84) / (1984–1987 I: 444 f. n. 84). This formulation is still
intentionalist. The artificial segregation of perlocutions from the other components has been criti-
cised, as well as Habermas’ original equation of perlocutions with latent strategic action, his ex-
clusive attribution of teleological goal-oriented behaviour to strategic action, and the logocentric
ideal type of rationality. In response to criticism, HABERMAS (1986: 401 n. 60) later accepted the
‘basic teleological structure of all actions’ and proposed a combination of ‘actor-orientation’
(success vs. understanding) and ‘types of coordination of action plans’ (influence vs. agreement)
as a replacement. This formula was necessary to save his definition of ‘proper illocutions’ being
dependent not only on subjective conditions of satisfaction of the meaning of a speech act, but
also on intersubjective conditions (reasons for the acceptance of validity claims). In reality, strate-
gic action always appears to be intermingled with communicative action (HABERMAS (1986: 443)),
and perlocutionary effects are not only consequences of strategic action but also of communicative
action. Cf. HABERMAS (1980: 397) / (1984–1987 I: 295 f.) versus SEARLE (1993: 98 f.).
59 Most critics of Habermas rejected his strict distinction between poesis and praxis.
60 HABERMAS (1996: 339): ‘“Insight” signifies that a decision can be justified on the basis of
“epistemic” reasons’, that is, when practical reflection ‘extends beyond the subjective world to
which the actor has privileged access [“pragmatic” reasons] to the [implicitly known] contents of
an intersubjectively shared social world.’
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speech act, which he sees as negotiable, but focuses on the (contextually varying)
conditions of acceptability, that is, the implicit or explicit reasons on which the va-
lidity claims of a speech act are based, which can be accepted or rejected in processes
of intersubjective communication. The question is: What does it mean to understand a
speech act? Not: What does it mean to understand an intention? Habermas expands
AUSTIN’s (1962) distinction between ‘locutionary’, ‘illocutionary’ and ‘perlocution-
ary’ speech acts, which he re-labels, partly following SEARLE’s (1979: 12–20) termi-
nology, as ‘constatives’, ‘regulatives’ and ‘expressives’ in analogy to his three univer-
sal validity claims ‘truth’, ‘rightness’ and ‘truthfulness’, by focusing not so much on
speech acts themselves but on the social function of speech for the co-ordination of
action. The advantage of Habermas’ distinction between ‘speech acts’ and ‘linguisti-
cally mediated interaction’, prefigured in the work of sociolinguists such as GUMPERZ
(1964), (1972) and HYMES (1972b),61 is that it allows to analyse the contextual moral
and legal implications of language usage, i.e. the socially binding force of the validity
claims implied in illocutionary speech acts, which cannot be reduced to the ‘power of
words’ themselves nor to the underlying intention of the speaker.
‘Communicative action’ is not the same as ‘communication’. It refers to a situa-
tion where the intersubjective co-ordination of action-plans is reached by way of
rational agreement, that is, where an explicit consensus is constitutive for social
integration (HABERMAS (1998: 396–98)). ‘Strategic action’ (success− / influence-
oriented action), on the other hand, refers to a situation of exploitation, because it is
not able to generate new normative consensus through rationally motivated accep-
tance of reasons itself, but only through the force of pre-existing norms and institu-
tional or other configurations, which are external to the communicative process.62
                                             
61 GUMPERZ (1972: 381): ‘Verbal interaction is a social process in which utterances are se-
lected in accordance with socially recognized norms and expectations. It follows that linguistic
phenomena are analyzable both within the context of language itself and within the broader con-
text of social behavior.’
62 HABERMAS (1984: 313–5) distinguishes between cognitive and expressive intentions; argu-
ing that the illocutionary goal of speech acts, that is, consensus, can be reached either through the
intersubjective recognition of power claims (perlocutionary effects) or of validity claims
(illocutionary effects) (HABERMAS (1980: 385 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 286 ff.), (1981: 107 ff.) / (1984–
1987 II: 69 ff.)). Cf. his comparison between imperatives (directives), e.g. commands, and
regulatives (commissives), e.g. promises (HABERMAS (1980: 427 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 319 ff.)):
both commissives, and directives (and declaratives) imply normative conditions by referring to
situations that OUGHT to be, whereas assertives merely represent situations as they ARE.
Acts of social self-commitment to do something in the future or to give reasons for a validity
claim, by way of promises, oaths and contracts, and acts aiming at committing others through
directives (commands, injunctions), by instrumentalising existing obligations, are both focal ele-
ments of Jain discourse. The difference between the models of Habermas and the Jains is that the
former rely on universal moral justifications, whereas the latter require only socially valid norms
POWER AND INSIGHT IN JAIN DISCOURSE 107
                                                                                                                                        
Hence, by defining communicative action as the original mode of language usage,
directly oriented towards normative agreement, Habermas is able to criticise strate-
gic action as a success orientated mode of language usage, which is parasitic on the
former, because it is only indirectly orientated towards communicative understand-
ing. The whole purpose of Habermas’ theory lies in the analysis of the conditions of
the possibility of a consensual constitution of social order, without grounding the
emancipatory potential of discourse either in metaphysical postulates or in institu-
tional configurations of power as suggested by FOUCAULT (1981), BOURDIEU
(1991a), (1991b), or BLOCH (1975). The critical emancipatory interest which in-
forms the theory of communicative action is directed against (illegitimate) power
and in favour of consensual (and non-violent) forms of conflict resolution and in-
stitution building. HABERMAS (1998: 449) argues that the emancipatory potential of
language is not a metaphysical ideal, but manifest in the ‘unconcealed idealising
surpluses of an innerworldly transcendence’ in form of the universal validity claims
implicitly presupposed in all processes of communication, as the vanishing points
(Fluchtpunkte) of infinite processes of open intersubjective interpretation.63
How can we explain the power of non-institutionally bound illocutionary acts to
produce feelings of normative obligation? What motivates a listener freely to submit
him / herself to normative constraints if not self-interest or external force? At first sight,
HABERMAS’ (1980) argument that illocutionary binding effects are the product of
processes of rational understanding, i.e. of insight into the validity of reasons (e.g.
common values and convictions), seems to rely on the pre-existence of an implicit
normative consensus and of the rhetorical ability of the speaker (HABERMAS (1980:
386)). However, like other proponents of formal pragmatics (Apel, Allwood, Grice),64
Habermas attempts to circumvent both normative reductionism and subjectivism, by
not focusing on the local ‘ethical’ context of specific empirical cases, but on the gen-
eral ‘moral’ presuppositions of communication, that is, the universal normative condi-
tions of intersubjective recognition which must be fulfilled for a speech act to be ac-
cepted. He states that ‘we understand a speech act, if we know, what makes him ac-
ceptable’ (HABERMAS (1980: 400)). Crucially, he assumes that every linguistically
mediated interaction presupposes a set of idealisations on the side of the interlocutors
                                                                                                               
as conditions for their acceptability. Expressives are a different case altogether. They are not
predicated on truth claims nor on claims of rightness, and therefore not redeemable by argument.
Legitimacy is entirely based on sincerity and redeemable by practice only (HABERMAS (1981: 97–
100) / (1984–1987 II: 62–4). For differing views on the structure and interrelationship of the vari-
ous components see APEL (1993: 45–9), HABERMAS (1993), and SEARLE (1989), (1993).
63 Remarks on religious communication can be found in HABERMAS (1988: 23, 34, 60, 185),
and HABERMAS (2005). See also ARENS (1991: 174–6).
64 On the history of formal pragmatics see APEL (1993: 43) and HABERMAS (1993: 21–5).
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themselves. He explicates these implicit basic conditions of communicative action in
terms of a model of three universal pragmatic65 validity claims underlying all gram-
matically comprehensible utterances: (1) (propositional) truth, (2) (normative) right-
ness, and (3) (expressive) sincerity.66 Habermas argues that the binding power of rea-
                                             
65 Cf. HABERMAS (1984: 354 f., 440). With some exceptions (HABERMAS (1980: 418 f.) /
(1984–1987 I: 312 f.)) his validity claims correspond closely to Grice’s cooperative principle and
conversational maxims (see infra) (and more generally to Searle’s conditions of success and non-
defective performance). However, one of the great misconceptions of speech act theory is the
assumption that almost all social actions are communicative actions, and that communication is
more or less identical with conversation. The cooperative principle of speech exchange should not
be mixed up with consent to social co-operation (HABERMAS (1980: 397) / (1984–1987 I: 295)).
Another mistake is to assume that only intentional communicative actions have communicative
effects. SEARLE (1993: 89) was the first to criticise Grice’s ‘meaning-nominalism’ with counter-
examples showing that even non-intentional statements can have an effect, which demonstrates
that conventional propositional content of words, i.e. representation, is more fundamental than
speaker intention, and that Grice, by concentrating exclusively on the transfer and decoding of
information, ultimately ‘confuses meaning with communication.’ In other words, understanding an
utterance cannot be regarded as a perlocutionary effect. Critics of Grice denounce the infinite
regress involved in the inference of speaker’s intentions, and the vagueness and arbitrariness
(incompleteness and incoherence) of the maxims. HABERMAS (1984: 333–48, 362), (1980: 371,
418) / (1984–1987 I: 274 f.) and APEL (1993: 32) criticise Grice’s (etc.) mentalist ‘intentional
semantics’ as treating understanding exclusively in terms of strategic action, á la Weber and eco-
nomic game theory, by reducing meaning to the perlocutionary effect of the intentions of an iso-
lated individual, not taking into account community context and conventional intersubjectivity and
understanding through consensual agreement by condemning the hearer to passivity.
From HABERMAS’ (1993: 18 f.) perspective, Searle offers an intermediary approach between intentional
semantics and universal pragmatics: ‘From my point of view, a speech act, which the speaker uses in order
to come to an agreement with the addressee about something, expresses simultaneously (a) a certain
speaker intention, (b) a certain state of affairs, and (c) an interpersonal relationship. According to the
original intentionalist view [Grice, P.F.], the whole communication process can be explained from the
perspective of the speaker and his intentions in such a way that (c) and (b) are derived from (a). …
Searle modifies his explanatory strategy to the effect that successful communication now depends on
the successful representation of states of affairs, namely that both (c) and (a) are derived from (b).’
66 Habermas’ validity claims are grounded in Popper’s ‘three world’ theory of subject, object,
and society. See ALBERT’s (1994: 240) critique of this ‘ontology’ from a ‘one world’ perspective.
Cf. Searle’s five ‘conditions of successful speech’ (essential condition, preparatory condition,
propositional content, sincerity), three of which correspond to Habermas’ validity claims (truth =
essential condition, rightness = preparatory condition, sincerity = sincerity), whereas one
(propositional content) is unique to Searle. On the basis of the idealised ‘standard form’ of rational
communicative action, HABERMAS (1980) generates a complex system of analytical categories, by
correlating the validity claims and the two dominant social orientations, consensus and power,
with four ‘basic’ types of speech acts (imperatives, constatives, regulatives, expressives). The aim
is to discriminate between consensual and latent strategic forms of language usage. The resulting
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sons, that is, of rationally motivated validity claims whose acceptance implies weak
normative obligations,67 is not rooted in content but in procedural form, i.e. in the
guarantee of the speaker, if necessary, to justify his / her claims in terms of these three
types of validity claims and to give reasons which can be criticised and rejected (only)
with better reasons (HABERMAS (1980: 406)).68 Precondition is the principal autonomy
of the interlocutors, their ability to say ‘no’. Only under this provision does acceptance
imply voluntary agreement. For Habermas, who follows Kant and Durkheim here, the
socially constitutive power of discourse is predicated on the independence of interde-
pendent interlocutors, who co-operate on the basis of negotiated agreement. This, crit-
ics object, is the logic of the modern market based on functional division of labour.69
HABERMAS (1981: 62 f.) / (1984–1987 II: 38 f.), (1991: 25, 44) acknowledges, the
readiness to accept the binding power of agreed normative claims, instead of tradi-
tional authority, is itself a product of processes of social conditioning and presupposes
specific forms of life and socialisation. The development of moral consciousness is
predicated on the internalisation of the perspective of the generalised other or threat-
ening or factually exercised sanctions. Moreover, the social manifestation of the ideal-
typical ‘standard form’ of rational argumentation presupposes situations or institutions
where unconstrained rational argumentation between equals plays a constitutive role
for society, such as the public sphere, the parliament, the courts of justice, or the uni-
versity.70 According to Habermas, modern social milieus such as these are the product
of evolutionary processes of social differentiation generating an increase in both inter-
                                                                                                               
‘pure types of linguistically mediated interaction’ are summarised in Figure 16 of Theory of Com-
municative Action (HABERMAS (1980: 439) / (1984–1987 I: 329).
67 They concern the present discourse of norm legitimation, not norm application. In updated ver-
sions of his theory HABERMAS (1991: 131–42) distinguishes two steps of argumentation: (1) related to
moral judgement (legitimation) and (2) to moral action (application); i.e. Begründungsdiskurs and
Anwendungsdiskurs.
68 ‘The binding effect of illocutionary forces comes about, ironically, through the fact that par-
ticipants can say ‘no’ to speech-act offers. … A hearer can be “bound” by speech-act offers be-
cause he is not permitted arbitrarily to refuse them but only to say “no” to them, that is, to reject
them for reasons’ (HABERMAS (1981: 114) / (1984–1987 II: 73 f.). GADAMER (1993) objected that
co-operation in communication does not automatically imply submission to the power of the better
argument, at least not without considering the relevance of reasons. FOUCAULT (1981), BLOCH
(1975: 21) and BOURDIEU (1991a: 107) similarly reject the idealisations of speech act theory in
terms of institutional theories of discursive or symbolic power: ‘The power of words is nothing
other than the delegated power of the spokesperson’ (BOURDIEU (1991a: 107)). For HABERMAS
(1980: 418) / (1984–1987 I: 311 f.), (1985) these arguments apply only to empirical pragmatics.
69 For instance R. Bubner, and A. Wellmer. See HABERMAS (1991: 32, 86 f., 166 f., 15).
70 On the difference between informal and institutionalised ‘ideal speech situations’ see
HABERMAS (1991: 132).
110 PETER FLÜGEL
                                                                                                                                        
dependence and individual autonomy and responsibility through a progressive univer-
salisation of law and acquisition of moral competence. He argues that in cases where
communicative action is consciously used for the production of normative consensus
and social co-operation, discourse takes over the social function of ritual, and becomes
a second order ritual (HABERMAS (1981: 86)).71 With reference to the apparently in-
creasing importance of explicit negotiation in processes of social self-identification,
Habermas defines this process of rationalisation as the ‘linguistification (Versprach-
lichung) of the sacred’, and argues that it goes hand in hand with the progressive ‘tech-
nicisation’ or ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ by systemic processes.
How to analyse Jain discourse from the point of view of the theory of communi-
cative action? Generally, religious discourse is depicted by HABERMAS (1980–1981)
as a form of communication based on structures of traditional authority in which
status rather than argumentation functions as a medium of generalised acceptabil-
ity.72 The role of power and insight in Jain discourse could be analysed in these
terms. But one has to be aware of the fact that the ‘rational reconstruction’ of the
universal normative presuppositions of linguistic exchange projects its own ideali-
sations into human reality. The theory of communicative action itself contains a
religious element in its notion of the ‘unconscious innerworldly transcendence’ that
is implicitly presupposed in communicative action. A deeper analysis of the differ-
ences between the theory of communicative action and the Jain doctrine of speech
therefore requires a comparison between the normative ideals underlying Habermas’
theories of communicative action and discourse ethics73 with those of Jain discourse
ethics (to my knowledge there are no Jain attempts to rationally reconstruct implicit
rules), supplemented by comparative analyses of rules and discourses of norm ap-
plication in typical speech situations (See infra section V–VI).
The daily sermon (pravacana) of Jain ascetics is a good example for a transitional
ritual, where discourse serves both as an instrument for the reproduction of the tra-
ditional authority of the saógha, and for the eventual production of new normative
consensus via the evocation of religious insight amongst yet unconverted listeners. A
                                             
71 Cf. WEBER (1978) on ‘ethicisation’, and FOUCAULT (1981: 62 f.) and LUHMANN (1982:
144 f.) on the progressive substitution of ritual through discourse. An evolutionary theory of re-
ligious development as increasing manifestation of communicative competence has been proposed
by DÖBERT (1973: 152). For a critique see PEUKERT (1992: 231 f.).
72 HABERMAS (2005) pointed out that within the public sphere religious arguments function in
same way as other arguments, as reasons to be accepted or rejected.
73 HABERMAS (1983: 103, cf. 76) / (1990: 93, cf. 66) defines the basic principle of discourse
ethics (D), the reflective form of communicative action, as follows: ‘Only those norms can claim
to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as partici-
pants in a practical discourse.’
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Jain discourse of conversion presupposes mutual independence of interlocutors and
creates new consensus via the unconstrained acceptance of validity claims. The main
difference compared with the ideal situation of communicative action is the institu-
tionalised one-sidedness of a monological discourse and its coded semantic form
which does not allow for a negotiated modification of the religious dogma itself, at
least not in the short run. Because insight and power go hand in hand in tradition-
based religion, conversion discourses always take the form of strategic action, pro-
ducing insight (psychological and verbal acceptance of the dogma) as a perlocutionary
effect predicated on the intentional deconstruction of the pre-existing conventional
normative consensus.74 In this case, latent strategic action serves as the vehicle for
both communicative action or even mythopoetic world disclosure, and for the unques-
tioned reproduction of the hierarchy of power. In practice, the two fundamental ways
of interpretation are irreducible to each other. But they can be analytically differenti-
ated. In the following, I analyse the plurivocality of Jain discourse primarily in terms of
its social implications—as a form of latent strategic action—though multiple ambigui-
ties can be distinguished in every speech act in a conventional speech situation.
It is an open question to what extent the theory of communicative action falls un-
der this verdict as well.75 HABERMAS (1986: 383), who after all regards communi-
cative action as the original or constitutive mode of language usage, insists on the
empirical inevitability of indirect violence and power in the initial stages of the
historical evolution of abstract norms. He distinguishes two developmental phases
of communicative co-operation and social integration: Communicative action, he
argues, is originally embedded in contexts of latent strategic action, because, ini-
tially, situation definitions do not sufficiently overlap. The participants therefore
have to use indirect communication ‘following the model of intentional semantic
approaches (Grice)’, in order to avoid a breakdown of co-operation. In the opening
phases of all processes of co-operation indirect communication plays an important
role for the creation of overlapping definitions of the situation, as an alternative of
meta-communication: the speaker makes the hearer understand something qua
perlocutionary effects, i.e. latent strategic speech acts, whose contextual implica-
tions are not directly expressed, and need to be inferred by the hearer.76 However,
                                             
74 This creates paradoxical consequences once communicative action as a value becomes itself
topical.
75 SEARLE (1993: 99).
76 On perlocutionary effects and latent strategic speech acts see HABERMAS (1980: 393–7) /
(1984–1987 I: 292–5).
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these strategic sequences are embedded within the general context of communica-
tively oriented speech.77
For HABERMAS (1980: 402–8) / (1984–1987 I: 298–304), (1981: 57–63) / (1984–
1987 II: 34–9), as for SEARLE (1993: 91, 99), normative authority is originally em-
bedded within imperative authority, and takes the form of context-specific intentions
and speech acts of particular individuals. This fits the case of the Jain sermon. How-
ever, Habermas’ evolutionary theory of the genesis of norms is highly speculative and
certainly the weakest part of his conceptual system. Moreover, he has not elaborated
his theory of latent strategic language usage. But he indicates the systematic role of
latent strategic action within a typology of social actions,78 and shows how shared
convictions may serve as sources of legitimate power. Power enters unnoticeable into
the pores of everyday-life communication via two forms of pseudo-communication
concealing strategic intent under the facade of consensual action: (a) conscious de-
ception or manipulation, and (b) systematically distorted communication (HABERMAS
(1984: 548)).79 In cases of manipulation, at least one actor intentionally deceives oth-
ers by hiding the fact that s/he does not comply with the three universal pragmatic
validity claims. In cases of systematically distorted communication at least one of the
participants deceives him / herself about the fact that s/he acts strategically, while
maintaining the external appearance of communicative action (HABERMAS (1984:
461)). In both cases a deviation from universal pragmatic presuppositions takes place,
through the splitting up or doubling of communication. In the first case, a competent
speaker generates intentionally multivocal expressions for social purposes. In the sec-
ond case, the internal organisation of speech is distorted by way of a privatised use of
language. In psychoanalysis this is regarded as a process of de-symbolisation. Ac-
cording to Habermas it is symptomatic for a loss of interactional competence (which
may or may not be culturally normalised) (HABERMAS (1984: 251–4)). He argues that
distorted forms of communication often occur in situations of social dependency,
where they serve as unconscious defence mechanisms concealing conflict smouldering
beneath surface consensus (HABERMAS (1984: 232, 264–9)).80 A manipulative, inten-
tionally symbolic usage of language, on the other hand, creating conflict artificially for
the sake of influence, is to be expected in situations of social dominance, and requires
cognitive and communicative competencies. We will see that ambiguous language can
be used for religious purposes as well.
                                             
77 HABERMAS (1980: 444) / (1984–1987 I: 331).
78 HABERMAS (1980: 446) / (1984–1987 I: 333).
79 For Durkheimian criticisms of psychological theories of ‘rationalisation’ see TURNER (1986:
36, 56).
80 Cf. JAIN (1929: 72), GOONASEKERE (1986).
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It could be asked whether the structural multivocality generated by Jain discourse,
superposed on varying contexts, can from different viewpoints be interpreted either
as a form of latent strategic action or of systematically distorted communication.
The perceived ambiguity of certain terms or utterances in Jain discourse is a func-
tion of processes of religious interpretation. Depending on circumstances, they may
involve forms of symbolisation as well as the expression of latent structural con-
flicts, resulting for instance from the typical position of many Jains as subaltern
elites within the hierarchical structure of Indian society. On the one hand, Jain as-
cetics use the strategy of intentional re-interpretation of dominant forms of dis-
course and popular rites, thus creating a private language for competent members of
their religious community. On the other hand, the propagation of Jainism through
proselytising renouncers eventually triggers effects of moral insight amongst some
listeners, by providing a language for example for the explanation and expression of
diffuse feelings or implicit conflicts, which may explain part of its appeal. It is im-
portant to note that the Jain tradition itself provides a yardstick for the critique of
self-deceptions and symptoms of alienated modes of life with its ideal of non-violence.
The authenticity associated with such a life-project could be understood as a higher-
level validity claim, in analogy to the claim to truthfulness in expressive speech acts.81
However, better analytical categories are required to investigate the empirical diversity
of forms of concealed strategic action. As Habermas indicates, some of them are pro-
vided by the intentional semantic approaches of Grice and Searle.
— IV —
One of the most interesting contributions to the theory of linguistic communication
and rhetoric is GRICE’s (1975) analysis of the communicative function of
‘conversational implicature’. In his article Logic and Conversation, Grice provides a
pragmatic description of how multiple meanings are purposefully generated. He in-
vestigates what he calls ‘implicature’, that is, instances in which ‘a speaker deliber-
ately says something which is not, in fact, what he means’ (GRICE (1975: 43 f.)).
Grice’s analysis is based on the fundamental pragmatic postulate that there is a as-
sumption by all conversationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk—a suppo-
sition, which can be formally stated in terms of a set of counterfactual principles and
maxims concerning the efficient and univocal transmission of information, given that
both parties co-operate and are interested to continue the conversation. Against this
assumption polite, multivocal ways of speaking appear as deviations, requiring ra-
                                             
81 HABERMAS (1996: 341).
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tional explanation on the part of the recipient, who finds in considerations of politeness
reasons for the speaker’s apparent irrationality or inefficiency. Given the speaker’s
rationality of expression, and the hearer’s willingness to co-operate, unclear, ambigu-
ous language forces the hearer to work out the implied suppositions of a multivocal
statement. The latter must ask her / himself why a speaker, who can express her / him-
self unambiguously, has chosen not to say directly what s/he means, but rather speaks
in a veiled language. In such cases, Grice argues, the hearer (interpreter) will assume
that the speaker has deliberately ‘flouted’ the mutually presupposed conversational
principles to ‘force an implicature’ onto the hearer, who then has to infer what the
speaker intended without saying so openly. Particularly interesting are cases in which
someone deliberately violates a maxim, not to mislead, but to influence others by get-
ting another message across. Strategically constructed ‘deviations’ such as these,
which are ‘parasitic’ to direct communication, are particularly successful in achieving
social influence, because they induce the necessary element of conflict in a manifestly
non-violent form, not breaching social norms openly but only indirectly via implicit
‘exploitation’ or ‘flouting’ of presupposed conversational principles. It is precisely this
‘non-violent’ form of social influence which I regard as central to Jain rhetoric.
The construction of implicatures is one of the foremost rhetorical and poetical de-
vices. Yet, only under certain contextual conditions will a conversational act of flout-
ing lead to social consequences. Without the hearer’s willingness and ability to co-
operate, and to invest the effort to work out or to grasp intuitively the implications of
an ambiguous statement, rhetorical communication with the help of implicature would
not be effective. The uses of implicatures presupposes the invocation of contextual
knowledge or common experiential ground on the part of the hearer, who is forced to
generate a meaningful interpretation in response to the speaker’s deliberate violation
of the principles of conversation, which implicitly forces on the hearer a choice be-
tween deference to the veiled imperative or discontinuation of the communication.
The efficacy of this kind of indirect communication is ultimately based on ego’s
exploitation of alter’s willingness to adhere to the general cooperative principle of
language exchange under given normative conditions. Accordingly, the principal
means of physically ‘non-violent’ resistance is non-cooperation.82
Grice’s theory of language usage is, in itself, of limited use in anthropological re-
search. Theories of information processing cannot sufficiently account for the em-
pirical role of conventional meaning and contextual knowledge, as HYMES (1972a),
(1972b) convincingly argued.83 BROWN’–LEVINSON’s (1978) theory of politeness,
                                             
82 SHARP (1960), (1973).
83 In his summary critique of Grice’s intentionalist semantics, DAVIS (1998: 174) notes that
‘common interests sustaining indirect speech act conventions are much deeper than mere polite-
ness.’ However, ‘A common interest need not be universally shared to sustain a common practice.’
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which builds upon Grice’s principles, therefore links the theory of conversational
implicature with Goffman’s theory of social self-identity or ‘face’ (self-esteem or
public self-image). It argues that talk exchange can be related to contextual, that is,
institutional, variables by considering the relative social position of speaker and
hearer, which decisively influences choices of politeness strategy. ‘Face’ is relation-
ally defined, ‘that is, normally everyone’s face depends on everyone else’s being
maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and
in defending their own to threaten others’ faces, it is in general in every participant’s
best interest to maintain each other’s face’ (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 66)). Two
kinds of ‘face wants’ are distinguished: ‘negative face wants’ (to be unimpeded by
others)—often achieved by strategies of non-interaction (which Marriott regards as
typical for Jains, and vaiœyas in general)—and ‘positive face wants’ (to be desirable
to others) (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 66)). ‘Face threatening acts’ (FTA’s) are illo-
cutionary acts which might cause a loss of face by way of orders, requests, threats,
offers, suggestions etc. They run contrary to particular face wants, and motivate
certain strategies of politeness, employed to minimise the threat, and to maintain
face in a particular situation (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 70–3)).
BROWN and LEVINSON distinguish four main strategies of politeness: (a) ‘bald on
record’ (being as clear as possible), (b) ‘positive politeness’ (the expression of soli-
darity), (c) ‘negative politeness’ (the expression of restraint), and (d) ‘off record’ (the
avoidance of unequivocal impositions) (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 73–5)).84 Any of
the four strategies may satisfy the opponent’s face wants to avoid conflict and to
minimise threat. Yet, politeness is also used in order to stimulate conflict in a calcu-
lated way. Positive politeness and negative politeness—the dominant Jain strategy— I
                                                                                                               
‘Speaker meaning’ and the ‘actual linguistic conventions of language communities’ should be stud-
ied: ‘Rather than trying to deduce arbitrary practices from some general psychosocial principles, we
must look at the social functions that particular conventions serve.’—‘In sum, Gricean theory fails
because speaker implicature is a matter of intention, sentence implicature is a matter of convention,
and neither is calculable from or generated by psychosocial principles. Conversational rules instead
codify social goals motivating intentions and sustaining conventions’ (DAVIS (1998: 190)).
84 Examples for positive politeness are familiar and joking behaviour. Negative politeness is
mainly concerned with self-determination. It is at the heart of respect behaviour and corresponds
to Durkheim’s ‘negative rites’, that is, rituals of avoidance, which are typical for Jains. Character-
istic examples of negative politeness are: conventional indirectness, question / hedge, be pessimis-
tic (don’t coerce, don’t assume other’s willingness to co-operate), minimise imposition, give def-
erence, apologise (beg forgiveness), impersonalise, state FTA as a general rule, nominalise, go on
record as incurring a debt, or as not indebting the hearer (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 134–216)).
There are certain similarities between these strategies and Searle’s and Habermas’ illocutionary
components, although Brown and Levinson’s categories reflect the inconsistency of Sahlins’ well
known scheme of reciprocities, which was obviously influential.
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would argue, are primarily strategies of conflict avoidance. The most interesting strat-
egy, also often used in Jain discourse, is to go off-record, that is, to construct inten-
tionally multivocal statements: ‘A communicative act is done off record if it is done in
such a way that it is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to
the act. In other words, the actor leaves himself an “out” by providing himself with a
number of defensible interpretations; he cannot be held to have committed himself to
just one particular interpretation of this act. Thus if a speaker wants to do a FTA, but
wants to avoid the responsibility for doing it, he can do it off record and leave it open
to the addressee to decide how to interpret it’ (BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 216)). The
purpose of off-record strategies is to make the addressee responsible for decoding the
intentions. An FTA, like any word, rule or symbolic act,85 gains its meaning through
context and becomes threatening only through its realisation via ‘wrong or correct’
interpretation.86 The near universal usefulness of off-record strategies for purposes of
persuasion and social influence is aptly expressed by STRECKER (1988: 114): ‘To go
off-record is one of the most pervasive strategies in social interaction whenever actors
want to avoid harsh confrontation and the possibility of conflict, and when they want
to persuade others, to influence them so that they do what they cannot be openly co-
erced to do. All this is done by means of indirect message construction.’ Important for
my argument is that politeness and symbolisation is used to avoid open conflict. A
great deal of politeness and symbolisation is therefore to be expected from the Jains.
BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 254–6) conclude their discussion of politeness phe-
nomena with a typology of characteristic patterns of strategy distribution in speaker /
hearer relationships regarding the contextual variables of power (P) and social dis-
tance (D) (which could be associated with ‘active’ directive and ‘passive’
commissive orientations respectively). In this way, they try to tie Grice’s concept of
conversational implicature into a context-sensitive social theory of linguistically
mediated interaction.87 They predict that in a situation where one of the interlocutors
has high social power over another, and where social distance is low, the speaker
with high social power will predominately use on-record strategies, and the speaker
with low social power will use negative politeness and off-record strategies.
STRECKER (1988: 165 f.), however, notes that individuals in an inferior position are
generally not allowed to force an implicature upon the socially powerful (only vice
versa). He suggests that the dominant pattern of strategy distribution in asymmetri-
                                             
85 Cf. CASSIRER (1923–1929).
86 Cf. BROWN–LEVINSON’s (1978: 219) depiction of off-record strategies as violations of the
Gricean maxims.
87 Cf. BROWN–LEVINSON’s (1978: 255) chart of dyadic strategy types.
POWER AND INSIGHT IN JAIN DISCOURSE 117
                                                                                                                                        
cal social contexts is the combination of off-record strategies on the part of supe-
riors and on-record strategies and negative politeness on the part of inferiors.
The still unresolved discrepancy between Brown and Levinson’s and Strecker’s
interpretation provokes the question whether it makes sense at all to link types of
socially-purposeful language usage to certain ‘social positions’, given the wide
range of contextually acceptable strategy choices. Off-record strategies, in fact, can
be used for many purposes: for purely aesthetic reasons, for the negotiation of un-
clear social relationships, for the veiling of heavy FTA’s or forms of control, or for
the stabilisation of asymmetrical social relationships. More importantly, a statement
in itself does not force a reader / listener to adopt a particular type of interpretation
(and no particular action follows from it in any structured way). Everything, in fact,
depends on the wider social context, particularly on the informal or institutionalised
norms and social conventions of a given field of discourse, which sanction the way
in which language is used and which interpretations are regarded as feasible. As
Habermas shows, it is only in situations where social pressures and normative sanc-
tions are attached to language usage, that normative claims can be enforced through
extra-linguistic sanctions. It is impossible to force anybody to comply with prag-
matic conditions for the fulfilment of an implication, in the Gricean sense, without
implicitly presupposing an institutional context and referring to a set of known so-
cial sanctions attached to the specific norms of a particular discursive field. 88
This point has evaded most linguistic theories of politeness, because—as Habermas
points out—they do not clearly distinguish between co-operation in conversation and
the role of speech acts for social co-operation. Therefore they cannot explain, for in-
stance, how, in certain situations, superiors may rely on contextual pressures to force
inferiors to decode their veiled speech and to fulfil the indirectly communicated de-
mands. It is not the power of the words themselves nor the speaker’s intentions which
inform the ‘calling in’ of conversational implicature, but the role of the presupposed
norms and sanctions which assure the perpetuation of social systems which, for in-
stance, force inferiors to infer unequivocally the indexical meaning of intentionally
ambiguous statements of their superiors, and to practically fulfil their unspoken com-
mands without questioning the normative basis of their social co-operation.89 Because
                                             
88 Strategies can be conventionalised and ossified into norms of dominance, and compliance
can be legitimately enforced. See HABERMAS (1984: 253).
89 In the technical linguistic and philosophical literature the term ‘implication’ is used in different
ways and still awaits clarification as BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 216 f.) note. For recent work see
HORN (1973), (1985), (2001), DAVIS (1998), LEVINSON (2000), HORN–WARD (2004), ATLAS (2005).
In the following I will call the process of fulfilling accepted validity conditions the ‘social implica-
tion’ of a speech act, in contrast to the ‘logical’ or semantical implication of a communicative act, and
to its psychological ‘conditions of satisfaction’. The social implications of a speech act are the possi-
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they accept the unnecessary constraints of Grice’s theory of information processing,
even Brown and Levinson and Strecker cannot avoid reductionist interpretations of
language usage in terms of pre-existing ‘social positions’ and differential ‘power’.
Habermas’ distinction between communicative and success orientated language usage,
however, seems to open a path for a non-reductionist understanding, for instance, of
the social function of positive politeness, which, in the words of Brown and Levinson,
can only ‘express’ but not ‘generate’ solidarity. Reductionism can only be avoided if
not merely the reflexive but also the constitutive function of discourse for the con-
struction of social identities is considered. From this perspective, strategies of negative
politeness and off-record appear to have greater power than positive politeness or on-
record strategies, particularly in social situations where coercion cannot succeed and
where co-operation is primarily engendered through indirect communication.
— V —
Any empirical analysis of conversational implicatures requires a careful descrip-
tion of the discursive field and conventional ways of speaking in different ‘speech
situations’ which form part of the ‘communicative competence’ (HYMES (1972b))90
and ‘repertoire’ of the members of a particular ‘speech community’ (GUMPERZ
(1964), (1972)).91 From an observer’s point of view, there are four formal contexts,
                                                                                                               
ble actions which may follow from it, if its validity claims are explicated through context-sensitive
processes of interpretation of indexical meaning, and accepted. Cf. WEBER (1988: 95, 125) on the
social function of ‘noetic’ interpretations of the social motives of ambiguous commands (in contrast
to the objective understanding of the meaning of a statement) either (a) in terms of / for practical
purposes, or (b) in terms of value-relations and for purposes of scientific understanding.
90 See GUMPERZ’s (1995: 209) definition: ‘Communicative competence can be defined in in-
teractional terms as “the knowledge of linguistic and related communicative conventions that
speakers must have to create and sustain conversational cooperation”, and thus involves both
grammar and contextualization.’
91 GUMPERZ (1964: 137) defined ‘speech community’ first as ‘any human aggregate characterized
by regular and frequent interaction over a significant span of time and set off from other such aggre-
gates by differences in the frequency of interaction.’ Later he added the criterion of compartmentalisation
(GUMPERZ (1972: 231)) and emphasised the role of social norms for the definition of a speech community:
‘any human aggregate characterized by regular and frequent interaction by means of a shared body of
verbal signs and set off from similar aggregates by significant differences in language usage. … Regardless
of the linguistic differences among them, the speech varieties employed within a speech community form
a system because they are related to a shared set of social norms’ (GUMPERZ (1972: 219 f.). See also
GUMPERZ–HYMES (1986) and HABERMAS (1980: 382 f.) / (1984–1987 I: 283). HYMES (1972b: 55) tries
to ‘bypass’ the difficulties of defining ‘community’ by stating: ‘The essential thing is that the object of
description be an integral social unit.’ The problem of essentialism does not pose itself at all in the more
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or ‘speech situations’92 and associated ‘speech events’ and ‘genres’, which are rele-
vant in the case of Jain discourse: (a) the religious debate (vivâda93 or prayoga),94
for instance at a royal court or modern court of law, (b) the public sermon
(pravacana),95 (c) the interaction between ascetics and non-ascetics in informal
settings (bhâšâ), and (d) the interaction between ascetics (vinaya).96 Each of these
settings involves a different set of social and stylistic conventions, norms and ex-
pectations.97 The agonistic debate at a royal court or a court of law for instance is a
highly pragmatic affair whose outcome might decide the fate of a particular monastic
group. Here, the contextual rules are defined by the king or the state, and classical
                                                                                                               
abstract theory of communicative action and Jain theories of speech (HYMES (1972b: 56), (1983:
167));—despite ALBERT’s (1994: 259 n. 41) objections. See footnotes 10, 18, 67, 142.
92 ‘Such situations may enter as contexts into the statement of rules of speaking as aspects of
setting (or of genre). In contrast to speech events, they are not in themselves governed by such
rules throughout’ (HYMES (1972b: 56)).
93 Þhâò 6.67 lists six empirical types of debate, and Þhâò 10.95 ten special faults of debate. On
Indian traditions of rational inquiry and theories of debate see, for instance, BRONKHORST (1999),
PRETS (2004).
94 CARRITHERS (1992: 112 f.) singles this setting out as particular significant; while emphasis-
ing the universal principle of free negotiation of situations (CARRITHERS (1992: 105 f.)).
95 Cf. WEBER (1978: 213 f.) on the role of politeness in the proselytisation of Jainism, and
WILLIAMS (1983: 45 f.) on the ‘spreaders of religious faith’ (prâbhâvaka).
96 Obviously, this is not an exhaustive taxonomy of all typical situations of language usage in
Jain culture. I do not discuss examples of formulaic language, such as mantra or japa, or political
oratory, which have already been exhaustively treated in the literature, but concentrate on those
types of ritualised interaction where religious discourse is the predominant form of language us-
age. There are many different classifications of speech situations in the Jain scriptures, which
deserve further investigation. For example, the four types of speech appropriate for an ascetic
performing bhikšu-pratimâs listed in Þhâò 237 (4.22): (1) requesting speech, used in the context
of the begging round (jâyaòî bhâsâ <yâcanî bhâšâ>), (2) questioning speech, used in the context
of the studying the meaning of the scriptures, or path-finding (pucchaòî bhâsâ <pracchanî
bhâšâ>), (3) speech used for seeking permission, for example to stay at a certain place
(aòuòòavaòî bhâsâ <anujñâpanî bhâšâ>), (4) speech used in the context of question-answer
dialogues (puþþha-vâgaraòî bhâsâ <praœna-vyâkaraòî bhâšâ>). Þhâò 4.274 specifies also four
situations in which it is permitted for monks and nuns to talk to each other.
97 HYMES (1972b: 55–66) proposed the following useful analytical categories: language field,
speech situation, speech event, speech act, speech styles, ways of speaking, components of speech
(message form, message content, setting [physical], scene [psychological / cultural], purpose
[outcome], purpose [goal], key, channel, forms of speech [varieties], norms of interaction [social
structure], norms of interpretation, genres). They roughly correspond to Malinowski’s earlier
distinction of dogmatic context, ritual context, and sociological context, as well as structure and
mode of recitation (HYMES (1972b: 64)). The interrelation of genres, events and acts and other
components in Jain settings is worth studying further (HYMES (1972b: 65)).
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philosophical and political rhetorical skills are in demand. The public sermon, on the
other hand, is comparatively informal, despite its conventional setting and asymmetri-
cal structure. It conveys religious content, inspiration and insight in an entertaining
manner, and is often followed by casual discussions at the end. The fundamental
norms of comportment are defined by the monastic community itself. The interactions
between ascetics and non-ascetics ideally take place within a hierarchical context of
worship of ascetic purity, and are sometimes highly ritualised.98 However, there are
also informal interactions, which require greater discriminatory skills on the part of the
ascetics for not transgressing the norms of non-violent interaction. The code of polite
interaction within the monastic order itself is derived from the principles of ascetic
seniority (dîkšâ-paryâya) and group leadership, and operates in a similar manner.
I have ordered these four ritualised types of discourse sequentially in terms of their
increasing coincidence with Jain ideals, starting with political rituals, then conversion
rituals, interaction rituals, and finally monastic rituals. Other forms of classification are
possible; for instance in terms of degrees of formality, social setting (assembly or indi-
vidual contact),99 or regarding the relative importance of discourse in ritual.100 How-
                                             
98 CARRITHERS (1992: 106) notes that in Jain (Indian) settings, the free negotiation of meaning
is constrained by socio-cultural norms: ‘There is a bias towards the authoritative pronouncement,
that is, towards a relationship of unquestioning domination of the instructor. … If we substract the
authoritarian flavour, the telling of Siddhasagar’s story [his example, P.F.] still retains an essential
element, the creating of a common meaning by working jointly, interactively, to establish which
interpretation is to be accepted.’
99 TAMBIAH (1968: 177 ff.) and BLOCH (1975: 19) also distinguish between the ‘primary func-
tion of language’, as a vehicle for communication, and certain types of ‘ritual language’ (e.g.
mantra or formalised oratory), which violate the communication function by being formal, unin-
telligible, and / or private (see also WHEELOCK (1982: 57); and HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW’s (1994: 89)
psychological variant). However, both ignore the constitutive function of language, and do not
distinguish between speech acts and linguistically mediated interaction. Hence, they are forced to
resort to reductionist interpretations of the social function of ritual language either in terms of
institutions of power (BLOCH (1975: 24)) or paradigmatic cultural ideas (TAMBIAH (1985: 154)).
Bloch’s singular, BERNSTEIN (1964) inspired, emphasis on formality as (a) the decisive and
(b) restrictive attribute of political and ritual discourse in contexts of traditional authority, can
neither account for the Jain emphasis on content rather than form, nor on their insistence on ethics
and the generative power of restraint. Tambiah criticises Bloch for not taking into consideration a
number of factors: the intelligibility of ritual language derived from cosmological ideas, the role
of ritual functionaries, and social context. Despite emphasising intellectual content of sacred lan-
guage (in Buddhism), and similarities between sacred and profane language, Tambiah himself
only discusses cases of popular ‘magical’ usage of language (e.g. mantra), and accepts emic
‘power of words’ theories as empirical fact, without discussing the role of discourse in ritual and
emic theories of language (e.g. Vedic: RENOU (1955), Navya-Nyâya: GANERI (1999); the power of
words to signify is also recognised by Jain philosophers).
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ever, for our primarily sociological purpose, the crucial variable is ‘interactional com-
petence’, that is, the knowledge and ability to use rules and moral judgement for inter-
action in specific situations. Interactional competence presupposes ‘cognitive com-
petence’ (PIAGET (1937)), ‘linguistic competence’ (CHOMSKY (1965)),101 ‘commu-
nicative competence’ (HYMES (1972a)), including ‘oratory skill’ (BLOCH (1975)).
HABERMAS (1984: 187 ff., 231 f.) defines interactional competence more specifically
as the universal pragmatic ability to regulate social conflict consensually through ra-
tional agreement, even in situations of severe discord, in accordance with the three
universal pragmatic validity claims. He distinguishes further between the intuitive or
conscious knowledge of specific grammatical and socio-cultural rules and contexts,
and the mastery of the universal pragmatic conditions of the possibility of mutual un-
derstanding (Verständigung).102 Because Habermas’ notion of ‘communicative com-
petence’, a composite of cognitive, linguistic and interactional competencies (in a
more narrow sense),103 is more abstract and formal than Hymes’ sociolinguistic notion
of ‘communicative competence’, it circumvents the problem of analytical reification of
'speakers' or of ‘speech communities’. Building upon HABERMAS’ (1991: 111–3) dis-
tinction between two levels of competencies, also reflected in his differentiation be-
tween universal ‘moral’ and cultural specific ‘ethical’ principles, and HYMES’ (1972b:
57 f.) notion that knowledge of grammatical rules and of determinate ways of speaking
together form the communicative competence of a particular speech community or
individual, I propose to differentiate further between general ‘interactional compe-
tence’ and specific ‘Jain interactional competence’, that is, the formal procedural
knowledge necessary for constituting discourse in agreement with Jain principles.104
                                                                                                               
100 TAMBIAH (1968: 176) poses the interesting question of the relationship of words to actions in
ritual, noting the predominance of words and intelligible language in healing and initiation rites ad-
dressing human beings, in contrast to rites of mass participation and rites addressing supernatural
beings or forces of nature. He also discusses the problem of alternation between various types of
language in ritual, and reformist attempts to destroy the ritual formalism of sacred language in favour
of increased accessibility and understanding. Both observations apply to contemporary Jainism.
101 See also DURBIN (1970).
102 HABERMAS (1975: 3).
103 To distinguish the two kindred notions of communicative competence, I privilege the term
interactive competence here. The usefulness of HYMES’s (1972a), (1972b) approach for the
empirical investigation of ways of speaking has frequently been highlighted by HABERMAS (1975:
5), (1980: 440) / (1984–1987 I: 328). Habermas first used ‘interactional competence’ and later
preferred ‘communicative competence’. I use the term interactional competence in the broader
sense of social coordination of actions through linguistic and non-linguistic means.
104 This application of the theory of social competence was first outlined in FLÜGEL (1994),
(1995–6: 165). For theories of religious competence (often combined with theories of religious
socialisation) see SAMARIAN (1969), LUHMANN (1982), WAARDENBURG (1979), and GLADIGOW
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Jain interactional competence is informed by general ‘Jain religious competence’,
which can be defined as the sum total of Jain religious knowledge learned by an indi-
vidual. In addition to general ‘Jain interactional competence’, religious rules and con-
textual knowledge necessary for navigating specific contexts can be studied, and the
‘Jain religious repertoire’ of a specific population or individual analysed (as part of a
particular ‘socio-cultural repertoire’).
General ‘interactional competence’ refers to the ability of a flexible reflective regu-
lation of total conduct in terms of universal moral presuppositions, contrasting with
institutionalised settings, which, through their formal properties, relieve the individ-
ual to some extent from the task of defining the situation and from difficult moral
choices. ‘Jain interactional competence’ varies with the degree of knowledge and the
internalisation of general and cultural specific (sectarian etc.) It is necessary to distin-
guish Jain principles and their contextual rules of use; that is, the cognitive and non-
cognitive (motivational, emotional etc.) know how to act in accordance with abstract
and specific doctrinal principles in different socio-cultural circumstances. Jain prin-
ciples and rules of application, of varying degrees of specificity.105 General Jain prin-
ciples are characterised by constitutive rules, generative of the field of Jain discourse
as a whole. They are exemplified by ideal Jain speech events. Jain interactional
competence is context-sensitive. The corresponding rules are deliberately con-
structed to enable a performer to react flexibly to emergent properties of a specific
speech situation, and to shape it in accordance with Jain principles. Since principles
and rules only negatively determine the field of pragmatic possibilities, speaking the
Jain way, or avoiding interaction altogether, are creative acts, performances, which
                                                                                                               
(1997). The latter noted that the ability to orient oneself in complex religious contexts, to distin-
guish between different situations, to develop a ‘religious identity’, and to act appropriately cannot
be taken for granted: ‘Die Kompetenz, in einer polytheistischen Religion zu leben, sie angemessen
zu benutzen, wird von modernen Interpreten einfach unterstellt’ (GLADIGOW (1997: 105)). Fol-
lowing Luhmann and Waardenburg, he advocates for the semiotic analysis of religious pantheons
as ‘languages’ which can be learned and selectively used (GLADIGOW (1997: 106)).
105 Cf. SINGER’s (1961: 96–138) distinction between principles and rules: ‘I argued that moral
principles are to be distinguished from moral rules by the fact that the former hold in all circum-
stances and do not admit of exceptions; that principles are always relevant whereas rules are not;
that principles are invariant and do not vary with changes in circumstances or conditions; and by
the fact that it is impossible for moral principles to conflict with each other. … I distinguished
between fundamental rules, local rules, and neutral norms. Local rules … depend on local condi-
tions in a way that fundamental rules do not, and hence are peculiar to, and differ with, different
groups and communities—that is to say, different circumstances. Neutral norms are local rules
that are conventional in a way that other rules are not [‘it would make no moral difference if their
opposites were adopted’ (SINGER (1961: 113))], but both neutral norms and local rules depend on
social needs or purposes that are advanced by general observance and would be frustrated or defeated
by their general violation’ (SINGER (1961: 327 f.)). On levels see also HARE (1981: 35 ff.).
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ideally transform any speech event into a Jain discourse. Actual speech performances,
or Jain ‘speech styles’ in the terms of HYMES (1972b: 57), I would argue, can not be
sufficiently understood in terms of statistical features of overt behaviour, or as devia-
tions from a general norm or ideal, but only as constitutive acts dependent on
‘qualitative judgements of appropriateness’ of selected features in a given situation.106
Theoretically, the required interactional competence of the ideal ‘pure ascetic’
(œuddha-sâdhu) increases with the degree of informality of the interactional situa-
tion, because ascetic self-control, in accordance with Jain principles, is the price for
freedom from external (social and ritual) control. In practice, Jain ascetics try to
prevent rule-transgressions due to insufficient procedural knowledge with various
methods: for example, by teaching context-sensitive rules not in abstract, but
through exemplary cases, or by keeping inexperienced ascetics away from morally
overcomplex situations through strict supervision. Similar competencies are out-
lined for the Jain laity. An ideal lay person is characterised, for instance by He-
macandra (YŒ 1.47–56), as one who is listening (œravaòa), memorising (dhâraòâ),
showing respect (vinaya), being an expert in sacred lore (pravacana-kuœala), and
also avoiding religiously unprofitable speech (sat-kathâ) etc. (WILLIAMS (1983: 265–
72)). Thus, it is always the Jain interactional competence, the religious and cultural
repertoire of an individual or group, which generates the capacity of defining or judg-
ing situations in terms of Jain principles, of imposing or inferring implicatures, and
determining the relevant type of rhetoric or hermeneutic procedure.107
Once the settings and the required competencies are considered, the social impli-
cations of Jain discourse can be analysed in terms of the conditions and presupposi-
tions of the acceptability of particular validity claims in Jain intersubjective herme-
neutics. These can be discovered by negating speech acts as a whole.108 The ques-
tion is always: What are the social implications of a religious claim in this particular
context? ‘What makes a religious statement acceptable?’109 Ultimately, such a
question can only be answered by the participants themselves, because only they
can determine on which grounds to accept or to reject a particular claim. In other
words, the explication of implications can never be achieved objectively, for in-
stance by explaining the ‘cogency of ideas’ through a description of ‘the structure of
                                             
106 On appropriateness and general features of discourses of rule application see also WELLMER
(1986), and HABERMAS’ (1991: 137–42) discussion of K. GÜNTHER (1988).
107 Non-literal speech-acts can only work if their implications are understood (and accepted).
BRUHN (1987b: 67), for instance, writes: ‘The fact that everybody knew the basic pattern [of Jain
soteriological sequences, P.F.] made it rather simple to find suitable words for a lecture or a sermon.’
Cf. GLUCKMAN (1955: 24) on degrees of ‘flexibility or of moral implication’ of legal concepts.
108 HABERMAS (1993: 26).
109 Cf. GOMBRICH’s (1988: 10) question: ‘What makes a religious innovation acceptable?’
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a problem situation’ alone, as GOMBRICH (1988: 11) suggests, but is always an out-
come of specific intersubjective processes of socio-cultural self-interpretation.110
Classical performative approaches to ritual or ritual language, for instance, which
made use of Grice’s or Searle’s analysis failed to investigate this (like Grice and Searle
themselves). In fact, they neglected the role of discourse in ritual altogether, in favour
of either cultural determinism (Tambiah) or mental (Humphrey and Laidlaw) or mate-
rial reductionism (Bloch). Following Searle’s and Habermas’ interpretation of the dual
(illocutionary and propositional) structure of the speech act, TAMBIAH (1985: 153)
argues that, because ritual action appears to mediate between (cultural) ideas and
(political) practice, it can be interpreted as a performative matrix of ‘indexical symbols
(and indexical icons) as duplex structures carrying semantic and pragmatic meanings’:
‘The duality thus points in two directions at once—in the semantic di-
rection of cultural presuppositions and conventional understandings
and in the pragmatic direction of the social and interpersonal context
of ritual action, the line-up of the participants and the process by
which they establish or infer meanings. We note that the sense in
which I imagine actors to infer indexical meaning is similar to Grice’s
formulation of “conversational implicature”, in that by saying or en-
acting something a certain meaning is implicated, which can be readily
understood (conventional implicature) or is capable of being “worked
out” (non-conventional implicature), given certain contextual features
and certain common understandings’ (TAMBIAH (1985: 154)).
Although he treats ritual acts as speech acts (thus identifying action and his own
action description), speech itself is curiously absent in Tambiah’s conception (and
where he talks about it, he returns to the traditional ‘power of words’, œabda-œakti,
theory). Moreover, the propositional component of the ritual act, its symbolism, is
not treated in terms of specific validity claims whose debatable normative implica-
tions may or may not be acceptable, but identified with timeless and incontestable
cultural paradigms. Tambiah’s performative analysis is therefore still oriented to-
wards the theological model of textual hermeneutics, that is, the dogmatic explica-
tion (phronesis) of contextual implications of mythic paradigms or sacred texts. His
approach assumes that the knowledge embodied in texts is superior to the inter-
preter’s, and has to be accepted.111 Because his performative analysis does not
clearly distinguish between ritual acts and ritually mediated forms of social interac-
tion, it must assume socially binding effects emerge automatically from the experi-
                                             
110 Cf. GARFINKEL–SACKS (1970).
111 Cf. HABERMAS (1980: 193–6) / (1984–1987 I: 134–6).
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ence of ritual acts themselves, and that the authority of traditional ritual form should
always be accepted, without question. The underlying notion of ritual enactment, a
variation of the Neo-Kantian model of value realisation, cannot account for proc-
esses of intersubjective negotiation of conditions of acceptability and for the
contextually varying social implications of ritually communicated validity claims.
The presumed timelessness of mythical paradigms re-produces the characteristic
pseudo-concreteness of Durkheimian functionalist studies of ritual performance,
positing social integration both as a presupposition and result of ritual, without in-
vestigating the constitutive role of discourse in and about ritual itself.
Tambiah’s theory does not throw light on Jain religious discourse, which appeals
to reason and insight, instead of formulaic repetition, and whose contextually spe-
cific normative claims are constantly challenged and revised by the Jain âcâryas,
under the threat of failure to appeal. In sum, because of the lacking theory of social
constitution and cultural change, and the absence of sociolinguistic interest,
Tambiah’s approach cannot assist analysing the problem of contextual ambiguity of
indexical meaning, which I deal with later in this essay. As an alternative, I suggest
investigating Jain ritual discourse through the analysis of the Jain discourse ethics
and traditional interpretative procedures for negotiating social meaning; to avoid
falling into the same trap as Bloch, who identifies an increase of formality generally
with a loss of meaning, which Tambiah rightly criticises.
Even if the idealist limitations of universal pragmatic or culturalist discourse
analysis could be overcome, there is still the problem of how to analytically recon-
struct implicatures in specific cases in a methodical way. This question is particu-
larly prominent in theological, juridical and moral-philosophical debates concerning
the status of rule application, that is, of interpretative processes that are involved in
the specification of principles and rules through the explication of the contextual
implications of given principles and rules.112 As language in general does,113 explicit
normative principles and rules always entail an anonymous indexical element. That
is, they implicitly refer to a range of possible situations as their field of applicabil-
ity, which we must know and accept, if we wish to act accordingly. To explicate
general conditions of applicability, one has to refer to paradigmatic situations. Para-
doxically, the range of applicability diminishes with the increasing specification of
the conditions, and increases with the diminishing specification.114 In other words,
the problem is the principal vagueness and ambiguity of the indexical meaning of
symbolic forms, which, as GLUCKMAN (1955: 293) and TURNER (1986: 44) argued,
                                             
112 GADAMER (1993: 107), WELLMER (1986).
113 APEL (1993: 41).
114 WELLMER (1986: 28, 35 f.).
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is in fact a positive functional feature of abstraction, because it secures the adaptability
of general principles to changing contexts.115 An exhaustive characterisation of merely
negatively determined situations, therefore, cannot and, indeed, should not be achieved
once and for all by participants, even if a principle itself is accepted.116
The contextual meanings and social implications of symbolic forms (and the forms
themselves) are always underdetermined and hence negotiable.117 They can only be
established temporarily through use and agonistic intersubjective interpretative proc-
esses, whose outcome is always open, even if methods of argumentation and discur-
sive procedures are conventional,118 and predicated on idealised universal pragmatic
presuppositions. I therefore suggest supplementing standard descriptions of ritual, or
action in general, by an analysis of the discursive procedures which define situations
and establish relevance and contextually acceptable social meaning. The discursive
field surrounding rituals and other social settings should be the main focus for an in-
vestigation of social dimensions of ritual efficacy. Conventional analyses of ritual
focus almost exclusively on the given ceremonial setting and on the performative ex-
perience itself, and tend to give undue weight to the procedural knowledge of ritual
functionaries, textualised cultural ideas, and articulated subjective experience. The
resulting meaning reductionism can be avoided by investigating discursive negotia-
tions of validity claims in situ,119 including possibly the relationship between general,
for instance moral, language games and institutionalised forms of reflexivity, such as
theology and the social sciences. The analysis120 of implicit judgements invoked in
everyday practices of moral justification, moral utterances and moral disputes, can also
demonstrate how cultural resources are used as potential reasons for claims of validity.
From this perspective, social solidarity does not only emerge exclusively as a conse-
quence of partaking in ‘effervescent’ rituals, to use Durkheim’s expression, but pri-
marily—and increasingly so—as the result of the participation in socially constitutive
discourses of norm legitimation and shared definitions of situations.
                                             
115 Pace BLOCH (1975: 17). On the function of general principles see also HARE (1981: 41).
116 On the impossibility of an objective description of indexical meaning of Jain religious termi-
nology see CORT (1989: 93), (1992: 178), HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW (1994: 101), and FLÜGEL (2006b).
117 General principles or rules are generally combined with more specific rule of application.
See WITTGENSTEIN (1953). ‘Keine Norm enthält die Regeln ihrer eigenen Anwendung’
(HABERMAS (1991: 24)).
118 They may include culturally specific discourse etiquettes and formalised interpretative procedures,
such as the (monological) forms of Jain scholastic exegesis (niryukti) described by BALBIR (1993: 56).
119 See the pioneering work of TURNER (1986: 45). Lately, HABERMAS (2004: 53) conceded
that all discourses are embedded in lifeworld practices, because they have the function to restore
partially distorted background consensus (as analysed by TURNER).
120 HABERMAS (1996: 335) used the term ‘critical understanding’ through ‘reconstructive translation’.
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The paradigmatic example of practical hermeneutical explications of implied indexi-
cal meaning, are intentionally multivocal forms of communication within ‘master-slave’
relationships; often discussed either in terms of formalisation of discourse, and of un-
derstanding implicit directives (e.g. commands), or in terms of the instrumentalisation
of interpretation as such by the rhetoric of spiritual power in contexts of traditional
authority. Building on the work of Brown and Levinson and Strecker on the influence
of social structure on discourse, DRECHSEL (1994: 50), for instance, draws an analogy
between the relationship of off-recordness and on-recordness in politeness theory, and
the relationship of the ambiguous symbolism of ‘sacred’ kingship and the unequivocal
social and material implications of royal pomp, which, he suggests, have to be worked
out by the lower strata of society qua unspoken command. Although mere compliance
or non-compliance with implicit directives in no way shows that they are legitimate or
illegitimate,121 the explanatory problem of this institutional theory is the same as in
Habermas’ analysis of latent strategic action in terms of universal normative presuppo-
sitions. The king’s dual socially constitutive role, as a living symbol of society and as an
individual with its own specific interests, involves his subjects in a paradoxical double-
bind situation.122 Because the king is the condition of socio-cosmic existence, royal
power appears not primarily ‘exploitative’, but ‘attractive’, to the extent that the sub-
jects try to read the king’s mind and, ideally, to fulfil his unsaid wishes. Because the
king is the condition of social order everyone is forced to identify with him. In fulfilling
his wishes, the subject reproduces the conditions of its own social existence as a social
being. A good example is the relationship between the king and his officials in the con-
text of the ‘polite society’ of the court, and their characteristic mutual strategic orienta-
tion: the characteristic ambiguity of the king’s role forces the officials to work out the
‘implications’ of royal gestures, and to fulfil his unspeakable material needs in form of
service, presents etc.123 Even a cursory glance at the vast literature on South Asian king-
ship shows the empirical significance of such phenomena, first theorised by HEGEL
                                             
121 APEL (1993: 49).
122 BURGHART (1996: 306): ‘In a “Government of one”, conventionally called monarchy, eve-
ryone else leads double lives. They lead a life as dictated by the will of their lord and master, and
they lead a life of their own.’
123 See also ALI (2004). LUHMANN (1979: 36) argued that the efficacy of power in general is predi-
cated on the mutual desire to avoid anticipated possibilities of open conflict and brute force. Obedience
is usually not the result of explicit commands but based on the avoidance of expected sanctions in case
of the non-performance of desired behaviour: ‘Der Machthaber braucht gar nicht erst zu befehlen, auch
seine unbefohlenen Befehle werden schon befolgt. Sogar die Initiative zum Befehl kann auf den
Unterworfenen verlagert werden; er fragt nach, wenn ihm unklar ist, was befohlen werden würde.
Explizite Kommunikation wird auf eine unvermeidbare Residualfunktion beschränkt. In gewissem
Umfange geht mit dieser Form der Machtsteigerung Macht auf den Machtunterworfenen über…’ A
classical European text on this phenomenon is LA BOÉTIE (1983: 136).
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(1981: 145–77) in his analysis of the dialectic of recognition, and investigated by ELIAS
(1983) in his sociological study of the French court and KANTOROWICZ (1957) on the
ideology of European kingship.124 BURGHART (1996: 308) found similar mechanisms
within the political discourse under the Hindu monarchy in Nepal of the 1980s, com-
bining arguments from Habermas and Bloch: ‘The king cannot speak informally to the
body politic: rather he must speak formally to everyone, for he represents everyone.
Little that he utters, therefore, can be taken at face value, and one treats Governmental
speech with some suspicion. It is, as a matter of course, something distorted.’
The relationship between a king and his subjects is structurally homologous to the
relationship between senior and junior Jain ascetics, and to the relationship between
ascetics and laity (œrâvakas, ‘listeners’, or upâsakas, ‘servants’). In Jain scriptures,
the junior partners in both relationships are characterised by the combined virtues of
politeness (vinaya) and serving the guru (vaiyâvåttya) (Uttar 30.30–7). From the
point of view of Jain laity, even the relationship between Jains and Non-Jains should
be analogous to the relationship between ascetics and Jain-laity (ascetics : laity ::
laity : non-Jains). Similar (on / off record) strategic orientations are therefore to be
expected. From an anthropological perspective, the crux of politeness theory is that
functional contributions for the maintenance of public self-image are not coerced
but received through processes of deliberate ‘fulfilment’ of face-wants of speakers
of superior status by ‘hearers’ of inferior status; particularly the ‘faces’ of legitimate
public figures, which condense the sense of identity in wider social circles. Social
power operates here indirectly through the medium of free will and consent, if only
under the implicit threat of social sanctions in the case of non-satisfaction of face-
wants. In the words of TURNER (1986: 30), ritual in general is a mechanism that
‘converts the obligatory into the desirable.’125
— VI —
It is essential for my argument to investigate Jain conceptions of pragmatic language
usage, and to compare them with the theories outlined in the previous sections. The
central question concerns the applicability of the theory of communicative action and
                                             
124 On indirectness see for instance VELUTHAT (1978), BURGHART (1983: 297), BALBIR (1993:
267–9). In his work on bhakti, LORENZEN (1995: 3) recalls Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’, i.e. ‘that
the ideology (or ideologies) of privileged classes may exert, by a combination of persuasion and coer-
cion, a “hegemony” over the ideology (or ideologies) of nonprivileged classes in the same society.’
125 GÖHLER’s (1995b: 72 f.) discussion of Kumârila’s explanation of the ‘impersonal’ injunc-
tive force of Vedic words whose propositional content can only be realised under certain condi-
tions could be reinterpreted in similar terms.
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its forms of operationalisation to the Jain context; particularly the role of the
‘universal’ validity claims and of the Gricean maxims. I have argued that the Jain
theory of speech plays a similar role within Indian social philosophy as Habermas’
theory of communicative action does within Western philosophy, because both pro-
claim the primacy of morality and ethics in language usage. Underlying Habermas’
theory of communicative intent (verständigungsorientierter Sprachgebrauch) is not
only the notion that, by definition, in the immediate context of communication all
participants must have a common interest in the maintenance of linguistic exchange,
and hence implicitly presuppose the ideal of non-violence, at least of the avoidance of
physical violence, but also that they are implicitly oriented toward reaching agree-
ment.126 In this regard, Habermas’ notion of infinite consensus represents a functional
equivalent of the Jain notion of infinite knowledge leading to salvation (see infra, p.
129 f.). Moreover, universal pragmatic validity claims can be usefully compared and
contrasted with the Jain vows of ahiôsâ and satya. On lower levels of abstraction, the
Jain doctrine of the ways of speaking (bhâšâ-jâta), as exposed already in the older
texts of the Œvetâmbara scriptures, can be usefully compared and contrasted with the
conversational maxims of Grice; and conversational implicatures in Jain discourse,
theorised in Jain literature, can be analysed as forms of latent strategic action in terms
of Brown and Levinson’s typology of FTAs. I do not argue that there is an exact corre-
spondence between these modern and ancient Jain schemes of interpretation. Nor do I
believe that there is only one way of reconstructing the social implications of Jain
theories of language from the point of view of modern social philosophy and logic.
But the comparison generates new perspectives on both Jain and Western philosophy ,
in particular on the ways in which fundamental ontological distinctions or questions
can function as codes for the constitution of different discourses.
The principal difficulty of this enterprise is the apparent incompatibility of
dialogical and monological perspectives; of the—quasi-legal—intersubjective and
egalitarian normative underpinnings of the theory of communicative action and the
self-centred and hierarchical normative foundations of the Jain theory of speech,
that is, their different ontological commitments.127 Habermas’ differentiation be-
tween universal ‘moral’ and culturally specific ‘ethical’ presuppositions undermines
from the outset the claim to universality of any religious ethical system. Since the
legitimacy of Jain religious speech is rooted in the traditional authority of the
                                             
126 Cf. HABERMAS (1991: 17, 173). HABERMAS (2004: 49) distinguishes four idealised presuppo-
sitions of argumentation: (a) public inclusion of all concerned individuals, (b) equal distribution of
rights to communicate, (c) non-violence in the discourse situation, (d) truthfulness of all participants.
127 See GERT (1973: Ch. 5–6) on the ways in which ego-centred legitimations of moral rules
can be universalised; and critical comments of WELLMER (1986: 41 f.) and HABERMAS (1991:
173 f.) from the point of view of dialogical ethics.
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speaker (âpta), that is, his/her Jain religious competence, rather than the procedural
form of communicative action (œabdânuœâsana),128 from the perspective of the the-
ory of communicative action, its claims to universality can only gain acceptability in
an open field of discourse to the extent that it articulates phenomena for which no
other language is available.129 Jain authors have also formulated a principles of dis-
course intended to transcend cultural boundaries. These principles can, however,
only claim universality to the extent that they fulfil the condition of universal ac-
ceptability. Yet, this criterion is not foregrounded in Jain texts. A rational defence of
the universality of Jain ethics will need to reconstruct the presuppositions of the
egological Jain ethical perspective from the point of view of general interest. Con-
versely, discourse ethics rooted in formal pragmatics has only weak regulative force
and needs to be supplemented by obligatory norms of action. The reduction of re-
ligion to morality and ethics and the epistemic approach, which Habermas inherited
from Kant, are however shared, to some extent, by Jain doctrine. The following
comparative study of Jain discourse ethics begins with the question of the status of
religious language in Jain philosophy, especially intentionally multivocal language,
which, at first sight, appears to violate the fundamental norms of universal pragmatics.
The main difficulty in understanding Jain concepts of religious language derives
from the paradoxical, direct and indirect, nature of Jain religious knowledge
(âgama). The problem is that, doctrinally, every utterance can be interpreted both
from the transcendental or ultimate point of view (niœcaya-naya or pâramârthika-
naya) (henceforth PN), and from the practical point of view (vyavahâra-naya)
(henceforth VN).130 For a participant, ultimate and relative points of view are not
necessarily absolutely distinct, but complementary, hierarchically related modes of
orientation, which mutually implicate one another (like noesis and noema in
                                             
128 Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 448).
129 HABERMAS (2005). Christian theologians such as ARENS (1989: 11, 17 ff.) criticised this
point already. ARENS (1991: 191) follows PEUKERT’s (1984) views: ‘In einer politisch-
theologischen Kritik an Habermas ist Religion selbst als kommunikative Praxis zu begreifen, die
“als Praxis, also im kommunikativen Handeln, Gott für die anderen behauptet und im Handeln zu
bewähren sucht”.’ ARENS (1995: 150) proposes to see the ‘church as a community of communica-
tion’ in a double sense: ‘Jesus Christ is communicated in the church and through the church’s
mediation.’
130 Although influenced by the Nyâya school and by Nâgârjuna, within Jainism this termino-
logical distinction goes back to Kundakunda, a South Indian Digambara ascetic of the c. 1st–8th
century CE, who gives the following definition: ‘From the vyavahâra point of view, conduct,
belief and knowledge are attributed (as different characteristics) of the Knower, the Self. But from
the real point of view there is no (differentiation of) knowledge, conduct and belief, in Pure Self’
(SSâ 1.7). Cf. MATILAL (1981: 43), CAILLAT (1984: 71 n. 54). The paradoxes generated by the
PN/VN distinction gave rise to an extensive commentary literature which cannot be reviewed here.
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Husserl’s notion of intentionality). We are thus confronted with a conception of
stages of religious insight and corresponding ways of using and interpreting lan-
guage, measured in terms of degrees of insight (jñâna) and restraint (saôyama), i.e.
practice of non-violence (ahiôsâ).131
The Jain tradition uses the term âgama ambiguously.132 It refers primarily to the
ultimate truth, which Mahâvîra, the last Tîrtha(ó)kara, had experienced directly and
preached to the world, and in a second sense to ‘canonical’ Jain scriptures, which
still form the doctrinal basis for sermons and writings of present day ascetics
(MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1968: 10–13).133 In classical Jainism, knowledge of ultimate religious
truth and reality can only be gained through meditation (bhâvanâ). However, in the
present ‘unhappy’ time cycle (dušamâ avasarpinî) direct insight cannot be achieved
anymore. Instruction through the words or testimony (œabda or âgama) of Mahâ-
vîra, handed down by the religious authorities (âcârya), is the only way of gaining
religious knowledge at all. The doctrinal primacy of cognition over language ex-
plains why Jains (and Buddhists) ‘have tried to preserve the meaning of the words
concerned and not (like the Brahmins—P.F.) words themselves’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ
(1968: 1)). Jainism teaches that, ultimately, all words—and indeed: doctrines—are
neutral; it is the attitude of the knower alone that turns them into means of valid
cognition (pramâòa).134 Conversely, for the knower, each word of the Jain scrip-
tures appears to condense the teachings of Mahâvîra in a summary fashion. This is
part of its evocative power:
‘The Jainas maintain that the meanings of one single sentence, grasped
by different hearers, are innumerable in accordance with their innu-
merable capacities … a sentence in the âgama has the power to suggest
in various ways innumerable meanings’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1968: 12)).135
It is crucial for any understanding of Jain attitudes to language that, from the ulti-
mate point of view (PN), sensuous cognition (mati) and words (œruta or âgama)136
                                             
131 Cf. CAILLAT (1991: 10).
132 Cf. AòD 51, 467–70.
133 The âgamas (scriptures) are not merely texts (HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW (1994: 199 f.)) but
transmitted ‘words of the omniscient’ (Mahâvîra), that is, of trustworthy authority (âpta). They are
considered as the vital force of Jain religion (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1968: 1). Âgama can be roughly trans-
lated as knowledge or testimony (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1968: 9)).
134 SHAH (1966: 211), TULSÎ (1985: 190 f.).
135 Cf. WITTGENSTEIN (1953) on word meaning and contexts of use.
136 DUNDAS (1996: 77) translates œruta-jñâna both as ‘knowledge of religious scripture’ and as
‘knowledge located within scripture’, which needs to be revealed through interpretation. On the
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are both forms of indirect, mediated knowledge (parokša) (TS 1.11).137 This is why
Digambara Jains insist that the sermons of a Jina take the form of a miraculous
sound (divya-dhvani), which radiates the meaning (artha) of his teachings instanta-
neously, not mediated through words. As there is no language for the unspeakable
(avaktavya) ultimate truth, any language can be used to express it.138 As a conse-
quence, ‘from the absolute standpoint, the validity of a word or sentence is not in-
trinsic but extrinsic. That is, it depends on the merit of the speaker as well as of the
listener’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1996: 2)). The conventional perception that ‘there is no pos-
sibility whatsoever of any faults or defects in the content of the Agamas’ thus rests
entirely on the dogmatic belief that ‘the speakers of the Jain Agamas were self-
realized (i.e. omniscient, P.F.) persons’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1968: 3)). The normative
basis of traditional hermeneutics euphemistically stated: ‘In substance, this means
that the absolute standpoint mainly keeps the listener in view while determining the
                                                                                                               
role of scriptures in Jain discourse see also FOLKERT (1993) and GRANOFF (1993). I am less concerned
with the problems of textual hermeneutics here than with the pragmatics of religious discourse.
137 According to TS 1.9–35, valid knowledge (pramâòa) is of two types, direct (pratyakša) and
indirect (parokša). Direct knowledge (PN) is based on immediate intuition. It includes kevala
(omniscience), manaÿ-paryâya (mind reading), and avadhi (clairvoyance). Indirect knowledge (VN)
is based on mediated intuition. It includes mati (empirical knowledge, acquired through the senses
and the mind) and œruta (knowledge acquired through instruction). Mati is subdivided into four sub-
categories: småti (memory), saôjñâ (recognition), cintâ (reasoning), abhinibodha (perception). œruta,
scripture, is knowledge communicated with the help of material symbols such as words and gestures.
There are a variety of views in Jain philosophy how the following four conventional means of knowl-
edge derived from Nyâya philosophy relate to mati and œruta (mostly they are associated with the
latter): paccakkha <pratyakša> (perception), aòumâna <anumâna> (inference), ovamma <upamâòa>
(analogy), and âgama (verbal testimony of a person of authority, or scripture) (Þhâò 4.504, AòD
436). See NYAYAVIJAYA (1998: 327 n. 1), TATIA (1951: 27–80), also TULSÎ (1985: 26 ff., 177–81).
138 Generally, Jain ascetics use the local vernacular. They reject the idea of the intrinsic sa-
credness of Sanskrit or other liturgical languages. However, with the canonisation of the scrip-
tures, Ardhamâgadhî gained an equivalent esoteric status. Many later Jain writings were composed
in Sanskrit, the language of the Brâhmaòic elite. The âgamas are in need of interpretation through
a person of authority, i.e. an individual who knows the language and who has privileged access to
religious insight (darœana). Initially, only the authority of Mahâvîra was accepted, the presumed
author of the teachings in most transmitted texts, but later also the authority of the œruta-kevalins,
and of the âcâryas, who now interpret the âgamas for their disciples. The Jain doctrine of testi-
mony thus legitimates the institutional hierarchy of religious authority. However, there are numerous
problems, because Jains are also realists acknowledging the power of words as sources of valid
knowledge, because they are connected with things, as well as with a speaker’s intentions, and lin-
guistic conventions. The logical arguments which were put forward, for instance by the NSâ 5–8 or
by MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1996: 2), to support the idea that the moral authority of the speaker is always more
important than the content of his speech are, however, debatable (cf. SHAH (1966: 226 f.)). On the
role of normative authority in Nyâya theories of testimony see GANERI (1999: 38 ff.).
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validity of the scriptures, and the empirical standpoint mainly keeps the speaker in
view while determining the same’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1968: 2)).139
Although kevala-jñâna (omniscience), the highest form of pâramârthika knowl-
edge according to Jain doctrine, cannot be achieved in the present age, even today’s
ascetics are supposed to have mind reading (manaÿ-paryâya) and clairvoyance
(avadhi) capacities. Through their training in non-identification they are expected to
be capable of switching perspectives between pâramârthika-naya and vyavahâra-
naya, and, thus, to look at the same phenomenon both directly and indirectly (note
that from PN, VN appears as a form of indirect cognition). This has significant con-
sequences for the apprehension of verbal utterances. From the religious point of
view (PN), language appears merely as a superficial ornament, which disguises the
essential truth and beauty of the inner soul, of pure consciousness, which can be
experienced through meditation only.140 In other words, the ambiguity of the con-
cept of âgama is itself understood in terms of the ‘absolute’ and ‘practical’ points of
view, which permit distinguishing clearly between ultimate religious meaning and
linguistic means.141 The main consequence of this perspective is the cognitive de-
substantialisation of everyday conceptions of language. From the worldly point of
view (VN), the propositional content of a word (œabda) depends on convention (and
on its power of signification).142 The semantic, and pragmatic, implications of a
grammatically correct verbal utterance vary according to context. Speaker’s inten-
tion (abhiprâya) is one of the contextual conditions of meaning. Yet, it is rarely dis-
cussed in the context of objectivist Jain (and Nyâya) semantics.
My general argument is that the doctrinal distinction between practical and tran-
scendental orientations, and the learned ability of reversing perspectives, informs
both the discernment and the systematic generation of plural, multivocal meanings
in Jain discourse.143 In my view, the cognitive competence of perspective alternation
                                             
139 Cf. Matilal’s theory of the ‘ideal hearer’ discussed by GANERI (2006: 115 f.).
140 Examples are discussed by RYAN (1998: 77) and FLÜGEL (1993).
141 Cf. PYE (1991), FAURE (1993: 209, 213) and GOMBRICH (1996: 24) on the Buddhist doc-
trine of skilful means (upâya).
142 Similar relationships between ‘authentic knowledge’ (jñâna) and ‘discursive / reflective knowl-
edge’ (vijñâna) can be found in Buddhism. Cf. LAMOTTE (1992: 21), BHARATI (1975: 169),
SEYFORT RUEGG (1985: 309–12).
143 In a modified form, the argument also applies to Mâdhyamika Buddhism, and can be ex-
tended to any context informed by universalistic two truth theories. Cf. KOKOSZYNSKA (1936) on
absolute truth (ideal language) and relative truth (everyday language). See ALBERT (1991: 124 ff.),
(2003: 128) for Popperian criticism of (a) double truth theories, (b) of Cartesian recourse to ‘god’,
and (c) Apel’s and Habermas’ recourse to the ‘hermeneutical god’ of the ‘ideal community of
communication’ as guarantors of certainty instead of a real, fallible consensus. Albert argues that
all double-truth theories are dogmatic ‘immunisation strategies’: ‘Particular viewpoints are intro-
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is a fundamental presupposition of Jain hermeneutics and rhetoric, and can be used
both for the pursuit of insight and power.144 Rooted in Jain ontology, the distinction
between empirical and transcendental perspectives was an implicit feature of Jain
doctrine even before its philosophical conceptualisation. The fundamental religious
problematic of Jainism, framed by the asymmetrical soul / body, non-violence / vio-
lence codes, creates paradoxes and pragmatic ambiguities which require interpreta-
tion and contextual specification / conditioning with the help of additional coding.145
How to translate these asymmetrical codes into practice? Many Jain texts address
this problem. According to classical Jain philosophy of standpoints (anekântavâda),
the epistemic tension created by the basic soul-body dualism of Jain doctrine, can
only be resolved, if at all, by a process of perpetual alternation of PN-VN perspec-
tives.146 In Kundakunda’s Samaya-sâra (SSâ), this epistemic necessity is endowed
with a soteriological function. The technical Jain syâd-vâda philosophy, the
conditionalisation of assertions, by contrast, is based on the conventional point of
view (VN).147 How do these two types of Jain perspectivism deal with the problem
of multivocality? The Jain religious point of view (PN) infuses all phenomena with
                                                                                                               
duced that supposedly allow the separation of some problem areas from others, with the intention
of eliminating any possibility of criticism from that direction; in short, one applies dogmatic
shielding principles’ (ALBERT (1991: 126). DUMONT’s (1980) theory of the complementary oppo-
sition of status and power in Hinduism could be cited as another example of a dualism thesis.
144 For different interpretations of the (potential) social functions of Jain perspectivism see for
instance MATILAL (1981), and JOHNSON (1995b), (1999). Cf. HOUTMAN (1999) for the political
functions of insight meditation (vipassanâ) in Buddhist Burma.
145 See LUHMANN’s (1982) theory of ‘steering differences’ which tend to have the form of
‘distinctions directrices’, applied to the Jain context in FLÜGEL (1995–6: 164 f.). LUHMANN (1990:
215) argues that binary codes, which define self-referential systems in an unequivocal functional
way, and ambiguous semantics are complementary: ‘Durch semantische Ambiguität wird die
Willkür in der Schließung des Systems und in der Ausschließung aller weiterer Werte aus dem
Code des Systems berücksichtigt. Ambiguität ist gleichsam das kommunikationsinterne Korrelat
für das, was im Beobachten und Beschreiben “zwischen” die Pole der Unterscheidung, besonders
zwischen “wahr” und “unwahr” fällt. Die Ambiguität entspricht der Stille, die nicht mitspricht,
wenn man spricht, oder auch die Weiße des Papiers, auf das man schreibt, und sie vertritt im
System all das, was an Stelle dieser Leere eigentlich der Fall ist. Der Widerspruch von
Eindeutigleit und Mehrdeutigleit kann auf diese Weise durch Differenzierung aufgelöst werden.’
146 Cf. JAINI (1979: 90 f.).
147 JOHNSON (1995a: 252 f.) argues that there is ‘a fundamental incompatibility between syâd-
vâda and the absolute vyavahâra-niœcaya distinction. The former is essentially an intellectual
strategy for evading confrontation … The latter, on the other hand, has … a soteriological func-
tion.’ For GANERI (2001: 133) anekânta-vâda and syâd-vâda are complementary: the former pro-
vides the epistemology and the latter the semantics. On the technical definition of alternation
(anyataratvâdinâ) in syâd-vâda theory see p. 143 f.
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new meaning by re-coding them in terms of the doctrinal body / soul distinction. I
shall designate this type of systematic distortion or appropriation of conventional
meaning which at the same time opens up new semantic space, ‘ontological ambi-
guity’, in contrast to ‘linguistic ambiguity’,148 in a wider sense, including expressions
whose implications are semantically and / or pragmatic underdetermined (vagueness,
indexicality, indirectness, presupposition etc.). Ontological ambiguity is not the same
as linguistic ambiguity. But it can only be expressed in linguistic form. Therefore, both
can be easily confused. Systematically distorted communication qua doctrinal re-cod-
ing and latent strategic communication are both predicated on the intentional creation
of multiple meanings. Like latent strategic communication, ontological codes imply
disguised generalised indexicality in form of the asymmetry of the binary code. Hence,
from a practical point of view, both are social practices of symbolisation. Only their
purposes, and perspectives, are different. From the point of view of Jain philosophy,
the estranged view of the everyday world, which is intentionally created by the tran-
scendental Jain perspective, is a product of discriminating knowledge, not of deliberate
deception. This does not mean that it is unambiguous. LUHMANN (1990) argues, in my
view convincingly, that every binary distinction creates at the same time clarity on one
level, and ambiguity on another, ad infinitum. Different types of ambiguity become
visible in the light of different distinctions. For instance, for someone applying the
dogmatically prescribed Jain philosophical standpoints (naya) (TS 1.34), and the cor-
responding procedures for disambiguating contextual meaning, plurivocality becomes
problematic in the light of conventional univocality, etymology etc.
More research is required to delineate different types and functions of multivocal-
ity in Jain discourse. However, one aspect of the Jain analysis of ambiguity deserves
to be mentioned at this point. According to Jain logic, linguistic ambiguity149 should
not be confused with vague or incomplete description, which Jain naya philosophy
contrasts with the epistemic ideal of definite description.150 The problem of definite
description has recently been discussed by HARE (1981: 40–3) regarding the media-
                                             
148 Cf. HEIDEGGER (1925) on the difference between ‘ontological’ and ‘ontic’ perspectives; and
LUHMANN (1990) on the difference between ‘code’ and ‘semantics’.
149 Analytical philosophers such as DONOVAN (1976: 1) broadly define religious uses of lan-
guage as ‘oblique’ and ‘evocative’ or ‘expressive’, in contrast to plain ‘informative’ language
(DONOVAN (1976: 11)): ‘In very broad terms, what happens in religious interpreting can be de-
scribed thus: the kinds of things in life found in one way or another to be religiously significant by
those who practice religions are taken to have meanings over and above their scientific, historical
or every-day meanings. These distinctively religious meanings they attempt to grasp and to com-
municate through the use of words, concepts, imagery, or stories drawn from the traditions of
religious belief’ (DONOVAN (1976: 100)).
150 GANERI (2001: 133 ff.), BALCEROWICZ (2003: 46 ff.).
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tion of general principle and specific situation, e.g. moral conflict.151 Hare advocates
a variant of the two-level theory of ethics. He argues that an exhaustive description
of a particular situation from the point of view of intuitive prima facie principles is
impossible, because they must be very general and simple. To inform moral choices,
prima facie principles need to be supplemented by exceptions, or by critical
principles, which ‘can be of unlimited specificity’.152 Both prima facie principles
and critical principles are universal prescriptions. However, critical principles can
only be universalised on condition of unlimited processes of specification by an
infinite intelligence, that is, an omniscient being. Because a superhuman ‘ideal ob-
server’153 can only serve as a theoretical vanishing point for finite cognition, the
need for prima facie principles and exceptions arises (HARE (1981: 44 ff.)).154
HARE’s (1981: 58) characterisation of the cognitive preconditions of ‘the rigor of
pure prescriptive universality’ enables us to recognise the similarities between the
Jain ideal of definite description, as a standard against which incomplete or vague
propositions can be measured, and Habermas’ ideal consensus of an infinite com-
munity of interpretation, against which both systematically distorted and latent stra-
tegic communication can be assessed. The subject-philosophical role of ‘omniscience’
and the universal pragmatic role of ‘infinite discourse’ are functionally equivalent.155
The comparison suggests also that the Jain ideal of omniscience is a logical conse-
quence of Jain epistemology, and not a mere product of fanciful religious specula-
tion.156 The question whether in specific contexts vague utterances are ambiguous or
                                             
151 Cf. supra, the discussion of rule-specification. See the critical discussion by WELLMER
(1986: 32–7), who argues that the problem of exceptions can only be solved in concrete situations
on the basis of ‘reasons’, not through processes of unlimited norm specification of ‘principles’, in
analogy to unlimited processes of specification of causal laws in the natural science. In human
history, the idea of a complete description does not even make sense as a regulative idea. There-
fore, this attempt to synthesise universal principles and specific situations cannot solve problems
of practical ethics. WELLMER (1986: 31)) himself derives secondary moral norms by way of nega-
tion of non-universalisable maxims.
152 HARE (1981: 41): ‘Briefly, generality is the opposite of specificity, whereas universality is
compatible with specificity, and means merely the logical property of being governed by a univer-
sal quantifier and not containing individual constants. The two principles “Never kill people” and
“Never kill people except in self-defence or in cases of adultery or judicial execution” are both
equally universal, but the first is more general (less specific) than the second.’
153 The term was introduced by Adam Smith.
154 HARE (1981: 40): ‘Critical thinking consists in making a choice under the constraints imposed
by the logical properties of the moral concepts and by the non-moral facts, and by nothing else.’
155 Infinite discourse also presupposes infinite knowledge (Lafont, in HABERMAS (2004: 256)).
156 This observation applies mainly to the historically later concept of ‘absolute omniscience’
as opposed to ‘complete self-realisation’.
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merely semantically underspecified157 cannot be rationally determined from a non-
omniscient perspective. From a participant’s point of view, under given normative
conditions, any utterance can be created or perceived as an intentionally plurivocal
symbol, even if the implicit indexical meaning or normative command can be inferred
unequivocally. Everything depends on the pragmatic context.
A peculiarity of the Jain theory of speech, derived from the Jain karman theory, is
that utterances are seen as material substances which stick to the impure soul but not
to a pure one. In fact, speech as a technique of social influence is not only an im-
portant subject for proselytising ascetics, trying to attract followers (systematic dis-
torted and latent strategic action are identical in this case),158 but also an explicit
topic of the Jain doctrine of karmic bondage, that is, the mechanism of binding
(bandha) the soul of a listener, through the medium of his / her passion (kašâya) and
desire (râga), via an influx (âsrava) of insight-generating pure matter (œuddha-
pudgala) (cf. TS 5.22). It is not necessary to recall the details and history of this
doctrine, because SCHUBRING’s (2000: 174, § 84) authoritative depiction of Jain
cosmology implicitly operates with a theory of Jain rhetorical influence. Schubring
shows, for instance, how processes of possession, which are considered to be the
reverse of insight, are explained in certain texts in terms of the sending of inauspi-
cious atoms (aœubha-pudgala) (SCHUBRING (2000: 151, § 69)); and how individual-
ity (which increases with social standing) and thus, ideally, the degree to which
karman is felt, generates the power of acting upon others, and to influence and bind
people by imprinting (dhâraòâ) certain karmic perceptions onto their soul via the
ejection of pudgala (SCHUBRING (2000: 181–7, § 87–91)):
‘This process [of speech] is, to put it briefly, the ejaculation (nisarai,
nisåjati) of substances (davva) taken in (geòhai) previously (now being
ready either for use or in store). They consist of ∞ atoms (aòanta-
paesiya), occupy the space of ¿ units, last for 1 sam. and own all
qualities possible with reference to colour, smell, taste and sensation.
Their reception is meant to bring about a close contact (puþþha,
ogâðha), i.e. with the units of the soul (âtma-pradeœa, Prajn.), and to it
both fine and coarse particles (aòu and bâyara) are subjected, which is
discussed circumstantially. The reception takes place either with or
without interruption (antara) in that either reception or ejaculation, or
both reception and ejaculation occur within 1 sam., and then, by the
way (267a), they will belong to the same content of speech (true, false
etc.) for which they were taken in. Their destiny depends on the inten-
                                             
157 A question raised by GANERI (2001: 133 ff.), and answered in the negative
158 Cf. SUNAVALA (1922: 26).
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sity of speech. As we learn from Prajn. on Pannav. 262b. and from Vy.
on Vij. 621b, when speaking [in a] low [voice] the particles of speech
leave the mouth in coarse portions (abhinna), but they do not reach far
and will perish soon, whereas when speaking loud they are finely di-
vided (bhinna), and in this case speech will increase infinitely and
reach the boundaries of the world’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 149, § 68).
The strategic production of religious influence via karmic binding is of course not the
primary concern of Jain karman theory, but certainly one of the possible consequences
of the application of Jain categories to worldly problems. From the conventional point
of view (VN), Jain scriptures describe speech as a potential weapon (duppautta-
maòo-vâyâ <dušprayukta-mana-vacana>) (Þhâò 10.93): ‘Speech, so Pannav. 255b
says, originates in the soul, while it becomes manifest in the body in the shape of a
thunderbolt … [and] exists only the moment when being spoken’ (SCHUBRING (2000:
148 f., § 68).159 Yet, fundamentally (PN) it is described only as an external ornament
of the soul without any intrinsic power, except the power of signification:
‘[1] Speech is different from the self (no âyâ bhâsâ, annâ bhâsâ). It is
concrete (lit. fashioned, rûviô), devoid of consciousness (acitta) and
inanimate (ajîva) though peculiar to living beings (jîvâòaô bhâsâ, no
ajîvâòaô bh.). [2] Speech exists and is divided’ (bhijjai) neither before
nor after but only during actual speaking. … .’ (Viy 621a = 13.7.1ab,
summarised by DELEU (1970: 199 f.)).160
If the hearer is aware of this s/he cannot be bound. Both interpretations derive
from the dualistic doctrinal distinction between soul and body, and their asymmetri-
cal hierarchical relationship.161
We can conclude from the foregoing discussion that, from the point of view of
Jain doctrine, both linguistic conventions and intentional language are vyavahâra—
worldly oriented—and ultimately of no religious value. Any pragmatic use of lan-
guage, even for purposes of religious instruction, has only relative value, because
the speaker is forced to orientate him / herself toward the external world, and to turn
away from the ideal meditative focus on the potentialities of the soul. From this per-
spective, one can hardly speak of a Jain concept of ‘religious language’ at all. Jains
never fully acknowledged the religious significance of mantras and other types of
                                             
159 Cf. Viy 102b, 621a, MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 321–6).
160 Cf. Âyâr 2.4.1.5. JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 3) points out that the commentator uses categories of
Vaiœešika philosophy to explain the meaning of this verse.
161 Cf. HUMPHREY–LAIDLAW (1995: 214) on the paradoxes generated by the Jain karman / jîva
code; and GANERI (2001: 137) on Jain ‘discourse pluralism … organised in a vertical hierarchy.’
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mystical utterances, which could be distinguish as ‘religious’ from ‘non-religious’
language. This applies even to Ardhamâgadhî, the liturgical language of the oldest
scriptures. The only religious ‘languages’ which Jains clearly recognise are silence
and meditative sounds, like Mahâvîra’s legendary divya-dhvani.162
Because Jain (and most Buddhist) philosophers recognise that language is rooted
in convention and mainly used for everyday communication, and other practical
purposes, discourse theoretical perspectives promise a useful new angle on the ne-
glected question of the socially constitutive function of Jain discourse. Studies of
the Jain philosophy of language to date focus almost exclusively on Jain semantics,
in particular on the seven nayas and the sapta-bhaógî, that is, pre-defined (but in
principle infinite) perspectives for the analysis of the semantics of words or sen-
tences under different contextual conditions. However, MATILAL (1981: 60 f.),
JOHNSON (1995a: 253), and GANERI (2001: 137), (2002: 275, 279 f.), following
earlier 20th century authors, interpret the Jain naya-schemes as models of ‘discourse
pluralism’, intended to integrate different perspectives in a syncretic and ultimately,
that is, from the perspective of unlimited perspectives, ‘complete account’. The
underlying theory of ‘intellectual ahiôsâ’ is doubted by CORT (2000: 341) with
reference to (a) scriptural examples of the ‘history of Jain struggles with non-Jains’,
and (b) criticism of the assumption that omniscience is ‘the sum total of all possible
nayas’: ‘The Jains posit that there is an absolutely true perspective’ (CORT (2000:
332)). The argument could be strengthened by a slight modification. Mistaking the
‘partial truth’ of a one-sided (ekânta) statement for the ‘whole truth’ is not the only
way of being wrong (durnaya) (CORT (2000: 331)) according to Jain philosophy.
Jain perspectivism is only concerned with the relationship between partially and
wholly true testimony (pramâòa), not with entirely false testimony (apramâòa),
which is excluded at the outset.163 Hence, it is not admissible to say that, by defini-
tion, ALL statements contain an element of truth. Strictly speaking, Jain naya doc-
trines are not theories of discourse, since they are focused exclusively on semantics.
Yet, the Jain scriptures and commentaries dealing with the practicalities of ascetic
life contain a general theory of the pragmatics of language usage, based on Jain
discourse ethics, and show how Jain principles applied to worldly problems generate
unique analytical possibilities of perceiving and manipulating speech. In contrast to
Jain semantics, which privileges the perspective of the listener, Jain pragmatics
privileges the perspective of the speaker.
                                             
162 On the systemic function of monastic silence and paradoxical language in general see
FUCHS (1989: 37).
163 Cf. BALCEROWICZ (2003: 46). The negative truth value (f) in the sapta-bhaógî relates only
to (underdetermined) existential predicates, not to statements that are doctrinally ‘false’, and ex-
posed as such in the polemical Jain literature.
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— VII —
Although Jain ascetics use the vernacular of their local followers, and reject the
Brâhmaòical idea of the intrinsic sacredness of certain words (MDhŒ 4.256), they
do maintain a clear distinction between religious and non-religious ways of USING
a given language, that is, the intrinsic structural (not metaphysical) features, inten-
tions and functions of an expression.164 In accordance with their basic religious
principles, they emphasise not the religious (dharmika) qualities of a language per
se but of speaking (and writing) as a social practice, and of the importance of the
underlying rules as well as the intention and function of speech.165 Already in the
early canonical scriptures, Jain ascetics developed a normative doctrine of religious
language usage, a discourse ethics supplemented by casuistic context-sensitive
rules, which, as I will now show in greater detail, shares certain concerns and fea-
tures with universal pragmatics.
Normative principles and rules of speech are constitutive for Jain discourse to the
extent that they are used by speech communities, both to generate and to interpret
speech. The way in which actual communication is informed by these principles is a
matter of empirical investigation. Characteristically, Jain norms of speech are pre-
sented in the form of hierarchical levels of universality and corresponding com-
petence of judgement and restraint of the speaker. Principles and rules of speech
inform practice in varying degrees, according to their level of abstraction. For the
following presentation, I distinguish four relevant dimensions of Jain doctrinal re-
flection on and prescription of ways of speaking:166
(1) Principles and criteria for religious speech (ahiôsâ and satya);
(2) General rules and clauses for language usage (bhâšâ-jâta);
                                             
164 BALCEROWICZ (2003: 53) observes: ‘No utterance is simply either true or false. In order to
ascertain its truth-value one has to ascribe it to its specific viewpoint type, that supplies the con-
textual information that is lacking.’ Similarly, no utterance is simply religious or non-religious.
165 Interestingly, speaker’s intention is not included in the list of Jain philosophical standpoints.
166 The underlying method of specification is akin to Jain methods of progressive specification
through fixed standpoints. See GANERI (2001: 133) for an analysis of the Jain view that linguistic
expressions are contextually ‘underspecified’ and contain ‘a hidden indexical element’ which Jain
dialecticians seek to systematically expose through the methods of syâd-vâda, using actual values
or quantifiers such as syât (GANERI (2001: 139)). For another example of the ways in which Jain
logicians contextualise utterances through a method of ‘progressive indexication’ of formalised
conditionally valid viewpoints (naya) or ‘context indicators’ which gradually specify the relevant
context in a controlled way see BALCEROWICZ (2003: 44 ff.). In contrast to the analysis of impli-
cations offered by universal pragmatics, Jain scholastic hermeneutics is based on dogmatically
fixed viewpoints considered in form of a monological pluralism.
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(3) Context-sensitive rules for proper ways of speaking;
(4) Examples (considering karmic and social implications) (dåšþânta).
(Ad 1) The main criteria for identifying ‘religious’ language-usage are (a) non-vio-
lence (ahiôsâ), and (b) truth (satya), that is, the first two of the five great and small
vows (mahâ-vrata and aòuvrata) of Jainism,167 which have to be accepted by anyone
who wants to be formally recognised as a practising Jain.168 ‘Non-religious’ language
is characterised by the opposite qualities—violence (hiôsâ) and non-truth or from the
point of view of the agent (the two perspectives are not clearly differentiated): non-
truthfulness (asatya).169
(Ad a) Ahiôsâ is the most important criterion for religious language usage. Jains, like
Buddhists, regard speech as an active force and a potential weapon which, if misused,
implies violence and negatively affects the karman of the one who handles it.170 However,
they also emphasise the fundamental connection between pure speech and spiritual ad-
vancement, which the Buddhist Subhâsita-sutta171 seems to deny.172 In order to mini-
mise violence, Jain âcâryas, like other South Asian legislators (cf. MDhŒ 4.138 f.), laid
great emphasis on the rules concerning proper speech, which they systematised proba-
bly for the first time in Indian philosophy:173 ‘the Jains insist on the absolute necessity
of refraining from directly or indirectly aggressive speech’ (CAILLAT (1984: 67)).
(Ad b) Truthfulness or truth (satya) is the one fundamental Jain principle that is
directly related to language use. Its importance for the Jains is indicated by the fact
that it is second only to the all-encompassing ahiôsâ-vrata, whereas it is given
fourth place in the Buddhist dasa-sîla list. The Âyâr II, one of the oldest texts of the
Jain tradition, gives the following wording of the satya-vrata (in Jacobi’s translation):
‘I renounce all vices of lying speech (arising from anger or greed or
fear or mirth). I shall neither myself speak lies, nor cause others to
                                             
167 ‘All the prohibitions and injunctions included in the two relevant lessons of Âyâr and Dasav
can be shown to proceed from the above fundamental principles, observance of truth based on
saôjama, and observance of ahiôsâ’ (CAILLAT (1991: 10)).
168 Most laity treats the aòuvratas only as regulative ideals.
169 Cf. BRUHN (1987a: 110), (1993: 28).
170 CAILLAT (1984: 64).
171 On well spoken language: ‘O Bhikkhus, the Bhikkhu speaks well-spoken (language), not
ill-spoken; he speaks what is right (dhamma), not what is unrighteous (adhamma); he speaks what
is pleasing, not what is unpleasing; he speaks what is true, not what is false. O Bhikkhus, the
speech that is provided with these four requisites, is well-spoken, not ill-spoken, both faultless and
blameless to the wise’ (SN 3.3).
172 CAILLAT (1991: 14).
173 CAILLAT (1984: 61).
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speak lies, nor consent to the speaking of lies by others. I confess and
blame, repent and exempt myself of these sins in the thrice threefold
way, in mind, speech, and body’ (Âyâr 2.15.3.1–5).174
Noticeable in this statement is, firstly, that lying is ‘renounced’, i.e. the possibility is
explicitly recognised, but deliberately excluded. Truth is not defined positively but
negatively, through the exclusion of what it is not; which has been a popular approach
in South Asian philosophy in general. Secondly, the vow refers to contexts of commu-
nication (speech acts such as consenting, causing others to do something). Thirdly,
speaking the truth and lying are conceived as effects of the emotions which motivate
the speaker’s intentions (as the clauses indicate). Truth is here not primarily perceived
in terms of the representational function of language, as a propositional relationship
between words and things, but in terms of the expressive and regulative functions of
language. After all, the intention of Jain authors was not primarily to produce a sound
semantic theory of truth, but a pragmatic method for the liberation of the soul. The
expressive aspect of speech, or truthfulness, is related to the character of the speaker,
that is, his / her ‘purity’ of insight and sincerity:175 ‘truth means the state of being true’
(TULSÎ (1985: 84)). The ethical and social dimensions of language are addressed in
Âyâr 2.4 and DVS 7.11 (see infra p. 161 and 162) in terms of the dispositions of the
speaker and the effects of language on speaker and hearer. Viy 25.1.4.a (854b) reflects
on fifteen kinds of activity (joga) which are affected by the four modes of inner sense
(maòa) and of speech (bhâsâ), which are seen as intrinsically connected.176 In all
cases, pivotal importance is given to avoiding violence.
It is worth noting that both the Jain theory of speech and the theory of communica-
tive action privilege pragmatic notions of truth. Habermas’ analysis of validity claims
focuses on the interplay of the dimensions of propositional truth, sincerity of expres-
sion and intersubjective rightness. Separately, these aspects are also distinguished in
Jain texts on ways of speaking. The multi-functional nature of utterances, the context-
relativity of truth values cum truth acts,177 and the relationship between belief and
meaning,178 etc., requires further investigation. In his analysis of intermodal transfer of
validity between speech acts, HABERMAS (1981: 442 f.) / (1984–1987 I: 444 f.),
(1984: 105–12, 126)) demonstrates that performative and ethical or aesthetic state-
ments also contain propositions, which can be questioned by interlocutors. Vows, for
instance, are expressives which also carry a strong normative element; while most
                                             
174 Cf. DVS 4.12.
175 SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74).
176 DELEU (1970: 267) points to the parallel in Paòò 317a where joga is replaced by paoga.
177 See FAUCONNIER (1981: 183) etc.
178 See DAVIDSON (1984: 153) etc.
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commissives and declaratives cannot work without emphasising the expressive com-
ponent.179 Declarations of sincerity, however, cannot be redeemed by argument but
only through behavioural practice. This observation makes us aware that one of the
functions of Jain ascetic practice is the public validation of sincerity, which is con-
verted into generalised acceptability qua prestige and moral authority.180
(Ad 2) The principles of ahiôsâ and satya are too abstract to be useful for judging
actual behaviour. This is why Jains have added further, lower order rules of lan-
guage usage, which supplement the general principles and facilitate translating them
into practice (speaking and writing). Two of the ‘senior’ canonical Jain texts deal
with language usage in greater detail—the chapter on modes (‘species’) of speech
(bhâsâ-jâya <bhâšâ-jâta>)181 in the Âyâr 2.4.1–2 and later parallels in the canon,182
and the chapter on pure speech (vakka-suddhi <vâkya-œuddhi>) in the Dasa-veyâliya
(Daœa-vaikâlika, DVS 7), which is probably derived from the Âyâr, but offers fur-
ther clarifying statements.183 In addition, there are several passages in the Viyâha-
pannatti (Bhagavatî, Viy),184 and the more systematic but on the whole ‘strikingly
ill-assorted’185 explanations of the modes of speech (language) in Chapter 11 of the
Pannavaòâ (Prajñâpanâ, Paòò) which, according to tradition, was composed c. 79–
37 BCE by an ascetic called Ârya Œyâma. The relevant passages of the Pannavaòâ
and its principal commentary, Âcârya Malayagiri’s (c. 1131–1203) Prajñâpanâ-þîkâ
(PaòòÞ), were summarised by SCHUBRING (2000: 148 f., § 68; 157 f., § 74),
MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 321–26) and, in passing, by CAILLAT (1991: 10 ff.).186 The
                                             
179 APEL (1993: 49).
180 Cf. HABERMAS (1981: 270 f.) / (1984–1987 II: 181 f.).
181 Sanskrit châyâ of Prakrit words is indicated by the symbols < >.
182 Uttar 24.22, Þhâò 4.23 (238) [183b/464b].
183 SCHUBRING’s (2000: 157 n. 2, § 74) opinion that the DVS version is derivative from the
Âyâr has been challenged by GHATAGE (1938: 137), who tried to prove the reverse. OKUDA (1975:
126) distinguishes between the Uttar (= Âyâr which is not mentioned) and DVS variants. Cf.
CAILLAT (1991: 2).
184 Viy 1.10 (103b), 10.3 (499b), 13.7 (621a).
185 SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74).
186 In addition to these key texts there are many scattered œlokas concerning proper speech in
the DVS 7–9. These texts are concerned with ‘humility’ and relate to the monastic environment,
i.e. the guru-œišya relationship. Similar passages can be found in the Âyâr and other texts which
deal with problems of monastic discipline, e.g. Uttar 1. They do not concern speech as such but
rather contextual factors, which I will discuss in the next section. DIXIT (1978: 59) notes, that ‘the
problem of employment of speech … is conspicuous by its absence in the old Cheda-sûtras’, and
that speaking is rarely mentioned in the later literature (but see FLÜGEL (1994: 110–115)). There
is, however, an extensive œrâvakâcâra literature, which specifies some of the old monastic rules of
the Âyâr and the DVS for the Jain laity. See WILLIAMS (1983: 71–8). I will refer to this literature
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categories of speech of the Âyâraôga (Âyâr), and one of the lists of sub-categories
of the Pannavaòâ appear also in Mûlâcâra (MÂc) 5.110–120 of the Digambara
author Vaþþakera. This text is generally dated 1st–3rd century CE (OKUDA (1975:
12 f.)), and must have been composed after the Pannavaòâ.
The situations which are depicted in these texts as problematic invariably show
individual ascetics interacting with the wider social environment, coinciding with
our paradigmatic speech situation type c. They are distinctly different from situa-
tions of monastic politeness (vinaya), formal sermons (pravacana), or public de-
bates (prayoga), which will be briefly discussed later.
The presentation of the bhâšâ-rules in the Âyâr is hierarchically structured in accor-
dance with Jain principles and ethos. It begins with the satya-mahâ-vrata, explaining
its various modes: referential truth, grammaticality, clarity of expression, the avoidance
of doubt, and of false promises etc. Then, various modalities of the ahiôsâ-mahâ-
vrata are described, such as the avoidance of harsh words, politeness, and indirect
affirmation of violent deeds of others.187 In addition to the vow of satya, five general
clauses are given to the neophyte. They explain how to avoid false speech. That is,
to speak with deliberation, and not in anger, fear, or mirth, because these states of
mind might move one to ‘utter a falsehood’ (Âyâr 2.15.3.1–5). Two further maxims
are important for the ascetics: the observance of the bhâšâ-samitis, the circumspection
regarding all speech acts, and of the bhâšâ-guptis, the controls of the four types of
speech, which are laid down in the Uttarajjhayaòa (Uttarâdhyayana, Uttar) 24.188
Like ahiôsâ and satya, they are intended to direct the attention away from violent
speech, from the expression of desire, and ultimately away from speech at all. These
maxims and rules are not linguistic in any technical sense, and not conventional or
customary in a folkloristic sense. They rather resemble the Gricean postulates, and
hence, I would argue, function within Jain philosophy in a manner similar to
operationalisations of HABERMAS’ (1980: 400) formal pragmatic presuppositions of
communicative action. That is, as principles, or general interpretive procedures,
                                                                                                               
only in footnotes. Because I am interested in the pragmatic aspect of speech, I will not discuss the
technicalities of the analytical-pedagogical nikšepa (transferring epithet) method and similar
purely exegetical devices of the Jains, which are used to delineate the true (intended) contextual
sense of an utterance through elimination of unwanted multivocality. It is important to note that
‘clear literal meaning’ is an explicit aim in (VN) Jainism.
187 Ahiôsâ is here not taken as a general principle, but only related to language. One could dis-
tinguish these two meanings as ahiôsâ I and ahiôsâ II. Satya takes precedence over ahiôsâ in this
context, because it is necessary to spell out rules of truthful speech first if one wants to discuss
ways of avoiding their violation. Cf. footnote 305.
188 Uttar 24.2, 24.22–23. See also TS 9.4–5. For further canonical references see SCHUBRING
(2000: 304 f., § 173).
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which theorise the normative conditions of the acceptability of statements, and
hence of the ability of language to avoid violence and to enable, or generate, both
non-violence and social co-operation (which is therefore seen as problematic).
In the following, I will analyse and compare these Jain modes of speech, both
with Habermas’ validity claims of truth, truthfulness and rightness, which corre-
spond to constative, representative, and regulative aspects of speech acts (which are
differently weighted in different contexts), and with the Gricean postulates, which
from the perspective of Habermas’ model further specify empirical pragmatic condi-
tions of validity claims. The discussion of some of the implications of the major
bhâšâ-rules follows, for purely formal reasons, the sequential order of Grice’s co-
operative principle and conversational maxims, though a mode of presentation ori-
ented towards Jain principles could have equally been chosen.
GRICE (1975: 45 f.) defines the ‘cooperative principle’ (CP), and the four main
‘conversational maxims’, which he labelled in analogy to the pure categories of
understanding (reine Verstandesbegriffe) in KANT’s (1974: 118 f.) transcendental
logic, as follows:
CP: ‘Make your conversational contribution such as required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of
the talk exchange in which you are engaged.’
Quantity: ‘Make your contribution as informative as required (for the cur-
rent purpose of the exchange). Do not make your contribution
more informative than is required.’
Quality: ‘Try to make your contribution one that is true: Do not say what
you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack ade-
quate evidence.’
Relation: ‘Be relevant.’
Manner: ‘Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief
(avoid unnecessary prolixity). Be orderly.’
Although the Gricean postulates are widely accepted as a theory of general princi-
ples of human communication, it is clear that partners in a conversation have to
resort to more than just the rules of their language and the cooperative principle. For
instance, to (1) conventional meaning of words and context, (2) background mean-
ing, such as common cultural assumptions etc. That is, dimensions such as those
listed as the seven Jain nayas. What counts as an appropriate, informative, true
(plausible), relevant, and unequivocal expression cannot be judged in abstract, but
only by the participants in a specific discourse. But it is the task of the analyst to
elicit both the unspoken conditions of communicative success and the social condi-
tions of fulfilment of speech acts in concrete situations. Here, I only indicate simi-
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larities and differences between the Gricean conversational postulates and analo-
gous categories of the Jain analysis of speech and discourse ethics, and attempt to
elicit the implications for a comparison with the theory of communicative action.189
Cooperative principle—non-violence (ahiôsâ)
Grice regards the cooperative principle as fundamental for any conversation. His
notion of ‘appropriateness’ corresponds to Habermas’ more general notion of ‘com-
municative intent’, which presupposes a commitment to the universal validity
claims of propositional truth, expressive truthfulness and normative rightness, in
addition to the basic condition of linguistic comprehensibility. Despite their differ-
ences, both notions are grounded in Kantian moral philosophy, rather than in utili-
tarian principles.190
Interestingly, in the two key Jain texts mentioned, no equivalent to the cooperative
principle per se can be found, nor, of course, is there any mention of a specific con-
sensus orientation. This is in accordance with the individual− or jîva-centred attitude
that is recommended from the ‘ultimate point of view’ (PN).
However, a passage in Kundakunda’s Samaya-sâra, whose importance has been
emphasised by CAILLAT (1984: 71 n. 54), clearly states the necessity to observe the
‘accepted purpose of the talk exchange’ (here: religious instruction), as maintained
by Grice’s principle. The purpose of this statement is to explain, why the teaching of
(ultimately incommunicable) Jain doctrines forces ascetics to give up their ideal
meditative silence temporarily to use worldly pragmatic language (VN) in agree-
ment with conventional standards of comprehensibility and rightness: 191
‘Just as a non-Aryan (foreigner) cannot be made to understand any-
thing except through the medium of his non-Aryan language, so the
knowledge of the Absolute cannot be communicated to the ordinary
people except through the vyavahâra point of view’ (SSâ 1.8).
                                             
189 Amongst the few South Asianists who considered Grice’s categories for understanding the
nature of religious language are WHEELOCK (1982) and SEYFORT RUEGG (1985) and for text inter-
pretation OETKE (1991: 61 ff.). The latter accepted the Gricean standards as cultural universals and
as a tool for the methodical reconstruction of an author’s ‘original intention’ (OETKE (1991: 35)),
arguing that ‘the Nyâyasûtras and the philosophical Sûtra-texts in general seem to be tailored to an
application of the Cooperative Principle and Grice’s conversational maxims’ (OETKE (1997: 140)).
See BRONKHORST (1993a). GÖHLER (1995b: 75), by contrast, argued that the speech act theories of
Austin and Searle are hardly applicable to written texts.
190 On Kant’s influence on the theory of communicative action see HABERMAS (1991).
191 The acceptance of linguistic conventions was generally taught in ancient India. See SCHARF
(1995) on Patañjali.
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The true insights of Jain teaching, it is stated here, cannot be understood by pupils
and the wider public if ascetics do not orientate themselves towards the capacities
and expectations of their audience and take a co-operative attitude. This is a Jain
version of the theory of ‘skilful means’ (upâya).192 The commentator Amåtacandra
explicitly states that ascetics should direct their utterances towards the pragmatic
‘purpose of the discussion’:
‘The ultimate reality must be subjected to an intellectual analysis and
the constituent elements so obtained must be selected and emphasised
according to the interest of the student and also consistent with the
purpose of the discussion. The variations in the context and the intel-
lectual aim will naturally determine the nature of the descriptions
adopted with reference to the reality studied. The method of selective
description to suit the purpose of the context is the method adopted by
the ordinary man … Since the method is determined by a purpose of
practical interest, the investigation will be relevant only to that purpose
and the conclusion obtained must therefore be partial … .’ (Commen-
tary on SSâ 1.8; p. 18 of Chakravarti’s rendition).
Supporting the spiritual quest of others is one of the duties of the (thera-kalpa) as-
cetic (DVS1 9.4.5). Yet, ultimately, social co-operation is not seen as a religious value
in itself, but as a hindrance for the process of self-purification. Teaching religion to
others is merely a ‘method determined by a purpose of practical interest’, but not di-
rectly oriented towards salvation itself, and therefore akin to the attitude ‘adopted by
the ordinary man who is engaged in his pursuit in life’ (SSâ 1.8, Commentary p.18).193
The doctrine of the ultimately (PN) non-religious character of teaching religious
knowledge is, I think, the prime reason for the conspicuous absence of any mention
of a functional equivalent of the cooperative principle itself in the Âyâr. From the
‘practical point of view’ (VN) co-operative intent is acceptable, and even assumes a
religious function, if the objective of the conversation is the furtherance of non-vio-
lence. In fact, the only difference between worldly co-operation (laukika-upakâra)
and religious instruction or supra-mundane co-operation (lokôttara-upakâra) is the
purpose of co-operation itself; that is, either the pursuit of worldly aims, or of the
purification of the soul.194 The same holds true for the difference between ‘worldly’
and ‘religious’ rhetoric, as we will see later. One should, therefore, expect men-
tioning of the cooperative principle in the AS’s discussion of pragmatic language
                                             
192 For Buddhist notions see for instance PYE (1978).
193 See the discussion of the ‘maxim of relation’ below.
194 TULSÎ (1985: 174 f.).
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usage as well. In order to explain its absence, I suggest an additional argument,
derived from the observation that violence is the main threat to co-operation, and,
conversely, that non-violence is its fundamental pre-condition. Thus, we find that
the value of ahiôsâ, which ultimately promotes total non-action (ayoga) in the
world, also reflects, on a secondary level, the potential of total (hierarchical and
non-violent) co-operation, in the sense of opening spaces, refuges, for existence
(Seinlassen). Accordingly, many Jain texts emphasise that the implication of
ahiôsâ, non-violence, is dayâ, compassion. The ahiôsâ-mahâ-vrata, therefore,
implies the sought-after cooperative principle, although it does not say so explicitly.
Indeed, from a Jain point of view, it could be argued, with good reason, that the
positive notion of communicative intent is merely an application of the more gen-
eral negative moral principle of non-violence within the sphere of social life. This
begs the question: How universal are the cooperative principle and the formal prag-
matic validity claims? Does communicative intent presuppose a more fundamental
commitment to an ethics of (physical) non-violence?195 The cooperative principle,
albeit apparently only concerned with straightforward information transmission
from speaker to hearer, implies normative conditions such as physical non-violence
(and of non-silence) to ensure ongoing linguistic co-operation. But it remains indif-
ferent to the distinction between violent and non-violent aspects of overt speech
(and of thought) itself. Communicative action considers form and content of speech
also only under formal aspects, that is, acceptability, which may include violent
communications. The Jain principle of ahiôsâ, by contrast, implies not only formal
but also qualitative conditions for the perpetuation of co-operation.
Numerous examples of rules concerning violent speech in the Âyâr and DVS im-
plicitly refer to non-violence as a condition for co-operation and as form of co-op-
eration, as in the following œloka:
‘Revered is he who speaks not ill in one’s absence, who uses not a
sharp tongue in one’s presence, who speaks not with assertion, nor
uses words that are harsh’ (DVS2 9.3.8–9).
It is not apparent from this statement why these attitudes should be revered, apart
from general considerations of the detrimental effects of violence on the karmic
                                             
195 Christian theologians attacked the self-limitation of universal pragmatics to formal condi-
tions of social communication from similar vantage points. PEUKERT (1984), (1992), for instance,
argues for the priority of the ‘resource’ of ‘universal solidarity’ in the lifeworld over communica-
tive ethics. The objective idealist HÖSLE (1997: 248 ff.) complains about the moral indeterminacy
of formal consensus (reasonable / unreasonable) and calls for a defence of ethics based on substan-
tial values; as do other ‘Neo-Aristotelians’ discussed by HABERMAS (1983), (1991), who accepts
this point and modifies his position in HABERMAS (2004).
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constitution on the speaker. But it is clear by implication that one who avoids ‘sharp
tongue’ etc., is revered also because, otherwise, the continuation of co-operation is
threatened and might be terminated. This and many similar statements implicitly
stress the value of completely avoiding ‘face-threatening acts’, although not saying
so openly. They are presented in the form of negations of non-universalisable
maxims.196 The closest one can get to an explicit, positive postulate of a ‘co-
operative principle’ are statements concerning the ascetic values of offering fear-
lessness (abhaya-dâna) and supra-mundane co-operation (pâramârthikôpakâra) for
the upliftment of the soul, which are seen as the greatest gift to society, in fact, consti-
tuting its fundamental condition.
Paradoxically, however, the methods of liberation taught by Jain ascetics do not
emphasise co-operation but its direct opposite: separation and non-interaction with
the world. This paradox is the main obstacle for an understanding of the social im-
plications of the principle of ahiôsâ. SEYFORT RUEGG (1985) addressed this prob-
lem in Gricean terms in an interpretation of the Âbhiprâyika− and Neyârtha-sûtras of
Tibetan Buddhism. He argues that the Buddha’s way of teaching non-cooperation
amounts to an act of ‘flouting’ not only of the conversational maxims, but of the co-
operative principle itself. But because the Buddha’s acts of ‘flouting’ are not in-
tended for the achievement of worldly gains, but for the spiritual liberation of oth-
ers, SEYFORT RUEGG introduces the terms ‘salvific principle’ and ‘salvific violence’
as religious supplements to the pragmatic Gricean ‘cooperative principle’:
‘In fact Grice’s Cooperative Principle yields in such Sûtras to what we
might call a Salvific Principle put to use in a perlocutionary manner.
Still, in conformity even with this Salvific Principle of the Buddha,
‘flouting’—or more specifically upâya-governed salvific exploita-
tion—of the Conversational Maxims are to be found in Âbhiprâyika
and Neyârtha Sûtras, just as they have been recognized in Grice’s sec-
ond type of conversational implicature involving exploitation of con-
versational maxims’ (SEYFORT RUEGG (1985: 317)).
SEYFORT RUEGG’s remarks are useful for understanding salvific violence, which
‘conquers violence’. At the same time, his analysis is problematic, because he does
not clearly distinguish between linguistic co-operation and social co-operation. Even
the Buddha (or Mahâvîra) was of course forced to observe the cooperative principle
during his sermons, like everyone else who wishes to communicate (SEYFORT
RUEGG (1985: 315)), even if esoteric Buddhist (and Digambara Jain) schools deny
this. From a pragmatic point of view, the ‘salvific principle’ of insight creation
                                             
196 Cf. WELLMER (1986: 24 f.).
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through acts of symbolic violence appears merely as a culturally specific norm, a
systematic distortion of communication which, indeed, as SEYFORT RUEGG (1985:
318) argues, cannot be inferred from the surface meaning of a communication, only
elicited via a systematic hermeneutics of the doctrinal system as a whole. Yet, from
an emic point of view, the non-motivated ‘intentional ground’ of socially ‘purposeful’
communication, cannot be simply identified with the codified doctrinal system of
Buddhism, as SEYFORT RUEGG (1985: 314 f.) suggests, because it refers to the exis-
tential conditions of meaning per se which can be explored only through direct medi-
tative experience. From an etic point of view, the Buddhist intention to put an end to
intention as a value, compared for instance with the phenomenological theory of the
constitutive role of the structure of intentionality of consciousness or Dasein, is one
ideology amongst others, and must be communicated in a conventional way.197
The conundrum of ideal non-cooperation becomes clearer, if we consider not only
discourse but also religious practice. The practice of renunciation, which Buddhist and
Jain doctrines aim to stimulate, is a religiously sanctioned act of social separation and
selective non-cooperation, which does involve what might be termed ‘sacred violence’,
in opposition to ‘physical violence’ and ‘symbolic violence’ (flouting) in the two forms
of latent strategic action and systematically distorted communication (‘salvific vio-
lence’). Within a hierarchical system, renunciation is a paradoxical act of status
encompassment which creates at the same time new asymmetrical social relationships
(renouncer / renounced, guru / devotees) and symmetrical social relationships (between
devotees). In this way, acts of social separation and religious self-limitation are socially
constitutive and culturally regenerative. Renunciation does not necessarily violate the
conversational ‘cooperative principle’. But, as a one-sided act of transcendence and
symbolic incorporation of already established links of social co-operation, it contributes
to the legitimation of stratified systems of functional differentiation and moral divisions
of labour. Following DUMONT (1980: 197) and SEYFORT RUEGG (1985), I therefore
propose to distinguish between the ‘salvific’ violence of (Jain) religious rhetoric and the
‘sacred violence’ of the quasi-sacrificial act of renunciation itself.198 Effectively, Jain re-
nouncers do not live outside society, but ‘unbound … amongst the bound’
(Âyâr 2.16.7). After renunciation, linguistic co-operation is strictly regulated, but con-
tinues. Worldly social co-operation, however, is severed more radically, although only
unilaterally, while the scope of social co-operation in religious contexts is actually wid-
ened.199 Sacred violence differentiates the levels of institutional non-violence and vio-
lence, while conditioning the patterns of selective co-operation. The necessary violence
                                             
197 See FAURE (1991), SHARF (1995).
198 On ‘sacred violence’, see for instance GIRARD (1977) and his critics.
199 FLÜGEL (2006a: 333 f.).
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(ârambhajâ hiôsâ) of the social world is always presupposed by Jain ascetics, in form
of Brâhmaòic household rites, the state and the socio-economic institutions and activi-
ties of their followers, which grant them one-sided material support:
‘The lay estate … cannot exist without activity and there can be no ac-
tivity without the taking of life; in its grosser form this is to be avoided
sedulously but the implicit part of it is hard to avoid’ (Âœâdhara’s 13th
CE Sâgara-dharmâmåta 4.12 summarised by WILLIAMS (1983: 121)).
Institutionalised ahiôsâ, therefore, does not only imply dayâ, but also hiôsâ,
within a structure of moral division of labour. That is, conceptually as well as prac-
tically, it necessarily implies—even presupposes—its own opposite.
In all these cases, from the practical point of view (VN), the principle of co-operation
is implicitly presupposed, if not constituted, by unconditional acts of one-sided renun-
ciation, although only the avoidance of violence is expressed. From the transcendental
point of view (PN), however, ahiôsâ requires total non-cooperation with the world.
Both possibilities of action, co-operation and non-cooperation, are open only to an indi-
vidual which, by positing renunciation as the norm, is able to ‘offer cooperation’, or
withdraw it,200 selectively. It is mainly because the interdependence (and potential con-
flict) between the renouncer and the world cannot be stated openly in systems of hierar-
chical co-operation, that the Jain principle of ahiôsâ fulfils the functions both of the
linguistic cooperative principle and of the constitutive principle of social co-operation
only implicitly: without saying so.201 In fact, most Jain norms for well spoken language
do not advocate positive values, but the avoidance of their violation. Negative principles
such as these are of a different kind than positive prescriptions à la Grice, who demands
‘do cooperate’, whereas the Jains implicitly say, ‘do not not cooperate’. Thus, co-op-
eration is implied in ahiôsâ, but in a modalised form.
The method of universalisation of specific moral norms and maxims qua double ne-
gation has been defended by WELLMER (1986: 21–37),202 against HABERMAS (1991:
167 f., 172 f.) objection that consequentialist concepts of universal morality, predi-
cated on norms of prohibition qua single or double negation, are inspired by the re-
stricted ‘liberal’ aim of creating spaces of negatively defined individual freedom, con-
trasted with positive maxims, which are oriented towards publicly negotiated common
interest. According to Habermas, the individualist conception of morality is based on a
                                             
200 Cf. SHARP (1960), (1973).
201 DUMONT (1980: 44, 60).
202 WELLMER (1986: 21 f.) argues that because obligatory norms of specific content cannot be
derived from the categorical imperative of Kant, secondary moral norms are necessary which can
only be derived by way of negation of non-universalisable maxims. See also the work of SINGER
(1961) and HARE (1981), critically discussed by Wellmer.
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negative reading of the monologically applied categorical imperative. In contrast to
positive duties, negative duties (and positive permissions) derive their plausibility
from the qualities of apodictic prohibition: (a) unconditional validity, (b) determinate-
ness of content, and (c) unequivocal specification of addressees. From the perspective
of the potential victim, to every negative duty corresponds a right; for example, to the
duty not to kill, the right to body and life. Yet, a principle of morality which permits
only the legitimation of general norms of prohibition cannot serve as an unequivocal
basis for the constitution of a positive common will. WELLMER (1986: 31 f.) and
HABERMAS (1991: 170 f.) agree that neither positive nor negative duties can claim
absolute validity, because every situation is different, and requires the invocation of
different norms. In discourses of norm application, as opposed to norm legitimation,
both negative and positive rights and duties can act as reasons for appropriate ac-
tion,203 though positive norms tend to be more unspecific. Yet, in concrete situations,
moral norms themselves cannot be legitimated privately, only from the perspective of
‘common interest’, determining what is equally good ‘for all’. While positive norms
are burdened with discourses concerning concrete aims (problem of prognostics, per-
formance, attribution of outcomes and unintended consequences, expectation and
moral division of labour, evaluation of a result in terms of quantifiable aims), negative
norms seem to remain aloof of problems of application, which cannot be avoided alto-
gether though. Negatively defined principles can only protect the integrity and subjec-
tive freedom of the potential victim and, by implication, the freedom of the individual
moral person itself. This may be the general principle underlying the Jain practice of
deliberate renunciation of all violent action.204
The absence of positive principles in Jain ethics has frequently been criticised. In
HABERMAS (1991: 166 f.) view, positive duties cannot be based on negative duties,
but only on the principle of mutual recognition informing communicative action.205 In
                                             
203 HABERMAS (1991: 170): ‘Die unwahrhaftige Auskunft, die einem anderen das Leben rettet,
ist moralisch ebenso geboten, wie die Tötung in Notwehr oder die unterlassenen Hilfeleistung zur
Vermeidung größerer übel moralisch erlaubt sind.’
204 See the ‘ten commandments’ of GERT’s (1973) ‘minimal ethic’, and C. FRIED (1978: 29)
cited by HABERMAS (1991: 172): ‘What we may not do to each other, the things which are wrong,
are precisely those forms of personal interaction which deny to our victim the status of a freely
choosing, rationally valuing, specially efficacious person—the special status of moral personality.’
205 According to HEGEL (1981: 148 ff.) voluntary death is the absolute proof of freedom in the
struggle for recognition. Liberation, both in a social and a religious sense, is also the positive implica-
tion of the Jain practice of sallekhanâ, the culmination of the process of implementing the negatively
formulated rule of non-violence. HABERMAS (1991: 173 f.), similarly, notes the fundamental nature of
‘self-referential’ norms which implicitly define the duty of fulfilling the pragmatic presuppositions of
communicative action, i.e. the positive norms of preserving the physical integrity of the body and life
and personal freedom which seems sometimes more important than death.
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his conception of morality, private morality and public justice differ not in principle,
only in terms of the types of institutionally mediated interaction. The positive norma-
tive equivalent of the apodictic prohibition of speaking the untruth (“you should not
lie”) from the communication theoretical perspective is phrased in the following way:
‘Act with an orientation to mutual understanding and allow everyone
the communicative freedom to take positions on validity claims’
(HABERMAS (1991: 173) / (1993: 66)).
Interestingly, this is not a maxim of truthfulness, but a reformulation of the coopera-
tive principle. Being truthful, does not only imply the renunciation of deception, but is
a positive act which contributes to the constitution of a social rela tionship.
There is another, practical, reason for the negative formulation of the cooperative
principle. A negative statement forces the ‘user’ or interpreter of such a principle to
work out the implied positive contextual presuppositions. This process involves the
personal experiences of the individual concerned, in such a way that the positive
‘implied’ meanings and / or functions of the formal principle appear to be generated
from the inner pool of values and expectations of the individual itself, and not as an
externally imposed rule. The realm of ‘sociability’ or of ‘the social’ itself is theo-
rised as an aspect of personal character, and not as an independently existing dimen-
sion of intersubjectivity (as in modern law, moral philosophy and sociology). From
the perspective of Jain ethics, positive rules are generally regarded as lower order
specifications of negative rules, whose conditions of application are implicitly pre-
supposed. Negative rules secure a higher degree of formality and universality than
positive rules, and hence greater contextual adaptability.206 These are some of the
reasons why positive principles are seldom expressed explicitly in the âgamas, but
left to the interpretative imagination of their users, who have to work out their con-
ditions of fulfilment.207 However, if ahiôsâ is the functional equivalent of the co-
operation principle, likewise do the modalities of the satya-mahâ-vrata correspond
to the conversational maxims, to which I will turn now.
Quantity—restraint (saôyama)
There is no equivalent Habermasian validity claim for Grice’s quantity-maxim,
although it could be easily constructed. Functional equivalents of the maxim among
the Jain rules of speaking are the principles of deliberation, moderation, and re-
straint (saôjama <saôyama>). Even if something is true, but is not to be said
                                             
206 Cf. GONDA (1959).
207 Closest to Grice’s formulation of this principle is Âyâr 2.4.1.6–7 (examples: Âyâr 2.4.8–11,
cf. DVS 7.11, Âyâr 2.4.2.19).
154 PETER FLÜGEL
                                                                                                                                        
(avattavva <avaktavya>), because it may create harm, or if it cannot be understood,
one should not say it. The purpose of the latter maxim is to avoid unintentional am-
biguity due to ignorance of the listeners (cf. SSâ 1.8).208 The information processing
aspect is expressed in Jain texts in general terms, such as ‘speaking with precision’
or ‘straightforward’ (åju). Often prescriptions are mixed with moral considerations,
thus overlapping with the manner aspect, as the following example demonstrates:
‘A monk or nun, putting aside wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, consid-
ering well, speaking with precision, what one has heard, not too quick,
with discrimination, should employ language in moderation and re-
straint’ (Âyâr 2.4.2.19).209
There is no mention here of the recipient of an utterance, nor of the ‘information’
to be communicated. The reasons are similar as in the case of the ‘cooperative prin-
ciple’ ahiôsâ. Restrained speech is regarded in Jainism primarily (PN) as an exer-
cise in self-purification, to be measured in terms of the strength of the commitment
to Jain values, and the degree of Jain interactional competence. Only indirectly (VN) is
restrained speech regarded as a vehicle for the univocal transmission of information.
This, again, derives from the fact that the realm of the ‘social’ is only presupposed
as a background for the individual ‘path of purification’.210
The problem of ambiguity resulting from the fact that, from the perspective of PN,
VN might be taken as a ‘mixture of truth and untruth’ is important. Interestingly, it
is discussed in the Âyâr and DVS itself in the context of half-true speech, or satyâ-
måšâ bhâšâ (see infra pp. 162–169):
                                             
208 Cf. CAILLAT (1975: 80). See VANDERVEKEN’s (1993: 378) generalisation of this maxim in
terms of the ‘strength’ of illocutionary acts, ‘in the sense that they have more conditions of suc-
cess, of non-defective performance … .’ For similar Jain formulations see BALBIR (1993: 71).
From the hearer’s point of view (which is not mentioned in the Âyâr sections on speech), the most
important quality is the ability to ‘conquer one’s senses’ and not to become restless through the
‘lashes of words reaching the ears’ (DVS2 9.3.8).
209 CARRITHERS (1990: 157–9) singles saôvara out, as the singular ‘aesthetic standard’
‘underlying both the rules and the morality’ of Jainism. This concept of aesthetics (which is
linked, in a footnote, with the concept of habitus) does not account for the normative religious
aspects of saôvara. The same applies to LAIDLAW (1995: 159).
210 BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 218 ff.) suggest corresponding off-record strategies to Grice’s
quantity-maxim: understatement, overstatement, and tautologisation. STRECKER (1988: 194) sees
silence as an extreme-form of the off-record strategy of understatement and thus as a violation of
the quantity maxim. From the ‘practical point of view’ this may be correct. For Jains, silence is
the prime vehicle of exercising restraint, as indicated by the bhâšâ-gupti, and counts as a form of
penance. For instance, an ascetic who fasts for one month ‘may express himself by four ways
only: by begging for alms, by putting a question, by making a request for lodging and by giving an
answer’ (Þhâò 183b, in SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74).
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‘Speaks not the wise something which is not known, or which gener-
ates confusion—whether this or that sense is right’ (DVS2 7.4).
Ideally, a mendicant should remain silent. Otherwise, straightforward speech
should be used. All language that could be both truth  and false should be avoided:
‘In speaking (a monk) should use as few words as possible; he should
not delight in another’s foibles; he should avoid deceiving speech, and
should answer after ripe reflection.—One will repent of having used
the third kind of speech (which is both true and untrue—P.F.); a secret
should not be made known. This is the Nirgrantha’s command.—[A
monk] should not call one names, nor “friend”, nor by his Gotra;
“thou, thou” is vulgar; never address one by “thou”’ (Suy 1.9.25–27).
Quality—truth (satya)
The equivalent of Grice’s quality-maxim is satya, or truth. VANDERVEKEN (1993:
377) has shown that the maxim of quality can be generalised to cover commissives and
directives, as well as assertives. A maxim of truth is positively expressed in the satya-
mahâ-vrata, which Jain ascetics recite twice a day during their obligatory pratikramaòa
ritual (see supra).211 However, in accordance with the preferred Jain method of negative
determination, the general principle of truth is treated in this context only in terms of its
characteristic violations (aticâra), that is, as the opposite of non-truth (asatya). The
precise implications of the maxim of truth for language usage are specified elsewhere in
form of a distinction of four types or ‘species’ of speech (bhâsâ-jâya <bhâšâ-jâta>),
which are at the centre of the Jain theory of discourse, which looks at speech primarily
as an object, and not from the perspective of the speaker. These analytical categories
should be known and utilised by mendicants (ideally by all Jains) to prevent both the
preparation and performance of violence (ârambha):
‘A mendicant should know that there are four kinds of speech: The first
is truth; the second is untruth; the third is truth mixed with untruth; what
is neither truth, nor untruth, nor truth mixed with untruth, that is the
fourth kind of speech: neither truth nor untruth’ (Âyâr 2.4.1.4).212
                                             
211 WILLIAMS (1983: 73) quotes Somadeva’s (959 CE) ‘casuistic analysis’ of the satya
aòuvrata for the laity with the help of this tetrad as an original statement, although it is clearly
only a restatement of Âyâr 2.4.1.4.
212 Âyâr 2.4.1.4: aha bhikkhû jâòejjâ cattâri bhâsâ-jâyâiô, taô jahâ—saccam egaô paðhamaô
bhâsa-jâyaô, bîyaô mosaô, taiyaô saccâ-mosaô, jaô ò’eva saccaô ò’eva mosaô ò’eva saccâ-
mosaô—asaccâ-mosaô òâma taô cautthaô bhâsâ-jâyaô. CAILLAT (1991: 8 n.4) located the fol-
lowing parallels to the above sûtra in the Œvetâmbara canon: Uttar 24.20–23, Þhâò 4.23 (238), Viy
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Notably, the same scheme of four modes is applied to speech and to cognition
(maòa <manas>) or knowledge (òâna <jñâna>) (Viy 622b/8.7.1b, 874b/15.1.4).
Hence, the four bhâsâ-guttis <bhâšâ-guptis>, or controls of speech, and the four
maòa-guttis <mano-guptis>, or controls of the inner sense, are both characterised by
the same terms in Uttar 24.19–23. The four modes, thus, represent general attitudes
towards truth, both in mind and in speech:
1. saccâ <satyâ> truth
2. mosâ <måšâ> untruth
3. saccâ-mosâ <satyâ-måšâ> truth mixed with untruth
4. asaccâ-mosâ <asatyâ-måšâ> neither truth nor untruth
 The formal structure of the four alternatives (tetra-lemma) is known as catuš-koþi
in Buddhist literature, but used differently here.213 As the frequent use of the four
                                                                                                               
13.7.1a (621a-b), Pannavaòâ 11 (860–866). See also Viy 16.2.2b (701a), 18.7.1 (749a), 19.8
(770b), Samavâya 13.1, and DVS 7.1–3. OHIRA (1994: 14, 155) is of the opinion that the four
modes were first taught at the time of DVS 7, which she dates between 5th–4th century BCE.
213 There is an extensive academic literature on the catuš-koþi in Buddhist philosophy. See for
instance SCHAYER (1933), RAJU (1954), MURTI (1955), BAHM (1957), ROBINSON (1957), STAAL
(1962), SMART (1964), JAYATILLEKE (1967), CHI (1974), SEYFORT RUEGG (1977), WAYMAN
(1977), JONES (1978), GUNARATNE (1980), (1986), BHARADWAJA (1984), SCHROEDER (2000), and
others. STAAL (1962: 52 n. 4) suggests the earliest passage to be Majjhima-nikâya 63. Nâgârjuna’s
(2nd CE) positive formulation of the ‘tetralemma’ (ROBINSON (1957: 303)) in his Mûla-madhyamaka-
kârikâ 18.6 attracted most academic interest (even more so the negated forms): ‘Everything is either
true or not true, or both true or not true, or neither true or not true; that is the Buddha’s teaching’
(Translated by ROBINSON (1957: 302), cf. MMK 18.8). In contrast to the debate on the use of the
catuš-koþi in ‘Buddhist logic’, focusing largely on the ‘negative dialectic’ of Nâgârjuna, the cited
Jain cases indicate that the catuš-koþi was used (at least by Jains) as a quasi-systematic scholastic
frame for the discussion of logical alternatives, without specific doctrinal implications being con-
nected with the frame itself. MURTI (1955: 129) noted early on: ‘Four alternative views are possi-
ble on any subject’ (referring to Madhyamaka and Jainism: he also cites Haribhadra) (see also CHI
(1974: 298)). Notably, the four alternatives in Âyâr 2.4.1.4 etc., are disjunctive, not additive, as
stereotypical representations of ‘Jaina Logic’ generally assume. Because Jain usage of catuš-koþis
was ignored, and because of the almost exclusive focus on Nâgârjuna, Buddhist scholars compared
the ‘four-cornered negation’ only with the ‘Jain relativism’ in general. They derived the catuš-koþi
either speculatively from Jain syâd-vâda (GUNARATNE (1980: 232)) or vice versa (BAHM (1957:
128)), or (and) contrasted it with ‘the relativistic logic proposed by the Jains, to which Buddhism
was opposed’ (JAYATILLEKE (1967: 82)). According to RAJU (1954), the mythical Sanjaya framed
the four alternatives already in the 7th century BCE, negating all of them, whereas ‘Jaina logicians
saw a relative truth in each pole and thus adopted a more positive and determinate attitude toward
our cognitions of the world.’ For recent, less logocentric, views on Nâgârjuna, focusing on
‘skillful means’, see for instance JONES (1978), SCHROEDER (2000). A similar four-valued theory
of truth was defended by the Megarians (PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 13)), which demonstrates that
no specific philosophical position is associated with the form itself, only with its uses.
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alternatives (catur-bhaóga or catur-bhaógî) as a classificatory scheme in Þhâò IV,
for instance, indicates,214 the catuš-koþi is used in Jain scholasticism in a similar way
as the nikšepa pattern, described by BRUHN–HÄRTEL (1978: v) as a formal
‘dialectical technique (often employed in a “pseudo-exegetical function”)’. 215
JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2) understood the first three modes to refer to assertions and
the fourth to injunctions. According to Paòò 860 (255b), the first two modes are
distinct (pajjattiyâ <paryâptâ>) ways of speaking, which can be analysed in terms
of the true / false distinction, and the third and fourth are indistinct (apajjattiyâ
<aparyâptâ>) ways of speaking, whose validity or non-validity is indeterminable.
The sub-categories of distinct speech are true speech (satyâ bhâšâ) and false speech
(måšâ bhâšâ), and the sub-categories of indistinct speech are true-as-well-as-false
speech (satyâ-måšâ bhâšâ) and neither-true-nor-false speech (asatyâ-måšâ bhâšâ). A
muni should use only the first and the last mode of speech, and avoid the remaining
two ‘by all means’ (DVS2 7.1) in order to minimise harm:
‘A monk or a nun, considering well, should use true and accurate speech,
or speech which is neither truth nor untruth (i.e. injunctions); for such
speech is not sinful, blameable, rough, stinging, &c.’ (Âyâr 2.4.1.7).216
                                             
214 See DUNDAS (2007: 50 f.) on the analogy between four types of armies and four types of
ascetics in Þhâò 292 (4.280–1). ALSDORF (1966: 186 f., cf. 190 f.) discussed a different type of
catur-bhaógas in Jaina literature, made up of combinations of two positive and two negative pos-
sibilities. He pointed out that the use of the ‘fourfold combination’ is ‘very typical of the scholas-
tic who never misses an opportunity to make a “caturbhanga”, i.e. the four possible combinations
of two positive and two negative possibilities…’ (p. 186).
215 Þhâò 3.239 offers also a trilemma: (1) to state the truth (tavvayaòa <tadvacana>), (2) to state
the untruth (tadaòòavayaòa <tadanyavacana>), (3) to state something meaningless or negative (no-
avayaòa <no-avacana>); Þhâò 7.129 a heptalemma: (1) speech (âlâva <âlâpa>), (2) taciturnity (aò-
âlâva <an-âlâpa>), (3) flattery (ullâva <ullâpa>), (4) insult (aò-ullâva <an-ullâpa>), (5) dialogue
(saôlâva <saôlâpa>), (6) prattle (palâva <pralâpa>), (7) contradiction (vi-ppalâva <vi-pralâpa>).
216 I do not give the original wording in all cases. In different words, the same teaching is ex-
pressed in DVS1 7.1–3, which may be the oldest text concerning this subject:
cauòhaô khalu bhâsâòaô parisaôkhâya pannavaô /
doòhaô tu viòayaô sikkhe, do na bhâsejja savvaso // 1 //
jâ ya saccâ avattavvâ saccâmosâ ya jâ musâ /
jâ ya buddhehi ’òâinnâ, na taô bhâsejja pannavaô // 2 //
a-sacca-mosaô saccaô ca aòavajjam akakkasaô /
samuppeham asaôdiddhaô giraô bhâsejja pannavaô // 3 //
‘[1] Of the four kinds of speech, the thoughtful monk] should, after consideration,
learn the training in two, [but] should not use the other two ones at any occasion.
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(a) Speaking truthfully can either be interpreted ethically, as straightforward and ac-
curate talk (on-record), or ontologically, as an assertion of the way things are.217 Both
perspectives can be found in the Jain and non-Jain commentary literature alike,218 often
mixed together, as the identical characterisation of the four guptis of mind and speech
illustrates. Satyâ bhâšâ refers both to the psychological and the normative conditions of
truthfulness, that is, sincere, grammatically accurate and contextually acceptable speech,
and to propositional truth.219 It is explicitly recognised in the Jain scriptures (though not
in these terms) that, as a speech act, propositional language has also an expressive and
normative content. The normative, the expressive, and the propositional components of
spoken language are altogether necessary to communicate something.
Paòò 862 states that ‘the truth or validity of the speech depends on various situations
and conditions’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1970: 325)). Ten different dimensions or ‘validity con-
ditions’ of truthful speech are distinguished220 (the compound −saccâ <satyâ> can be
translated as ‘sincere’ or ‘true’ ‘according to the conventions of ____’):221
 1. jaòavaya-saccâ <janapada-satyâ> Country
 2. sammata-saccâ <sammata-satyâ> Consensus
 3. þhavaòâ-saccâ <sthâpanâ-satyâ> Representation
 4. òâma-saccâ <nâma-satyâ> Name
 5. rûva-saccâ <rûpa-satyâ> Form
                                                                                                               
[2] That [form of speech] which is true, [but] not to be uttered, that which is half-
true, that which is [quite] untrue and which is not practised by the Jinas, the
thoughtful monk should not use.
[3] [But] he should, after deliberation, use a speech not exposed to doubt, [a
speech] which is neither true nor untrue and [a speech] which is true, provided that
it is not to be blamed [and] rough’ (SCHUBRING (1932: 101)).
See Âyâr 2.4.8–11 and cf. DVS 7.11, 7.2 for examples.
217 Cf. HABERMAS’ (1980: 419 ff.) / (1984–1987 I: 312 ff.) defence of his clear-cut distinction
between claims to truth and claims to truthfulness.
218 Mookerjee, in TULSÎ (1985: 107): ‘Truthfulness is the revelation of truth. (Gloss) Truth
means the straight-forwardness [åjutâ] in deed (physical movement), intention and word, and non-
discrepant behaviour. The revelation (disclosure) of that truth is called truthfulness.’ ‘(Note) Here
“truth”, as an ethical principle, is defined and explained. Umâsvâti [Tattvârtha-bhâšya 7.9], how-
ever has included revelation of ontological reality also as an aspect of truthfulness.’
219 Þhâò 308 (4.349) gives the nikšepa of satya: name, object, knowledge, knowledge and ac-
tion according to truth. Þhâò 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of truth defined in
terms of unequivocality or sincerity (ujjuyayâ <åjutâ>) of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind,
(4) seamless combination of the three, with the intention not to deceive.
220 See also Þhâò 10.89.
221 JACOBI (1895: 160) translated bhâva-satyâ as ‘sincerity of the mind’, and yoga-satyâ as
‘sincerity of acting’.
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 6. paðucca-saccâ <pratîtya-satyâ> Confirmation
 7. vavahâra-saccâ <vyavahâra-satyâ> Custom
 8. bhâva-saccâ <bhâva-satyâ> Inner Meaning
 9. joga-saccâ <yoga-satyâ> Practice
10. ovamma-saccâ <aupamya-satyâ> Analogy
The same list is given and explained in Mûlâcâra 5.111–116, with exception of yoga-
satyâ, which is replaced by category No. 8 sambhâvanâ-satyâ, translated by OKUDA
(1975: 128) as ‘truth of possibilities’ (Möglichkeitswahrheit; see infra p. 161).222 There
is no apparent systematic connection between the categories in this list. Yet, the list is
clearly informed by the four ‘doors of disquisition’ (aòuogaddâra <anuyoga-dvâra>)
of canonical hermeneutics (AòD 75), especially by the method of contextual interpre-
tation (aòugama <anugama>) through progressive specification via fixed standpoints
(naya) (AòD 601–606).223 The occurrence of the terms nâma, sthâpanâ and bhâva in-
dicates the deliberate incorporation of a variant of the ‘canonical’ nikkheva <nikšepa>,
as BHATT (1978: xv, 20) suggested, although the davva <dravya> standpoint is miss-
ing.224 A nikšepa is a scholastic scheme which delineates fixed perspectives for the
analysis of the principal dimensions of the possible contextual meanings of a word
(contemporary linguistics is still struggling to establish comparable categories). The
original purpose of the list of ten, as a whole, may have been similar. That is, assessing
the meaning of an utterance from several commonly relevant perspectives.225
Most categories are self-explanatory. Truthful utterances based on the linguistic con-
ventions of a country are explained by the commentaries through the example that ‘in
Konkan piccaô is said for payas and that by the gopâla the lotus is called aravinda
only’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 157 n. 4, § 74)). Because terms such as these are synonyms,
they are all equally true.226 Similarly, what is accepted by many people, i.e. linguistic
                                             
222 MÂc 5.111: jaòa-vada sammada þhavaòâ òâme rûve paðucca-sacce ya sambhâvaòa
vavahâre bhâve opamma-sacce ya.
223 According to AòD 605, contextual interpretation (aòugama) of the meaning of a sutta
should progress in the following sequence: ‘Know that the characteristic features (of exposition)
are sixfold, viz. (1) the (correct) utterance of the text (saôhitâ), (2) disjunction and parting (of
words), (3) paraphrasing, (4) expounding of compound words, (5) anticipation of objections, and
(8) establishment (of the correct meaning).’
224 Cf. Þhâò 4.349.
225 BHATT (1978: 14) emphasises that the nikšepa in Paòò 863 ‘has no execution in the canoni-
cal context.’ The material is therefore likely to belong to ‘post-canonical works from which it was
taken before the canon acquired its present shape.’ He lists similar passages in the canon and the
commentary literature (BHATT (1978: 157)).
226 PaòòU 81: jana-pada-satyaô nâma nânâ-deœî-bhâšâ-rûpam apy avipratipattyâ yad ekârtha-
pratyâyana-vyavahâra-samartham iti, yathôdakârthe koôkaòâdišu payaÿ piccaô nîram udakam ity-
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expressions, is conventionally true (sammata-satyâ).227 Pragmatic theories of truth
would fall under this perspective. A figurative representation, such as a statue which is
not god itself, may itself not be accurate, but that what it symbolises can be recognised
as true (sthâpanâ-satyâ).228 The same applies to a name such as Devadatta or ‘given by
god’ (nâma-satyâ) (MÂc 113).229 Allusions to external appearance in form of proto-
types such as ‘white cranes’ (not all cranes are white) are examples of rûpa-satyâ.230
According to the commentators Haribhadra (PaòòV) and Malayagiri (PaòòÞ), the term
pratîtya-satyâ designates an utterance which is true only under certain conditions, and
thus predicated on empirical confirmation.231 Examples are relative size (‘this is long’)
or the relative state of transformation of objects at a given time (cf. MÂc 114).232 Like
other conventional expressions which, under certain conditions, could equally be
classified as ‘truth-mixed-with-untruth’, common or idiomatic utterances such as
‘the kûra (i.e. the cooked rice) is cooking’ (MÂc 114) are acceptable as customarily
true (vyavahâra-satyâ).233 The Œvetâmbara commentators explain the inner truth
(bhâva-satyâ) expressed by certain utterances with the example of a ‘white crane’
(œuklâ balâkâ),234 which MÂc 113 uses to illustrate rûpa-satyâ, whereas Vaþþakera
interprets the term as designating the ‘higher truth’, i.e. saying something untrue in
order to avoid injury to someone (MÂc 116). This perspective is also applied to
                                                                                                               
âdi, adušþa-vivakšâ-hetutvân nânâ-jana-padešv išþârtha-pratipatti-janakatvâd vyavahâra-pravåtteÿ
satyam etad iti, evaô œešešv api bhâvanâ kâryâ. PaòòÞ1 257a.1: ity-âdi “jaòa-vaya-saccâ” iti taô taô
jana-padam adhikåtyêšþârtha-pratipatti-janakatayâ vyavahâra-hetutvât satyâ jana-pada-satyâ yathâ
koókâòâdišu payaÿ piccam ity-âdi.
227 PaòòU 81: sammata-satyaô nâma kumuda-kuvalayôtpala-tâmarasânâô samâne paôkaja-
saôbhave gopâlâdînâô sammatam araviôdam eva paôkajam iti.
228 PaòòU 81: sthâpanâ-satyaô nâma akšara-mudrâ-vinyâsâdišu yathâ mâšako ’yaô kâršâpaòo
’yaô œatam idaô sahasram idam iti.
229 PaòòU 81: nâma-satyaô nâma kulama-varddhayann api kula-varddhana ity ucyate dhanam
avarddhamâno ’pi dhana-varddhana ity ucyate, apakšas tu pakša iti.
230 PaòòU 81: rûpa-satyaô nâma tad-guòasya tathâ rûpa-dhâraòaô rûpa-satyaô, yathâ
prapañcayateÿ pravrajita-rûpa-dhâraòam iti. PaòòÞ1 257a: yathâ dambhato gåhîta-pravrajita-
rûpaÿ pravrajito ’yam iti.
231 OKUDA (1975: 127) translates pratîtya-satyâ as ‘relative truth’.
232 PaòòU 81: pratîtya-satyaô nâma yathâ anâmikâyâ dîrghatvaô hrasvatvaô cêti, tathâ hi
tasyânaôta-pariòâmasya dravyasya tat tat-sahakâri-kâraòa-sannidhânena tat tad-rûpam
abhivyajyata iti satyatâ. PaòòÞ2 257a uses the expression pratîtya-âœritya, recourse to confirma-
tion. PaòòV 11.17 gives the synonym apekšâ, consideration or regard.
233 PaòòU 81: vyavahâra-satyaô nâma dahyate giriÿ galati bhâjanaô anudarâ kanyâ alomâ
eðiketi, giri-gata-tåòâdi-dâhe loke vyavahâraÿ pravarttate, tathôdake ca galati sati, tathâ
saôbhoga-jîva-prabhavôdarâbhâve ca sati, lavana-yogya-lomâbhâve cêti.
234 PaòòU 81: bhâva-satyaô nâma œuklâ balâkâ, saty api paôca-varòa-saôbhave.
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other contexts in the Œvetâmbara texts Âyâr 2.4.1.6 and DVS 7.11. An example of
truth based on association with practice (yoga-satyâ) is to describe someone ac-
cording to his / her activity, for instance the designation chattrî (a kšatriya who should
protect his realm performs chattra-yoga), or daòðî (who performs daòða-yoga or
punishment).235 Instead of yoga-satyâ, the Mûlâcâra 115 has sambhâvanâ-satyâ,
which means that assuming the possibility of something is a valid condition of
truthful language: ‘If he wanted, he could do it. If Indra wanted, he could overturn
the Jambudvîpa’ (OKUDA (1975: 128)). As an example of speaking the truth, using
comparison or analogy (aupamya-satyâ),236 MÂc 116 mentions the word palidovama
<palyôpama>, literally ‘like a sack of corn’, which designates a high number.237
Aòuogaddârâiô (AòD) 368–382 demonstrates the practical ‘usefulness’ of this
simile through the naya method of progressive disambiguation.238
(b) Untruthful language or speaking untruthfully (måšâ bhâšâ) is the proscribed op-
posite of truth or truthfulness.239 In contrast to the ten conditions of truth, featuring the
semantics of propositional utterances, the ten conditions out of which untruth ‘arises’
(compound: −nissiya <niÿsåita>), listed in Paòò 863, are primarily psycho-physical
conditions.240 According to SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 69), ‘speech springing from
emotion is by itself understood as mosâ.’241 Eight of the ten categories overlap with
the standard Jain list of the eighteen sources of sin (pâva-þhâòa <pâpa-sthâna>),242
starting with the four passions (kasâya <kašâya>), and attachment and aversion,
which in the Paòò are the sole cause of karmic bondage, disregarding yoga, or activity
(MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1970: 384)). Most types of untrue speech, conditioned by these factors,
can be categorised as expressive utterances. The last two categories, âkhyâyika-
                                             
235 PaòòU 81: yoga-satyaô nâma chattra-yogâc chattrî daòða-yogâd daôðîty evam âdi.
236 Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 105–7) on Hemacandra’s examples of upâcara, secondary meaning
of a word based on similarity.
237 PaòòU 81: upamayâ satyaô nâma samudravat taðâgaô.
238 The problem of the vagueness of the concept of ‘heaps’ is also addressed in the so-called
sorites paradoxes attributed to Eubilides.
239 Þhâò 254 (4.102) distinguishes four types (aspects) of untruth defined in terms of equivo-
cality or insincerity (aòujjuyatâ <anåjukatâ>) of (1) gesture, (2) speech, (3) mind, (4) contradic-
tory combination of the three, with the intent to deceive.
240 According to Jain philosophy, cognitive and motivational factors are linked. See also
HYMES (1972a: 283) notion of communicative competence: ‘The specification of ability for use as
part of competence allows for the role of non-cognitive factors, such as motivation, as partly de-
termining competence. In speaking of competence, it is especially important not to separate cog-
nitive from affective and volitive factors, so far as the impact of the theory on educational practice
is concerned; but also with regard to speech design and explanation.’
241 Arguably, conditions such as anger and pride can also evoke (painfully) true statements.
242 Viy 1.9.1 (95a).
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niÿsåita243 and upaghâta-niÿsåita,244 do not refer merely to an underlying negative
psycho-physical state in general, but to the unspecified psycho-physical conditions of
two specific types of self-referentially defined commonly untrue speech acts—hearsay
and false accusation—with predominately constantive and regulative attributes.
 1. koha-nissiya <krodha-niÿsåita> Anger
 2. mâòa-nissiya <mâna-niÿsåita> Pride
 3. mâyâ-nissiya <mâyâ-niÿsåita> Deceit
 4. lobha-nissiya <lobha-niÿsåita> Greed
 5. pejja-nissiya <premana-niÿsåita> Attachment
 6. dosa-nissiya <dveša-niÿsåita> Aversion
 7. hâsa-nissiya <hâsya-niÿsåita> Ridicule
 8. bhaya-nissiya <bhaya-niÿsåita> Fear
 9. akkhâiya-nissiya <âkhyâyika-niÿsåita> Hearsay
10. uvaghâya-nissiya <upaghâta-niÿsåita> False Accusation
CAILLAT (1991: 11) observed that the Paòò presents the kašâyas as the cause of
untruth, not of injury, as in Âyâr 2.4.1.1 and DVS 7.11. This change of perspective,
from ahiôsâ to −satya as the main criterion, may reflect the shift of emphasis in
classical Jain karman theory from act to intention. The ten categories seem to have
in common that they refer to acts which, intentionally or unintentionally, produce
unwholesome perlocutionary effects in the addressee (and the speaker as well).
They are either factually false, ethically wrong or both.245
(g) The category ‘partially true speech’246 or ‘truth-mixed-with-untruth’ (saccâ-
mosâ bhâsâ <satyâ-måšâ bhâšâ>) should not be mixed up with the conditionally
true standpoints of syâd-vâda, which apply only to valid statements, not to false
                                             
243 Following Haribhadra (PaòòU 82: âkhyâyikâ asaôbhavyâbhidhânaô) and Malayagiri
(PaòòÞ1 258b.9: âkhyâyikâ-niÿsåtâ yat-kathâsv-asambhâvyâbhidhânam), akkhâiya <âkhyâyika>
is usually understood as a narrative (kathâ) of something non-existing or impossible, based on
mere ‘legend’ or hearsay. See RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 59), and GHATAGE (1996 I: 64). This be-
trays the spirit of realism of Jain philosophy. Though, kathâ may also refer to ‘talk’, ‘discussion’
or ‘disputation’. Potentially negative consequences of knowledge based on mere hearsay are ex-
plained in Viy 9.31(430a–438a). Þhâò 7.80 lists seven types of gossip (vi-kahâ <vi-kathâ>).
244 Uvaghâya / uvagghâya <upaghâta> is explained by Malayagiri (PaòòÞ1 258b.10) through
the example cauras tvam (‘you are a thief’), understood here as abhyâkhyâna—false and ground-
less accusation. The term upaghâta generally designates an act of violence, but here more specifi-
cally an insult. See also Âyâr 2.4.8 for this and similar examples of ‘sinful speech’.
245 Þhâò 6.100 lists six types of unwholesome speech. Þhâò 6.101 lists six types of false accu-
sations, related to the context of enumeration (pathârâ <prastâra>) in confession.
246 See for instance NYAYAVIJAYA (1998: 343–5).
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knowledge (apramâòa). ‘Truth-mixed-with-untruth’ designates intentionally or
unintentionally ambiguous or unclear speech, which is strictly prohibited.247 The
meaning of the term is explained by DVS 7.4–10:
‘4. But this and that topic which confines the Eternal within limits—
this half-true speech the wise [monk] should avoid.
5. By a speech which is untrue, though its appearance is that of a true
one, a man is touched by sin, how much more a man who speaks plain
untruth!’ (DVS1 7.4).248
Satyâ-måšâ bhâšâ is sinful language, based on the whole on non-universalisable
ethical principles. For instance, the language of heretical forest-monks, who do not
abstain from killing, whose thought, speech and behaviour is not well controlled:
‘They employ speech that is true and untrue at the same time: “do not
beat me, beat others; do not abuse me, abuse others; do not capture me,
capture others; do not torment me, torment others; do not deprive me
of life, deprive others of life”’ (Suy 2.2.21).
The ten types of truth-mixed-with-untruth listed in Paòò 865249 do not explicitly
address expressive or regulative aspects of speech acts, but only propositional con-
tent; despite the fact that performatives can also be both true and untrue. According
to the commentaries, all types deal with indiscriminate speech, and with semantic
and logical fallacies, such as category mistakes regarding the quality or quantity of
objects or temporal modalities which can be easily ‘mixed up’ (compound: −missiyâ
<miœritâ>), for instance in utterances designating part-whole relationships.
 1. uppaòòa-missiyâ <utpanna-miœritâ> Born
 2. vigaya-missiyâ <vigata-miœritâ> Destroyed
 3. uppaòòa-vigaya-missiyâ <utpanna-vigata-miœritâ> Born-Destroyed
 4. jîva-missiyâ <jîva-miœritâ> Life
 5. ajîva-missiyâ <ajîva-miœritâ> Matter
 6. jîvâjîva-missiyâ <jîvâjîva-miœritâ> Life-Matter
                                             
247 On combinations of truth and untruth in behaviour (vyavahâra), intent (pariòata), belief
(dåšþi) etc., for instance in succession, theorised in terms of character types, see Þhâò 241 (4.35–
44). See CAILLAT (1965/1975: 80) on types of duplicity to be avoided.
248 DSV 7.4–5:
eyaô ca aþþhamannaô vâ jaô tu nâmei sâsayaô /
sa bhâsaô sacca-mosaô pi taô pi dhîro vivajjae // 4 //
vitahaô pi tahâmottiô jaô giraô bhâsae naro /
tamhâ so puþþho pâveòaô, kiô puòa jo musaô vae // 5 //
249 See also Þhâò 10.91.
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 7. aòanta-missiyâ <ananta-miœritâ> Infinite
 8. paritta-missiyâ <parîta-miœritâ> Separate
 9. addhâ-missiyâ <adhva-miœritâ> Time
10. addhâddhâ-missiyâ <ardhâdhva-miœritâ> Halftime
The list of ten modalities evidently reflects general issues of particular concern for
Jain doctrine. It can be thematically subdivided in two triplets and two pairs. The first
triplet—utpanna, vigata, utpanna-vigata—addresses unclear distinctions concerning
life and death. The commentators explain the meaning of utpanna-miœritâ as speaking
in non-specific ways about the born, mixed with references to the yet unborn; for in-
stance birth occurring in this or that village or town, that ten or more or less boys were
born (‘ten boys were born in this village today’) etc.250 In the same way, vigata-miœritâ
refers to cases of ‘stating mortality in an indefinite way, e.g. saying that ten people
have died in this village, etc.’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 400)).251 Utpanna-vigata-
miœritâ refers to both true and false, or contradictory assertions (visaôvâda) regarding
manifestations of both birth and death.252 The second triplet—jîva, ajîva, jîvâjîva—
similarly addresses the problem of pointing in a general way to ‘great numbers’ of
either living or dead beings, or quantities of mixed living and dead beings.253 Life
(jîva) in abstract and concrete form can be confused through vague language, such as
the language of sets (râœi), or other numerical expressions. The same applies to matter
                                             
250 PaòòU 82: saccâ-mosâ dasa-vihâ uppaòòa-mîsaga-vigata-mîsagâdi, uddissa gâmaô vâ
nagaraô vâ dasaòhaô dâra-gâòaô jaômaô pagâsaôtassa ûòesu ahiesu vâ evam âdi uppanna-
missiyâ. PaòòÞ1 258a: “uppaòòa-missiyâ” ity-âdi, utpannâ miœritâ anutpannaiÿ saha saôkhyâ-
pûraòârthaô yatra sâ utpanna-miœritâ, evam anyatrâpi yathâ yogaô bhâvanîyaô, tatrôtpanna-
miœritâ yathâ kasmiôœcit grâme nagare vâ ûnešv adhikešu vâ dârakešu jâtešu daœa dârakâ asminn
adya jâtâ ity-âdi.
251 PaòòU 82: em eva maraòa-kahaòe vigaya-missiyâ. PaòòÞ1 258b: evam eva maraòa-
kathane vigata-miœritâ.
252 PaòòU 82: jammaòassa maraòassa ya kaya-pariòâmassa ubhaya-kahaòe visaôvâdaòe
uppâeòa-vigata-missitâ. PaòòÞ1 258b: tathâ janmato maraòasya ca kåta-pariòâmasyâbhidhâne
visaôvâdena côtpanna-vigata-miœritâ.
253 PaòòU 82: jîvaôta-mayaga-saôkhaòagâdi-râsi-darisaòe aho mahaô jîva-râsi tti
bhaòaôtassa jîvaôtesu saccâ maesu mosa tti jîva-missitâ, ettha ceva bahusu matesu aho mahaôto
’jîva-râsi tti bhaòaôtassa maesu saccâ jîvaôtesu musâ iti ajîva-missiyâ, saccaô mayam amayaô
vâ ubhayaô òiyameòa avadhârayaôtassa visaôvâde jîvâjîva-missiyâ. PaòòÞ1 258b: [4] tathâ
prabhûtânâô jîvatâô stokânâô ca måtânâô œaókha-œaókhanakâdînâm ekatra râœau dåšþe yadâ
kaœcid evaô vadati—aho mahân jîva-râœir ayam iti tadâ sâ jîva-miœritâ, satyâ-måšâtvaô câsyâ
jîvatsu satya tvât måtešu måšâtvât, [5] tathâ yadâ prabhûtešu måtešu stokešu jîvatsu ekatra râœî-
kåtešu œaókhâdišv evaô vadati—aho mahânayaô måto jîva-râœir iti tadâ sâ ajîva-miœritâ, asyâ api
satyâ-måšâtvaô måtešu satyatvât jîvatsu måšâtvât, [6] tathâ tasminn eva râœau etâvanto ’tra
jîvanta etâvanto ’tra måtâ iti niyamenâvadhârayato visaôvâde jîvâjîva-miœritâ.
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(ajîva), and both life and matter (jîvâjîva). The consequence of imprecise language
may be unintentional violence against individual living beings (in a ‘heap of dead
beings’). According to Âvassaya-nijjutti (ÂvNi 8.56–100), one of the principal heretics
of the canonical period, Rohagutta, committed the mistake of mixing up categories by
positing a third principle, nojîva or the half-living, which mediates between jîva and
ajîva. Hence, his heresy was called terâsiyâ.254 The pair ananta and parîta addresses
indiscriminate language regarding aspects of finite-infinite, part-whole, or singular
term-existence relationships. The commentaries explain ananta-miœritâ with reference
to the case of certain plants, for instance root vegetables such as radish (mûlaka),
which have only one body, yet are composed of an infinite number of souls (ananta-
jîva).255 The category parîta-miœritâ focuses, conversely, for instance on the independ-
ence and separateness of each individual element within a composite form of vegeta-
tion.256 The two ontological levels of the relationship between one and many can eas-
ily be mixed up in these cases; which has potential ethical (karmic) consequences. One
of the principle concerns of the Pannavaòâ, highlighted in Malayagiri’s commen-
tary, is the difference between the categories infinite (ananta) and uncountable
(asaôkhyâta).257 With regard to adhva, time, speech is both true and untrue if one
says, for some reason, that ‘it is night’ during the daytime, or ‘get up, it is day’ when it
is night.258 The same applies to the part of a measure of time, or ardhâdhva, such as a
                                             
254 See LEUMANN’s (1885) article on the seven early schisms (niòhava).
255 PaòòU 82: mûlakâdi aòaôta-kâyaô tasseva paðirikkaya-paôðuô-pattehiô aòòeòa vâ
vaòassaikâeòa missaô daþþhûòa esa aòaôta-kâyôtti bhaòaôtassa aòaôta-missiyâ. PaòòÞ1 259a:
tathâ mûlakâdikam ananta-kâyaô tasyÎva satkaiÿ paripâòðu-patrair anyena vâ kenacit-pratyeka-
vanaspatinâ miœram avalokya sarvo ’py ešo ’nanta-kâyika iti vadato ’nanta-miœritâ. Cf. GHATAGE
(1996 I: 227). On the ananta-kâyas see WILLIAMS (1983: 113–6).
256 PaòòU 82: tam eva samudayaô karamette sarittâòaô amilâòaô râsî-kayaô parittam iti
bhaòaôtassa paritta-missiyâ. PaòòÞ1 259a: tathâ pratyeka-vanaspati-saóghâtam ananta-kâyikena
saha râœî-kåtam avalokya pratyeka-vanaspatir ayaô sarvo ’pîti vadataÿ pratyeka-miœritâ.
257 See MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 271, 430). Þhâò 10.66 lists ten meanings of the word ananta.
258 This characterisation cannot be related to the difference between experienced or conven-
tional time (samaya) and imperceptible abstract time (addhâ) explained in Viy 11.11.1 (532b)
(DELEU (1970: 178)), because in this case the speech act would be neither-true-nor-false. As the
authoritative work of Jain scholastic hermeneutics, the Aòuogaddârâiô shows, Jains are careful to
distinguish semantic ambiguity from philosophical perspectivism (anekânta-vâda, syâd-vâda,
nikšepa, naya etc.), which is seen as an analytic instrument for disambiguation: ‘Whereas in the
fallacy of chhal (fraud), one word has two meanings, no word in this argument [of syâd-vâda] is
of such nature. … To declare the existence of an object from one point of view and to declare its
non-existence from another point of view, is not to indulge in a pun, and thus to be guilty of this
fallacy’ (KANNOOMAL (1917: 16)). Cf. C. R. JAIN (1929: 8, 16–18), GANERI (2001: 133). It should
be noted that similes and analogies are considered to be media of disambiguation and not convey-
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prahara, a quarter of the bright or dark period of the day.259 The statements may be
true in as much as time in general is concerned, but false with regard to time in par-
ticular (i.e. it may be bright, although technically it is still night).260
Examples for a potential mix up of the modalities of time, which may have nega-
tive moral consequences in cases of promises for instance, are given in Âyâr 2.4.2,
and in DVS 7.6–10 as paradigmatic cases for satyâ-måšâ speech. The illocutionary
form of these sentences is not essential, since they can be transformed into proposi-
tions of the form: ‘x promises (commands etc.), that p’:261
‘6. Such speech therefore, as e.g. “we [shall] go”, “we shall say”, “we
shall have to do that”, or: “I shall do that”, or “he shall do that”, 7. un-
certain in the future or with regard to a matter of the present [or] of the
past, a wise monk] should avoid. 8.9. If [a monk] does not know, [or]
has some doubt about, a matter which concerns past, present and fu-
ture, he should not say: “it is thus”; 10. (this he should do only) when
there is no room for doubt’ (DVS1 7.6–10).262
                                                                                                               
ors of mixed truth and untruth. Obviously, they can play both roles. On chala, features of ‘god’,
‘bad debates’ etc., especially in the Nyâya-sûtra, see MATILAL (1999, Chapters 2–3).
259 RATNACANDRA (1988 I: 270 f., 268), GHATAGE (2001 II: 454, 461).
260 PaòòU 82: addhâ kâlo so divaso rabhî vâ, jo tam-missiyaô kareti, paraô turiyâveôto
divasato bhaòati-uþþhehi rattî jâyatti, esâ addhâ-missiyâ, tasseva divasassa râtîe vâ ega-padeso
addhâddhâ, taô paðhama-porisi-kâle taheva turiyaôto majjhaòhî-bhûtaô bhaòatassa
addhâddha-missiyâ. PaòòÞ1 259a: [9] tathâ addhâ—kâlaÿ, sa cêha prastâvât divaso râtrir vâ
parigåhyate, sa miœrito yayâ sâddhâ-miœritâ, yathâ kaœcit kaœcana tvarayan divase varttamâna eva
vadati—uttišþha râtrir yâtêti, râtrau vâ varttamânâyâm uttišþhôdgataÿ sûrya iti, [10] tathâ
divasasya râtrer vâ ekadeœo ’ddhâddhâ sâ miœritâ yayâ sâ addhâddhâ-miœritâ, yathâ prathama-
paurušyâm eva varttamânâyâô kaœcit kañcana tvarayan evaô vadati—cala madhyâhnî-bhûtaô iti.
261 HABERMAS (1981: 97–117) / (1984–1987 II: 62–76), and others, showed that semantic
content of normative sentences can be transformed into propositional sentences while the reverse
is not always possible.
262 DVS 7.6–10:
tamhâ gacchâmo, vakkhâmo, amugaô vâ òe bhavissaî /
ahaô vâ òaô karissâmi, eso vâ òaô karissaî // 6 //
evamâî u jâ bhâsâ esa-kâlammi saókiyâ /
saôpayâîyam aþþhe vâ taô pi dhîro vivajjae // 7 //
aîyammi ya kâlammî paccuppannam aòâgae /
jamaþþhaô tu na jâòejjâ “evameyaô” ti no vae // 8 //
aîyammi ya kâlammi paccuppannam aòâgae /
jattha saókâ bhave taô tu “evameyaô” ti no vae // 9 //
aîyammi ya kâlammi paccuppannam aòâgae /
nissaókiyaô bhave jaô tu “evameyaô” ti niddise // 10 //
POWER AND INSIGHT IN JAIN DISCOURSE 167
                                                                                                                                        
Somadeva, in his Yaœas-tilaka of 959 CE (YT, p. 349–350), mentions a similar
example of a statement which is on the whole true but to some extent false, that is,
when someone ‘after promising to give something at the end of a fortnight, gives it
after a month or a year’ (HANDIQUI (1968: 265)). He also mentions the statement
‘he cooks food or weaves clothes’ as one which is to some extent true but on the
whole false because ‘properly speaking, one cooks rice etc. and weaves yarn’. A
different example of mixed speech, mentioned in Viy 18.7.1 (749a), are utterances
of someone who is possessed. The fact that this case, referring to an existentially
mixed psycho-physical state rather than to semantic ambiguity, cannot be easily
fitted into any of the ten categories illustrates that the list is not exhaustive. From
other viewpoints, the examples may also fit the categories of the other lists.
All of the ten enumerated modalities seem to refer to utterances in which the univer-
sal and the particular, or modalities of time, quantifiers, or other categories,263 are
mixed up in an indiscriminate and hence ambiguous way.264 Though the mistakes
discussed in the texts seem to be primarily based on indiscriminate cognition, produc-
ing objectionable uncertainty (cf. Âyâr 2.4.1–2), the ten categories are very broad and
can cover a great variety of motives, logical and semantic conundrums, such as vague-
ness or paradoxes, and linguistic forms and discursive strategies, such as off-record
uses of metaphor, similes, veiled speech and politeness, which Brown and Levinson
have analysed as popular forms for saying one thing and meaning another.265 These
phenomena deserve more detailed analysis in future studies. For the purpose of this
essay, a few comparative notes on the implications of the findings for the question of
the stance of Jain philosophy on the law of non-contradiction must suffice.
For PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 3), ‘admission or insistence, that some statement is
both true and false, in a context where not everything is accepted or some things are
rejected, is a sure sign of a paraconsistent approach—in fact a dialethic approach’,
i.e. the assumption that ‘the world is inconsistent’. The Greek word dialetheia (two-
                                             
263 See the mixed true-false utterance ‘The god of the sky’ (Âyâr 2.4.1.12–13) and similar ex-
amples of mislabelling discussed in footnote 293.
264 In symbolic logic such problems are discussed under the labels such as ‘no-item thesis’,
‘misleading form thesis’, ‘truth value gap thesis’, and ‘new truth-value thesis’ (HAACK (1974: 47 ff.)).
According to PRIEST (1987) the single rationale underlying the theory of different types of truth value
gaps, derived from the correspondence theory of truth, is that ‘for certain sentences, a there is no Fact
which makes a true, neither is there a Fact which makes ¬a true’, which are to be distinguished from
dialetheia, or true contradictions such that both statement A and its negation, ¬A, are true. In his view,
the argument fails, because ‘if there is no Fact which makes a true, there is a Fact which makes ¬a
true, viz. the Fact that there is no Fact which makes a true’ (PRIEST (1987: 54)).
265 See for instance BALBIR (1987: 9) and DUNDAS (1996: 62).
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way truth) refers to a true contradiction facing both truth and falsity.266 PRIEST–
ROUTLEY (1983: 17) were the first to point out parallels between Jaina logic and
modern discussive logic, but argue, like most logicians before them, that Jain per-
spectivism is predicated on the rejection of the law of contradiction.267 However,
GANERI (2002: 274) demonstrated in his re-construction of the assumptions under-
lying the method of seven-fold predication (sapta-bhaógî), based on an extension of
discussive logic via modalised many-valued truth-tables, that Jain logic ‘does not
involve any radical departure from classical logic … The underlying logic within
each standpoint is classical, and it is further assumed that each standpoint or partici-
pant is internally consistent.’ The findings of BALCEROWICZ (2003: 64) on the con-
textual logic of the seven nayas concur with this general conclusion. Both authors
show that Jain logic is context-sensitive and a quasi-functional system.
To syâd-vâda and anekânta-vâda the Jain catuš-koþi of the modes of speech can be
added, as another example of ‘Jain logic’ which clearly operates within the confines of
the law of non-contradiction, and does not need to be interpreted as a form of scepti-
cism, nor of syncretism predicated on the notion of a total truth integration of all view-
points, as MATILAL (1981) argues. Our brief glance at the Jain interpretation of the
third mode of the so-called ‘four-valued logic’ of the catuš-koþi, applied to language
usage, that is, the explicit exclusion of the values ‘false’ and ‘both true and false’,
showed that ‘Jain logic’ does not ‘flatly deny’268 the law of non-contradiction. The
examples in Jain scriptures for modes of speech which are both-true-and-false, and
their explicit rejection, demonstrate, on the contrary, that Jain philosophy is unequivo-
cally opposed to violations of the law of non-contradiction. This conclusion is also
borne out by the Jain analysis of the temporal aspects of action (Viy 1.1.1=13a,
9.33.2d = 484a), which explicitly denies the possibility that an action that is being
performed is not equal to the completed action, as the heretic Jamâli held (‘has the bed
been made or is it being made’). The question of the identity of an action in time has
important consequence for the evaluation of karmic consequences, also of speech-acts.
                                             
266 PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 14) cite Stoic and other authors from Greek antiquity defending
this view.
267 ‘In this respect the Jains anticipate contemporary discussive logic, initiated by Jaœkowski,
and they may similarly be interpreted in terms of integration of different worlds, or positions,
reflecting partial truth … Naturally such a theory risks trivialisation unless some (cogent) restric-
tions are imposed on the parties admitted as having obtained partial truth—restrictions of a type
that might well be applied to block amalgamation leading to violations of Non-Contradiction.
Unlike the Jains, the Mâdhyamikas apparently affirmed the law of Contradiction. But this does
not prevent a certain unity of opposites, e.g. in the negative dialectic of Nâgârjuna, a concept, such as
Being, can become indistinguishable from its opposite, Non-Being’ (PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1983: 17)).
268 STCHERBATSKY (1958: 415), cited in PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 16)).
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Contrary to PRIEST–ROUTLEY’s (1989) intuitions, it seems, the main technique of
argumentation used by Jain philosophers in all these cases resembles Aristotle’s refu-
tation of Heraclitus and other ‘paraconsistent’ thinkers in ancient Greece:
‘Key parts of his analysis involved the use of time to avoid contradic-
tion—instead of saying that a changing thing was both in a given state
and also not in that state, it was said that the thing was in that state at
time t1, but not in that state at a different time t2—and the theory of
potentiality—required to reunify these now temporarily isolated states
as parts of the one (and same) change. The appeal to different temporal
quantifiers illustrated the method of (alleged) equivocation used since
ancient times to avoid contradiction and reinforce consistency hy-
pothesis; namely, where both A and −A appear to hold, find a respect
or factor or difference r such that it can be said that A holds in respect
r1 and −A in respect r2. It can then be said that a contradiction resulted
only by equivocation on respect or factor r. Often however the method
of alleged equivocation does not work in a convincing way, and it
breaks down in an irreparable way with the semantic paradoxes, as the
Megarians were the first to realize’ (PRIEST–ROUTLEY (1989: 8)).
Speech that is both-true-and-untrue is rejected in the Jain scriptures, because it
mixes aspects which can be discriminated, if necessary with the help of the method
of perspective variation in time. To what extent ancient Jain philosophers would
have agreed with Aristotle on this point is a question which can only be clearly an-
swered in a separate study. It seems to me that the Jain theory of time is fundamen-
tal, also for Jain perspectivism.
(d) The most interesting of the four modes of speech (and cognition) is ‘speaking
neither truth nor untruth’ (asaccâ-mosâ). That is, speech to which the true / false
distinction is not applicable. Muni Nathmal (Âcârya Mahâprajña) characterised
asatyâ-måšâ language as vyavahâra-bhâšâ, or conventional speech (Þhâò 4.23,
Hindî commentary). Twelve types of the asatyâ-måšâ bhâšâ are distinguished in
Paòò 866 = Viy 10.3.3 (499b):269
                                             
269 LALWANI’s (1985 IV: 133 f.) rendition of Viy 10.3.34 reads as follows: ‘[Gautama speaks]
Bhante! There are twelve forms of language—address, order, prayer, question, advice, refusal,
consent, enquiry, conviction, confusion, distinct and indistinct. Now, when one says, I shall take
lodge, I shall lie, I shall stand, I shall sit, I shall stretch, do these forms conform to the fifth type
viz. advice, and it is correct to say that they are never false?—[Mahâvîra answers] Yes Gautama!
They conform to the fifth type and they are never false.’
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 1. âmantaòî <âmantraòî> Address
 2. âòavaòî <âjñâpanî> Order
 3. jâyaòî <yâcanâ> Request
 4. pucchaòî <påcchanî> Question
 5. paòòavaòî <prajñâpanî> Communication
 6. paccakkhâòî <pratyâkhyânî> Renunciation
 7. icchâòulomâ <icchânulomâ> Consent
 8. aòabhiggahiyâ <anabhigåhîtâ> Unintelligible
 9. abhiggahiyâ <abhigåhîtâ> Intelligible
10. saôsaya-karaòî <saôœaya-karaòî> Doubt-Creating
11. voyaðâ <vyâkåtâ> Explicit
12. avvoyaðâ <avyâkåtâ> Implicit
Nine of the twelve categories are also listed in MÂc 5.118–119. The categories 1–
7 are identical in both texts. Of the last five, only saôœaya (No. 10) is mentioned by
Vaþþakera, and a category labelled aòakkhara <anakšara>, ‘incomprehensible’,
which can be read as an equivalent of aòabhiggahiyâ <anabhigåhîtâ> (No. 8, maybe
also incorporating aspects of No. 12).270
Speaking neither-truth-nor-untruth is interpreted by JACOBI (1884: 150 n. 2,
151)271 and MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 325 f.) as referring to injunctions. However, con-
sidering the great variety of listed speech acts (only the first three are injunctions), it
seems better to use AUSTIN’s (1962) term ‘performatives’, which are by definition
neither true nor false, to characterise the first seven terms.272 The last five terms
cover aspects which Grice discussed under the conversational maxims of relation
(‘relevance’) and manner (‘avoid obscurity’). In Austin’s terminology, addressing,
                                             
270 On articulated (akkhara-suya) evidence, composed of written and oral sources see
SCHUBRING (2000: § 74).
271 Âyâr 2.4.1.4 n., 2.4.1.7.
272 AUSTIN (1962) distinguishes between implicit and explicit, self-verifying, performatives. An
‘explicit performative sentence’, such as taking a vow, ‘indicates that the issuing of the utterance
is the performing of an action—it is not normally thought of as just saying something’ (AUSTIN
(1962: 6 f.))—this would be a ‘descriptive fallacy’ (AUSTIN (1962: 3)). ‘None of the utterances
cited is either true or false’ (AUSTIN (1962: 3)). ‘It is essential to realize that “true” and “false”,
like “free” and “unfree”, do not stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension
of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this
audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. … This doctrine is quite different from
much that the pragmatists have said, to the effect that the true is what works, &c. The truth or
falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of words but on what act you were
performing in what circumstances’ (AUSTIN (1962: 144)). The problem of determining truth-val-
ues of performative utterances has been discussed, for example, by FAUCONNIER (1981: 182).
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ordering, requesting, and questioning etc. are all illocutionary acts. Questions,273
commands, and exclamations are not propositions, since they can not be asserted or
denied; that is, they are neither true nor false. Imperatives (directives), such as or-
ders and requests, and regulatives (commissives), such as consenting and renounc-
ing (promising, vowing etc.), through which the speaker commits him / herself to
perform certain actions in future, imply normative conditions which ought to be
fulfilled, but which are not fulfilled yet. In this sense, the propositional content is
also neither true nor false. Truth, and its opposite, falsity, are properties that belong
only to propositions. Propositions are statements that either assert or deny that
something is the case. Not all sentences are true or false, because not all sentences
make such claims. Commands, questions, and expressions of volition neither assert
nor deny that something is the case, and are, consequently, neither true nor false.  
ARISTOTLE (PH 4) already noted that ‘every sentence is not a proposition; only such
are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but
is neither true nor false.’ Problems related to the ontological and truth-functional status
of future events and the grammatical future were also discussed in Greek philosophy,
which may or may not have influenced Indian philosophy in this point.274 In De
Interpretatione (PH), ARISTOTLE offers the following solution to a paradox posed by
Diodoros Cronus as to the truth-value of the sentence ‘Will there be a sea battle tomor-
row?’ Any definite answer (‘yes’ or ‘no’) to this indecidable question is presently
neither true nor false, but if in future one becomes true, then the other becomes false:
‘One of the two propositions in such instances must be true and the
other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false,
but must leave the alternative undecided. One may indeed be more
likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or
actually false. It is therefore plain that it is not necessary that of an af-
firmation and a denial one should be true and the other false. For in the
case of that which exists potentially, but not actually, the rule which
applies to that which exists actually does not hold good’ (PH 9).
For Aristotle, as for the Jains, it is both unethical and factually wrong to assume
the future is determined, since actions evidently influence events. Although it is not
entirely clear what exactly Aristotle and the Jain author(s) had in mind, in both
cases the commitment to free will and to the logic of events overrules the logic of
                                             
273 Þhâò 6.111 lists six types of question-contexts, not all of which can be categorised as nei-
ther-true-nor-false; e.g. vuggaha-paþþha <vyudgraha-praœna>, questioning an opponent.
274 On ambiguities created by the use of the future tense see also FAUCONNIER (1981: 180 f.),
and others.
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propositions. Generally, empirical facts can neither be proven true nor false by logi-
cal necessity: ‘Even if I say “It’s raining now” when the sun is shining, I have not
said something that is  n e c e s s a r i l y  false, just something that happens to be
false’ (HARNAD (1999: 1)).275 From a purely logical point of view, Bertrand
RUSSELL (1905) showed that all predicates with variables are not propositions to
which a truth value can be attached in an unambiguous way. Hence they are neither
true nor false. However, they can be transformed into propositions by replacing the
variable with a value or a quantifier.276 It is, of course, difficult to say to what extent
ancient Jain philosophers already shared certain intuitions with modern logicians.
The first seven categories, sometimes combined, cover most speech acts a Jain as-
cetic would conventionally use in contexts of monastic life; for instance taking
vows (paccakkhâòa), requesting permission (âpucchaòâ), ordering (âjñâ), confess-
ing (âlocanâ), begging forgiveness (kšamâpaòâ) etc., Âmantaòî <Âmantraòî>
speech or language, for instance, is ‘used for attracting somebody’s attention, a
vocative word or expression’ (GHATAGE (2003 III.2: 1001)), for instance ‘O Deva-
datta’.277 MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 325) gives the following examples of an address and an
order: ‘when a person wanting John to come near him says “O! John”‘ or ‘when a
person says to another person, “Go ahead”.’ However, not in all contexts are such
expressions neither-true-nor-false. Under certain circumstances, the first example may
represent or can be read as an ‘indirect’ or ‘implicit performative’ speech act clad in
form of an address, and it could be argued that, in certain contexts, the second example
does not correspond to the prescription in Âyâr 2.4 for mendicants to avoid pragmatic
interventions.
The last five terms of the list are of a different nature. The term aòabhiggahiyâ
<anabhigåhîtâ> refers to ‘unintelligible or incomprehensible speech’ (RATNA-
CANDRA (1988 I: 156)), which is either ‘irrelevant’ (DELEU (1970: 169)) or / and ‘un-
acceptable’ (GHATAGE (1996 I: 237)), but neither-true-nor-false. Its antonym,
abhiggahammi boddhavvâ, intelligible instruction, refers to ‘clear and intelligible
                                             
275 HAACK (1974: 58 f., 73–90) criticises the ‘modal fallacy’ in Aristotle’s argument on future
contingents, but accepts it as valid if interpreted as a truth value gap theory.
276 See further STRAWSON (1950) and the ensuing debate, on which see also HORN (1985),
(2001: 362 ff.), and others.
277 PaòòU 82 f.: “âmantaòî” ity-âdi, he deva iti âmantaòî, ešâ kilâpravarttaka-nivarttakatvât
satyâdi bhâšâ-traya-lakšaòa-viyogataœ câsatyâmåšêti, evaô sva-buddhayâ anyatrâpi bhâvanâ
kâryêti, kajje parassa pavattaòaô jahâ imaô karehitti âòavaòî, katthai vatthu-visesassa dehitti
maggaòaô jâyaòî, aviòòâyassa saôdiddhassa vâ atthassa jâòaòatthaô tad-abhijutta-codaòaô
pucchaòî, viòîyassa uvaeso jahâ—pâòavahâu òiyattâ havati dîhâuyâ arogâ ya emâdi paòòavaòî
paòòattâ vîyarâgehiô. PaòòÞ1 258b: “âmantaòi” iti tatra âmantraòî he devadatta ity-âdi, ešâ hi
prâg-ukta-satyâdi-bhâšâ-traya-lakšaòa-vikalatvân na satyâ nâpi måšâ nâpi satyâ-måšâ kevalaô
vyavahâra-mâtra-pravåtti-hetur ity asatyâ-måšâ.
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language’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 351)), which is ‘relevant’ and ‘acceptable’, and
neither-true-nor-false.278 Malayagiri’s commentary explains the difference between
irrelevant and relevant speech through the following example: ‘to the question
“What shall I do now?” the answer “Do as you like” is aòabhiggahiyâ, the answer
“Do this, do not that!” is abhiggahiyâ’ (DELEU (1970: 169)).279
It is not entirely clear why saôsaya-karaòî bhâsâ <saôœaya-karaòî bhâšâ>,
‘ambiguous language which causes doubt’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 570)), is re-
garded as neither-true-nor-false, and therefore permissible. It must be assumed that
only the use of strategically ambiguous messages for the purpose of creating
vairâgya-shocks is seen as legitimate, but not language which creates doubt about
Jainism in the minds of believers. He seems to follow Malayagiri (PaòòÞ), who
argued that from the niœcaya-naya not only satya-måšâ but also asatyâ-måšâ state-
ments are false—‘if they are spoken with the intention of deceiving others’(
MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 346)). However, Viy 18.7.1 (749a) states that, by definition, the
speech of a Kevalin, because it is harmless, can only be true or neither-true-nor-
false.280 The statement associates higher moral truth with this type of speech, which
can thus be compared with the ‘twilight-language’ (sandhâ-bhâšâ) of Tantric Bud-
dhism, which is also characterised as neither-true-nor-false.281 According to OKUDA
(1975: 129), MÂc 119 explains saôsaya-vayaòî <saôœaya-vacana> as ‘speech
which expresses doubt’. But its commentator Vasunandin (11th–12th century) inter-
prets this as ‘speech of children and old people’ as well as the sounds of (five-
sensed) ‘roaring buffalos’ etc., which cause doubt as to their meaning, while the
Digambara authors Aparâjita and Âœâdhara and the Œvetâmbara Haribhadra com-
menting on DVS 7, read saôsaya-karaòî simply as ‘ambiguous speech’ (anekârtha-
sâdhâraòâ). Haribhadra classifies speech of children as aòakkhara <anakšara>,
incomprehensible, which also figures as the ninth and last category listed in MÂc
                                             
278 PaòòÞ1 259a: abhigåhîtâ prati-niyatârthâvadhâraòaô, yathâ idam idânîô karttavyam
idaô nêti.
279 PaòòÞ1 259a: anabhigrahâ yatra na pratiniyatârthâvadhâraòaô, yathâ bahukâryešv
avasthitešu kaœcit kañcana påcchati—kim idânîô karomi?, sa prâha—yat pratibhâsate tat kurv iti.
See SPERBER–WILSON’s (1986) arguments for considering ‘relevance’ as the key to communica-
tion and cognition.
280 DELEU (1970: 241).
281 Jambûvijaya’s edition of the Þhâò 4.23 (238) contains the following commentary of
Jinabhadra’s Viœešâvaœyaka-bhâšâ (VÂBh) 376–7: aòahigaya jâ tîsu vi saddo cciya kevalo
asacca-musa.
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119, which Vasunandin reserves for expressions of animals of two-four senses, and
for sounds created by snipping fingers etc. (OKUDA (1975: 129)).282
Vyâkåtâ bhâšâ refers to clear distinct speech with explicit unambiguous meaning
(RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 511)).283 There is no example given by the commentar-
ies for distinct speech which is neither-true-nor-untrue. Avyâkåtâ-bhâšâ>, refers to
indistinct involuted or poetic speech consisting of obscure or unintelligible words
‘with deep and profound meaning’ (RATNACANDRA (1988 IV: 445), cf. GHATAGE
(2001 II: 800)).284 Mantras or sûtras may be fitting examples. The fact that the
Mûlâcâra does not mention these two categories reinforces the suspicion that they
are redundant, and overlapping with the category of incomprehensible language.
The most interesting case is pannavaòî-bhâsâ <prajñâpanî-bhâšâ>, explanation,
the generic term which Mahâvîra himself employs in the scriptures285 to designate
his discourse, which also gives the Pannavaòâ-suttaô its name. Like all descrip-
tions of speech acts, pannavaòî is a somewhat ambiguous term, because it refers
both to the illocutionary act, locutionary content, and perlocutionary effect of pro-
claiming something. This ambiguity is reflected in different translations of the word.
SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 69) and DELEU (1970: 169) translate pannavaòî as
‘communication’ (Mitteilung). According to SCHUBRING (2000: 157 f., § 69), the
examples for ‘communication’ given in Viy 10.3.3 (499b) = Paòò 866, ‘We want to
[wollen] lie down’ (âsaissâmo) etc., refer to ‘expressions of an intention’ (to do
something). However, DELEU (1970: 169) and LALWANI (1985: 133) translate
âsaissâmo <âœayišyâmaÿ> as ‘we will lie down’ and ‘we shall lie down’ respec-
                                             
282 PaòòÞ1 259a: saôœaya-karaòî yâ vâk anekârthâbhidhâyitayâ parasya saôœayam utpâdayati,
yathâ saindhavamânîyatâm ity atra saindhava-œabdo lavaòa-vastra-purušavâjišu. SCHUBRING (2000:
157 f., § 74): ‘All animals with two to four senses and beings with five senses express themselves in
the neither true nor wrong way, but the latter will employ the first three modes just as well (Pannav.
260a) provided they have learnt to do so or carry along with them a higher ability.’
283 PaòòÞ1 259a: vyâkåtâ yâ prakaþârthâ.
284 PaòòÞ1 259a: avyâkåtâ atigambhîra-œabdârthâ avyaktâkšara-prayuktâ vâ avibhâvitârthâtvât.
285 The Pâli equivalents of pannavaòâ and pannatta are paññâpana, paññatta (MÂLVAÒIYÂ
(1971: 212)). The word pannatti <prajñapti>, teaching, information, instruction, is frequently used
in the canon, for instance at Viy 2.1.90, or Viy 16.6 (709b) where the verbs pannaveti parûveti
<prajñâpayati prarûpayati> are used in to describe Mahâvîra’s preaching activity. Hence, his
teachings are called pannavaòâ <prajñâpana>, exposition, or parûvaòa <prarûpana>, explanation
(AòD 51, MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 210)). The ‘proclamations’ (Kundmachung) or preachings of the
unattached ones are also called niggantha pâvayaòa / pavayaòa <nirgrantha pravacana> in Viy
2.5.5 (134b), 20.8.5 (792b) and Þhâò 176a. See SCHUBRING (2000: 73, § 37).
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tively, that is, as the description of a future action or state.286 MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971:
211), who points to kindred views in the Pâli text Puggala-paññatti, prefers the
word ‘describing’ as a translation of pannavaòî which he renders as ‘speech that
intends to describe a thing’. In this, he follows the 13th century commentary of
Âcârya Malayagiri who stated that pannavaòî ‘means the speech that intends to
describe the thing (or event) [as it is]’.287 It is a form of asaccâ-mosâ speech, ‘a
speech which has nothing to do with norm (validity or invalidity) but which only
describes the thing (or event)’: ‘To be more explicit, the speech which has nothing
to do with religious dos and do-nots but which simply describes the thing is called
Prajñâpanî.’288 MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 212) cites the example quoted by the commen-
tator Malayagiri’s Prajñâpanâ-þîkâ, ‘Those who refrain from killing living beings
live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth)’,289 and notes: ‘The gâthâ in point
contains no command “do not kill” but simply describes the fact that those who do
not kill live long and remain healthy.’ Such speech ‘has nothing to do with religious
dos and do-nots’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 211)). Hence, it should be distinguished from
implicit performative speech. But, of course, it may be interpreted as such by a lis-
tener who infers an ‘ought’ from the ‘is’. MONIER-WILLIAMS’ (1986: 659) Sanskrit-
English Dictionary translates the causative prajñâpana as ‘statement, assertion’.
                                             
286 DELEU (1970: 169) writes: ‘âsaissâmo is âœayišyâmaÿ, not, as Abhay. says, âœrayišyâmaÿ.’
According to the rules of speech in Âyâr 2.4.1.5 and DVS 7.8–10 one should avoid such a state-
ment if one cannot be entirely sure.
287 PaòòÞ 249b: yathâvasthitârthâbhidhânâd iyaô prajñâpanî, in MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 211, cf.
346).
288 Contrary to MÂLVAÒIYÂ’s (1971: 211) view that asatya-måšâ speech ‘has nothing to do
with norm’ it is obvious that by referring to situations that ought to be both imperatives, commis-
sives (vows), and declaratives imply normative conditions, even if used by an enlightened being.
Only assertives attempt to represent situations as they are. Searle showed that from the hearer’s
perspective even literal speech implies a contextual horizon to be intelligible (HABERMAS (1980:
452) / (1984–1987 I: 337)). According to Paòò 246b, asatyâ-måšâ speech signifies not only
ohâraòî <avadhâraòî> or determinative expressions such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’, but all at-
tempts to communicate transcendental truth through descriptive (prajñâpanî) speech, which is
assumed to be context-free and thus by definition neither-true-nor-false (satyâ-måšâ). The Paòò
accounts for the use of certain classificatory terms and words which express universals (e.g. mas-
culine, feminine, neuter) without clearly specifying their contextual range of meaning. Imperatives
such as ‘go ahead’ belong to this category too. For instance, we may ‘order a person of any gender
and this person may or may not carry out orders. … This âjñâpanî (imperative) speech too could
not be held as false. It should be regarded as a case of prajñâpanî speech’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971:
326)).
289 PaòòÞ1 249b:
pâòivahâu niyattâ havaôti dîhâuyâ arogâ ya /
emâî paòòattâ paòòavaòî vîyarâgehiô //
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LALWANI (1985 IV: 133) apparently follows the Illustrated Ardhamâgadhî Diction-
ary of RATNACANDRA (1988 III: 443), based on Malayagiri, in using the word
‘advice’ (upadeœa).290 What is probably meant by the term pannavaòî is that from
the conventional point if view, which underlies the Jain ‘catuš-koþi’ of language
usage, the testimony of an authoritative person is neither true nor untrue, because its
meaning may be incomprehensible for a hearer, similarly to unintelligible utterances
of non-enlightened creatures. With imperatives and addresses expressing universal
truths or ideals has in common that no referent exists in re at a given place and point
of time (as for instance in Malayagiri’s example which should not be read as a pre-
diction relating to a specific individual). The multidimensional implications of a
general statement or rule such as this cannot be understood entirely in an instant, as
WITTGENSTEIN (1953: 53–55, § 138–40) noted in his remarks on the relation be-
tween meaning and use of a word (WITTGENSTEIN (1953: 190 ff., § 138 f.)). Moreo-
ver, the example given by the commentaries concerning the necessary link between
non-violence and health cannot be proved or disproved from a conventional per-
spective. It must be accepted on the basis of the authority of the speaker. Interest-
ingly enough, the two truth theory is not invoked by the commentaries in defence of
the concept of transcendental speech, being neither-true-nor-false, in spite of its
capability to immunise any statement against criticism.291
Paòò 832–857 gives another example for speech which is neither-true-nor-false by
discussing the question of the ‘congruity of grammatical and natural gender and num-
ber’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74)). It argues that words such as go, cow, which ex-
press (genderless) universals but are employed in masculine singular, are not false or
both-true-and-false, say, with regard to female cows, but neither-true-nor-false. The
same applies to imperatives (âjñâpanî), since ‘we may order a person of any gender
and this person may or may not carry out our orders’ (MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 326)).292
The last of the four variants of ohâraòî-bhâsâ <avadhâraòî-bhâšâ>, or determi-
nate speech, is another example of speech which is neither-true-nor-false. Reflexive
                                             
290 Uttar 28.16 ff. lists amongst the ten sources of right insight (samyag-darœana) communica-
tions such as upadeœa, instruction, âjñâ, command, bîja, seed (suggestion), as well as abhigama,
comprehension of the sacred scriptures, and vistâra, complete course of study (including proofs,
pramâòa, and perspectives, naya): nisagguvaesa-ruî, âòâ-ruî sutta-bîya-rui-meva / abhigama-
vitthâra-ruî, kiriyâ-saôkheva-dhamma-ruî // .
291 Cf. MURTI (1955: 129) on transcendental language which expresses truth which is beyond
language; and GANERI (2002: 271) on the non-assertible (inexpressible) in classical Jain seven-
valued logic (sapta-bhaógî), which may be conceptually related to incomprehensible speech.
292 This example could be interpreted as an early version of the ‘misleading form thesis’
addressed by RUSSELL (1905) and others. See HAACK (1974: 53–55). By contrast, the example
‘Devadatta, give me the cow’, mentioned by GLASENAPP (1915: 46), is neither-true-nor-untrue as a
simple performative.
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expressions such as ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’ are said to be capable of expressing any
of the four modes of speech, depending on whether they serve religion (ârâhiya
<ârâdhita>), in which case they are true by definition, harm religion (virâhiya
<virâdhita>), in which case they are false, both serve and harm religion, in which
case they are true-as-well-as-false, or whether they do neither, in which case they
are neither-true-nor-false (Paòò 830–831 [246b]).293
The examples show that in the Jain philosophy of speech pragmatic efficacy, that
is, non-violence, supersedes propositional truth:294
‘It goes with the sphere of ethics that all four modes of speech, and
consequently the mode of wrong speech as well, are admitted, pro-
vided they are employed in a pious way of mind (âuttaô =samyak),
while even true speech coming from a sinner’s mouth will count for
nothing (Pannav. 268a)’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74).
Conversely, as mentioned before, ‘a mode of speech springing from emotion is by
itself understood as mosâ’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 157, § 74)). In other words, the
speaker’s beliefs, attitudes or intentions (if not his / her Being), and the specific prag-
matic context is decisive, not the words themselves, or the propositional meaning.
Arguments relating to the ‘higher truth’ of morality based on similar considerations.
HANDIQUI (1968: 266) notes that the 10th century Digambara âcârya Somadeva
is more concerned with ethics than with propositional truth:
‘Somadeva appears in certain circumstances to attach greater impor-
tance to self-preservation and philanthropic considerations than to
speaking the truth. He opines that the truth must not be spoken if it is
likely to endanger others and bring inevitable ruin to oneself.’
Another example of this attitude is given by the Œvetâmbara Âcârya Hemacandra
who, in his 12th century Yoga-œâstra (YŒ 2.61) and self-commentary, narrates that
the sage Kauœika, who was famous for speaking the truth, ‘went to hell because
accurate information given by him led to the capture and killing of a band of rob-
bers’ (cited by HANDIQUI (1968: 266 n. 4)):
‘On the other hand (api), even though a statement may be true, it
should not be spoken if it causes affliction to others [This is] because,
                                             
293 Cf. SCHUBRING (2000: 158, § 74), MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 325 f.)).
294 Cf. CAILLAT (1975: 80), QVARNSTRÖM (2002: 41 n. 4).
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even if it is accepted [by all the people] in the world, Kauœika was sent
to hell [on account of making such a statement]’ (YŒ 2.61).295
The explanations of the four modes of speech in canonical Jain literature and its
medieval Sanskrit commentaries show that they are conceived as meta-rules, on a
level of abstraction comparable to the discourse ethics of universal pragmatics,
while the sub-categories and examples correspond to the level of empirical seman-
tics and pragmatics. The levels of abstraction of the lists of examples in the com-
mentaries vary, since the Jain lists are relatively unsystematic, although some may
have been intended as scholastic devices for cumulative indexication qua fixed
analytical perspectives. From the point of view of comparative analytical philoso-
phy, some examples could serve as illustrations for one or other of the conversa-
tional postulates à la Grice (‘be relevant’ etc.), Searle, or Habermas, while others
can be related to the modern logical investigations of vagueness, category mistakes,
quantifiers, or modalities of time in particular. In contrast to modern intentionalist
semantics, Jain philosophers of language analyse examples of fundamental types of
speech rarely with reference to the intention of the speaker, but prefer an objective
or listener’s standpoint. That is, they investigate the structure of the utterance as a
whole, from the de-contextualised point of view of the four combinations of the
basic true / false distinction, seen from the perspective of discourse ethics. The same
perspective is preferred by universal pragmatics.
We can conclude from this brief discussion of the explanations of the four modes
of speech in the Œvetâmbara canon and commentaries that the rules of Jain discourse
are less concerned with referential truth than with the pragmatics of speech;296 in
particular with the expression of the ‘higher truth’ of religious insight gained
through direct self-experience, and speaking in accordance with the ethics of non-
violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that truth in Jain discourse is always
defined as an aspect of objective illocutionary force, depending on the form of the
utterance and the intentional state of a speaker alone, without the need to be backed
up by argument in processes of critical inquiry. The primacy of pragmatic ethical
and moral considerations, considered from a monological perspective, makes the
Jain theory of speech in many ways akin to Habermas’ theory of communicative
action. The analysis of the implications of the Jain maxim of truth for language
usage show that it combines as it were the validity claims two, three and four:
                                             
295 For discussion of the ethical implications of this dilemma, for instance in terms of appropri-
ateness, see for instance GERT (1973), HARE (1981), WELLMER (1986: 26 ff.), and HABERMAS
(1991: 170).
296 GANERI (2002: 277) shows that the sapta-bhaógî is also ‘not strictly truth-functional’, but
suggests a solution to this problem.
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propositional truth, normative rightness, and expressive truthfulness. Despite the
primacy of non-violence and sincerity of expression, there are numerous examples
for rules concerning referential truth, the ideal of univocal or straight (åju) speech,
and the avoidance of deception, especially Âyâr 2.4.1.1, Âyâr 2.4.2.19, and DVS
8.46.297 Such rules of avoidance of false representations (including false references
                                             
297 Interestingly, some œlokas are similar to the last of Grice’s quality maxims: ‘Do not say that for
which you lack adequate evidence’, which invokes questions of referential truth and of the relation-
ship between representational and expressive functions of language. The definition of the concept
truth and falsehood, or of aspects thereof, is a notoriously difficult problem for modern science and
philosophy, whose discourse is constituted by this fundamental distinction according to FOUCAULT
(1981) and LUHMANN (1990). It is therefore interesting to see how the Jains tackle this issue, which is
one of their foremost concerns. There is a note by LALWANI added to DVS2 4.12 which identifies
three types of falsehood: ‘(i) to deny what is, (ii) to establish what is not, and (iii) to alter the mean-
ing’. They can be illustrated by the following examples:
(i) Jains are epistemic realists. Hence, it is not surprising that there are explicit statements de-
fending the ideal of objective truth in the scriptures, as opposed to mere appearance, opinion,
or consensus. The following passage stresses the necessity for ascetics to use their faculty of
judgement to discover the truth of a given phenomenon, and not to be deceived by false ap-
pearances: ‘Employing their judgment, they should know something for certain and some-
thing for uncertain: (1) Having received food or not having received food, having eaten it or
not having eaten it, has come or has not come, comes or does not come, will come or will nor
come’ (Âyâr 2.4.1.1–2). This orientation toward the world, predicated on a realistic analysis
of the modalities of time, is diametrically opposed to Brâhmaòism and Vedântic concepts
such as mâyâ etc. This is evident in the following passage, which implicitly criticises the con-
fusion of natural phenomena with illusory imagery of divine agency: ‘A monk should not
say: “The god of the sky! the god of the thunderstorm! the god of lightning! the god who be-
gins to rain! the god who ceases to rain! may rain fall or may it not fall! may the crops grow
or may they not grow! may the night wane or may it not wane! may the sun rise or may it not
rise! may the king conquer or may he not conquer!” They should not use such speech. … But
knowing the nature of things, he should say: “the air; the follower of Guhya; a cloud has
gathered or come down; the cloud has rained”’ (Âyâr 2.4.1.12–13).
(ii) False appearance and deception should be avoided by all means: ‘A muni speaks of ap-
pearance, ignoring the truth, encounters a sin. Then what to speak of one who indulges in
whole untruth [Note by LALWANI: When a woman is dressed as a man and if she be called
a man, it is a falsehood, though in her dress she appears like a man …].’ (DVS2 7.5, cf.
Âyâr 2.4.1.3). Ways of ‘establishing what is not’, such as vague promises and speculation,
are also seen indiscriminate or deceptive utterances, because of the confusion of past, pre-
sent, and future. Language which may create doubt (‘maybe or not’) has to be avoided by
all means: ‘When one knows not true implication, in the context of the present, past, and
future, says not one, “surely it’s like this”. When one is in doubt about implication, in the
context of the present, past and future, says not one, “surely it’s like this”. “Surely it’s
so”,—says one when one has not an iota of doubt of implication about the present, the
past and future’ (DVS2 7.8–10, cf. DVS2 7.6–7, Âyâr 2.4.1.5). It is remarkable, that early
Jainism already insists on the correct use of temporal modalities, which must be related to
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to past, present and future) and non-deceptive speech etc., can be understood as
expressions of a pragmatic anti-illusionist (anti-Brâhmaòic) realism, that is, as anti-
deception strategies. From the perspective of politeness theory, one could add that the
underlying cognitive realism does not only serve as a strategy of self-protection, as
WILLIAMS (1983: xix) argues, but also to calculate the karmic consequences of speech
acts, and functional demands on social inferiors, who (have to) read and fulfil the
pragmatic implications of intentionally ambiguous statements of social superiors.
Relation
The Gricean maxim of relation, concerning the relevance of a statement, is gener-
ally determined by the ‘purpose of the talk exchange’ as already stressed by the co-
operative principle, of which it is but a mode298 (and therefore absent in Habermas’
scheme).299 The principle of relevance is vital for the selection of appropriate con-
textual references of both utterances and standpoints of interpretation. In religious
discourses, the implicit limitations inscribed in the semantic structure of the ideo-
logical system, enforced by a system of related institutional and social sanctions,
play an important role in the discrimination of relevant contextual references.300
                                                                                                               
the philosophy of transmigration, but also with the critique of the Brâhmaòic sacred-word
theory: ‘speech exists only the moment when being spoken’ (SCHUBRING (2000: 149,
§ 68). The practical value of all the cited examples is the same: reducing illusory appear-
ances to their ‘real’ content.
(iii) There are no further maxims concerning ‘changing the meaning’ in the texts on the ways
of speaking. Effectively, however, Jain narrative literature is based on a method of
‘changing the meaning’ of Indian folklore (HERTEL (1922)). The combined systematicity
and context-sensitivity of Jain rules and regulations is particularly obvious in the follow-
ing statement of the Digambara author Vasunandin’s (1100 CE) Œrâvakâcâra 209, which
propagates not only the ‘abstention from untruth spoken out of passion or hate’ but ‘from
truth too, if it provokes the destruction of a living being’ (cited in WILLIAMS (1983: 78)).
This and similar examples illustrate how the hierarchically superior principle of ahiôsâ
supersedes the maxim of truthfulness in cases of rule-contradiction. Cf. MÂLVAÒIYÂ
(1971: 325) on the role of the (situational) conditions of truthfulness in the Pannavaòâ.
298 Amåtacandra’s commentary on the Samaya-sâra (supra p. 147) states this implication openly.
Similar references can be found with regard to public debates at the royal court etc. Cf. ÂyârD 4.2.
299 HABERMAS (1980: 418) / (1984 I: 312) remarks that it is hard to establish the universality of
this maxim.
300 Œrîmad Râjacandra’s rules of speech recommend avoiding controversial religious themes:
‘1. While you are talking of one thing, you may not, unless it is absolutely unavoidable, bring in
another thing. 2. Listen attentively to what the other is saying. 3. You should answer it patiently
and with a sense or propriety. 4. Only such words be uttered as do not involve you either in self-
praise or self-abasement. 5. For the time being, the less you talk of religion the better. 6. Do not
involve yourself with others on issues pertaining to religion” (in MEHTA (1991: 72)).
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I have argued elsewhere,301 that the ethical ‘code’ of ahiôsâ / hiôsâ forces limita-
tions and therefore an attitude of reflective distance onto those individuals who ob-
serve themselves self-referentially with the help of this semantic differential. Cognitive
distance, in turn, generates the potential of a selective, discriminating relationship
towards the world, i.e. it allows for choice, by presupposing the perceptibility of po-
tentialities, the modalisation of perception, which—as we have seen—is generated
through the practices of meditative introversion and perspective alteration.
In other words, the ways in which contextually relevant references are selected are
negatively determined, and channelled, by Jain values and rules, given that they de
facto orientate practice. Through its in-built directionality, the dominant ethical
code of Jainism (ahiôsâ / hiôsâ) regulates pragmatic choices in everyday life, to the
extent of the religious commitment and power of judgement of the user. Conversely,
any semantically coded generalised strategy of selective choice implies corre-
sponding processes of exclusion of non-relevant references, which form the com-
plementary horizon of the unsaid and the unspeakable of legitimate religious experi-
ence. The discriminative functions of implied references to background knowledge
and pragmatic conditions of fulfilment of religious claims, can be socially exploited
through the off-record strategies of ‘presupposition, hint, give associative clues’
etc., which are associated with the Gricean maxim of relation. Precisely these quali-
ties are associated with the proverbial South Asian ability both to tolerate and to
ignore, which HACKER (1985) called ‘inclusivism’.
Manner
The last maxim is explicitly concerned with the phenomenon of intentional mul-
tivocal speech, stressing the necessity of grammatically correct and unambiguous
speech. The correlates of this maxim are held in great esteem by the Jains. The Âyâr
refers several times to the necessity of using clear language:
‘Well considering (what one is to say), speaking with precision, one
should employ language in moderation and restraint: the singular,
dual, plural; feminine, masculine, neuter gender; praise, blame, praise
mixed with blame, blame mixed with praise; past, present, or future
(tenses), the first and second, or third person’ (Âyâr 2.4.1.3).302
Not only referential truth, relevance, and the syntactically correct use of words is
discussed in such contexts (cf. DVS 8.49), but also the orientation towards the in-
tended effect of (religious) speech on the hearer. That is, not to create doubt, and
                                             
301 FLÜGEL (1993), (1995–6: 163–5) pace JAINI (1979: 312).
302 Cf. Âyâr 2.4.1.7, 2.4.2.19. See also Þhâò 10.96 etc.
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lack of clarity (DVS 7.4). Manner can be interpreted as a combination of the validity
claims of truth and sincerity with the condition of grammatical comprehensibility.
Such features are usually considered in conjunction with other aspects of ideal
speech acts, such as key, tone, spirit or style.303 Grammar is not singled out in the
Jain equivalent of the manner-maxim and privileged over other aspects of commu-
nicative competence, as it is in modern linguistics, but presented together with other
rules of use, such as stylistic rules of performance.
Jain ascetic rules of manner directly address the problem of implicit meaning, and
the necessity to avoid the (manner related) off-record politeness strategies of
‘vagueness, ambiguity, over generalization, or incompleteness’ (BROWN–LEVINSON
(1978: 230 f.)). The clauses stating that both politeness (Âyâr 2.4.2.3–6) and speech
which might harm (Âyâr 2.4.2.1–2) is to be avoided at all costs, however, forces the
exclusion of a wide range of topics onto the performer of ‘pure speech’. This is what
makes Jain doctrinal texts often so dry—most of the ‘juicy bits’ are ‘potentialised’,
left out, remain unsaid, although they are implicitly presupposed. In fact this is the
area, where the ‘rhetoric’ of silence is, as it were, forced upon the Jain ascetic, who
has to select words carefully, in order to steer between the need to communicate
with the world and the obligation to observe the principles of satya and ahiôsâ.
To briefly summarise the results of the comparison between the Jain rules of speech
with Habermas’ validity claims and the Gricean postulates, it is apparent that for all of
the universal pragmatic principles and conversational postulates there are functional
equivalences amongst the Jain principles and rules of speech, which are by no means
‘primitive’ and ‘ill-assorted’, as for instance the philologist SCHUBRING (2000: 157,
§ 74) believed. Jain principles and rules of discourse are not mere examples of a cul-
ture-specific ‘particularistic ethics’, as LAIDLAW (1995: 14) argues, but form a
‘comparatively systematic code which is well-grounded in objective considerations’
(CAILLAT (1991: 14)).304 The Gricean maxims and the Jain rules of speech are similar,
though not identical. The norms of unequivocal and grammatically correct significa-
tion and transmission of information are fundamental for the Jain understanding of
proper language use, but not sufficient for an understanding of its primarily ethical
concerns, which overlap with Habermas’ theory of communicative action. The Jain
texts deliberately avoid defining certain words as ‘sacred’. However, for Jainism, too,
‘correct speech is of religious value’ (CAILLAT (1984: 71)) in so far as the foremost
                                             
303 Cf. HYMES (1972b: 62).
304 For an early universalistic ethical statement see the ‘very difficult passage’ JACOBI (1884:
31 n. 4) Âyâr 1.3.3.1 equating self and world: saôdhiô logassa jâòittâ. âyao bahiyâ pâsa. tamhâ
òa haôtâ òa vighâyae. All beings intend to live. Knowing the intention, one should not be non-
vigilant. Consider all other beings as thyself. Therefore, you should not kill them yourself, nor get
them killed by others (ÂyârBh 3.51, p. 214).
POWER AND INSIGHT IN JAIN DISCOURSE 183
                                                                                                                                        
requirement for the realisation of Jain norms is restraint (negative politeness) in mind,
speech and action. The religious ideal of correct, truthful and non-violent manner of
speech is summarised in the following passage, already quoted above:
‘A monk or nun, putting aside wrath, pride, deceit, and greed, consid-
ering well, speaking with precision, what one has heard, not too quick,
with discrimination, should employ language in moderation and re-
straint’ (Âyâr 2.4.2.19).305
What is manifest in this statement is that the Jain maxims themselves address the
necessity of avoiding the violence and the consequential karmic results of ‘flouting’
the rules of proper speech by means of off-record strategies. At the same time,
negative politeness (especially conventional indirectness) is regarded as mandatory
for maintaining the vows of non-violence and truth in language usage. A different
matter altogether is the ‘salvific’ use of off-record strategies in contexts of religious
instruction which will be discussed below.
(Ad 3) In addition to the general principles and maxims of proper speech discussed
thus far, much space of the language related sections in the Âyâr and DSV is devoted
to experience-near examples and practical rules for selection of what to say and what
not to say in accordance with the satya-vrata. These regulations do not have the status
of general principles or maxims, but are derivatives of the latter, and provide general-
ised examples or schemata for the interpretation of certain types of situation. Generally
single utterances and types of speech-acts (strategies) are discussed in the manner of
modern analytical philosophy, often focusing on negative examples (asatya). The
respective passages are almost identical in both key texts (Âyâr 2.4.2.7–16 = DVS
7.22–35). They can be summarised as follows: First and foremost, one should avoid
interventions in worldly affairs, particularly those involving value-judgements, taking
sides, practical advice, or demands. Recommended speech-strategies are usually forms
of negative politeness, such as conventional indirectness, impersonalisation or nomi-
nalisation.306 Impersonalisation by way of transforming directives and commissives
                                             
305 Conversely: ‘[1.] The monks and nuns may not use the following six forbidden forms of
speech: lying, sneering, insult, coarse speaking, worldly speech, or speech renewing atoned mat-
ters. 2. There are six cases of idle talk about right conduct: of speaking rashly in relation to others,
of damaging living creatures, of untruthfulness, of forbidden appropriation, of a jade, a eunuch, or
a slave. Whoever uses those six kinds of idle talk, without being able to prove them fully, ranks as
one who has committed the transgression himself’ (KS 6.1).
306 Cf. BROWN–LEVINSON (1978: 134 ff.). In PaòòÞ folio 259 B cited by MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971:
212), and discussed earlier, the positive karmic consequences of not killing are expressed in this
way; avoiding commandments of the form ‘do not kill’ for example by saying: ‘Those who refrain
from killing living beings live long and enjoy good health (in the next birth).’
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into assertives, that is, a second-person performative perspective into a third-person
observer’s perspective, is the preferred method; evidently, because in this way
‘illocutionary force switches over into the propositional content and thereby loses, if
not its meaning, at least its force’ (HABERMAS (1993: 27)).307
For instance, one should not say ‘this should be done’, but ‘this is’. And one should
not speak about forbidden subjects, such as business-choices etc., at all. One should
not ask householders to do something, or ‘forecast’, or make promises to them (DVS2
7.46 f.; 51). Another example of depersonalisation and nominalisation is the
‘avoidance of harsh words’. That is, (false) accusations, abuse, and other varieties of
face-threatening acts, such as speaking about the other’s negative attributes (instead
one should select positive ones, without being polite) (Âyâr 2.4.2.1–11), or flattery,
compulsive requests and rejection.308 The most general strategy of nominalisation is
not to mention anything which might lead to violent acts:
‘In the same manner, a muni who is wise, Says not “This cow is fit for
being milked”, or “this ox is catigable” Or “capable of drawing a plough or
carrying a load” Or “of drawing a chariot”. (But if need be) Permissible is
the following vocabulary: “This is a milch cow’ “The ox is young” “The
bull is thick or short” Or “this is worthy of a chariot”‘ (DVS2 7.24–5).
By the same token, a mendicant is not to say ‘this is the murderer’ or ‘this is a thief’
if such a person enters the house in the night, because if s/he gives a warning, either
the thief or s/he him / herself might get killed, or ‘the householder will suspect the
ascetic … to be the thief’ (Âyâr 2.2.2.4). The reverse strategy is applied to past acts of
violence, as evident in the recommendation not to say ‘well done’ about an accom-
plished worldly task but always to stress the amount of unavoidable karman-producing
violence employed (Âyâr 2.4.2.3–6).309 The second generally recommended strategy is
thus to avoid references which might imply the potential for future acts of violence in
both worlds,310 and to condone past and present acts of violence, in order to stimulate
                                             
307 See also AUSTIN (1962: 4) and BOURDIEU (1991a: 109) on disguising a performative utter-
ance as a descriptive or constative statement. For somewhat different reasons, the counter-intuitive
nominal style is also preferred by scientists and philosophers, as JACOBI (1903) has shown with
regard to scientific Sanskrit.
308 SCHUBRING (2000: 308 f., § 176).
309 See WILLIAMS (1983: 71–8) for a discussion of the parallel rules of the œrâvakâcâras.
310 Umâsvâti’s Œrâvaka-prajñapti (ŒrPr) 264 says: ‘the aim of speech should be the intelligent
pursuit of what is best for both worlds and the avoidance of what may cause hurt to others or to
oneself or both’; and Kârttikeya defined satya as ‘the avoidance of harmful, harsh, cruel, or secret
speech and the use of balanced language that gives satisfaction to all living creatures and ex-
presses the sacred truth’ (in WILLIAMS (1983: 77 f.)).
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acts of repentance. The latter is the only case of assertiveness which is explicitly de-
manded from an ascetic. In fact, a sermon is not considered to be asatya by Amåta-
candra (c. 11th CE) and other medieval writers, even if unpleasing (apriya) (PASU 91–
101),311 in accordance with the general principle that determinate (avadhâraòî) speech
which enhances religion is true by definition.312 The determining factor in the Jain
literature on speech, rather than the semantics of words, is the non-violent function of
the utterance, not the intention of the speaker. Because this would amount to a general
absolution for the religious uses of symbolic violence.
There is only a fine line between unnecessary and necessary violent speech, how-
ever, especially in the satyâ-måšâ and asatyâ-måšâ modes. The avoidance of trans-
gression requires great analytic skill (which explains why only senior ascetics are
permitted to conduct sermons). The statement quoted above, about the required
proper knowledge of ‘true implication in the context of past, present and future’
(Âyâr 2.4.1.5)313 is relevant here. An ascetic must be able to discriminate temporal
modalities so as to avoid and to repent acts of violence. The ability to distinguish
between modalities of time is also the general condition of strategic manipulation,
of one’s individual purity, for instance, or of others, and of the self-realisation of the
individual in the context of the hierarchical Brâhmaòical system, where ‘the tempo-
ral is intellectually subordinate to the spiritual and enclosed in it’ (DUMONT (1980:
196)).314 Temporal modalisation, in particular, enables a competent individual to
apprehend or create unequivocal speech, and strategic ways of instrumentalising
implicitly presupposed background knowledge.315 By means of the ideal standards
of on-recordness, and of non-violence, a competent Jain can discriminate truth and
falseness, and right and wrong,316 as well as explicit and implicit meaning, and its
facets of false judgement, unclear speech, ambiguity of meaning, and deceptive
purpose. The cultural specific conceptualisation of the ideal of clear, unambiguous
                                             
311 Cf. WILLIAMS (1983: 78).
312 MÂLVAÒIYÂ (1971: 325).
313 Cf. DVS 7.8–10. See p. 179 ff.
314 Cf. JAINI (1979: 139, 145–7). CAILLAT (1991: 13) dismisses the ‘trival remarks’ on tempo-
ral modalisation as unimportant. However, Jains generally do not consider the ‘social functions’ of
speech acts, but only the karmic, ‘individual functions’. Hemacandra’s YŒ 2.53–64 describes the
consequences of asatya as follows: ‘A liar may have his tongue and an ear cut off, may be beaten
and imprisoned, treated with contumely, and deprived of his possessions. In another incarnation he
may be afflicted with dumbness, speech defects, and fetid breath’ (WILLIAMS (1983: 78)).
315 Cf. HABERMAS (1981: 400 ff.) / (1984 II: 267 ff.).
316 Cf. HARE (1972).
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speech generates also its opposite—an awareness of the implications of speech and
the option to exploit them through lies, deception and intentional multivocality. 317
Compliance with Jain rules of unequivocal, non-violent speech requires reflective
monitoring of speech and conscious analysis of conditions of acceptability. The
ability to discriminate between various modes of speech renders linguistic and so-
cial co-operation as problematic and therefore as manipulable. Rule-generated re-
flexivity also creates the cognitive potential for the strategic manipulation of social
meanings, for instance through the intentional construction of multivocal statements
(as it were an instrumentalisation of anekânta-vâda and syâd-vâda). The doctrinally
promoted distancing from the world, and the resulting apperception of the variabil-
ity of perspectives and meanings, can be exploited in many ways—for salvific pur-
poses or for personal gain. There are numerous instances of conscious flouting of
(Jain) maxims, for both purposes, for instance in Jain narrative literature. What dis-
tinguishes religious and worldly usage of language is, from the point of view of Jain
doctrine, only the effect, not the intention of the speaker, nor the words themselves.
The speaker has to construct the message from the objective viewpoint of its poten-
tial violent / non-violent function, not from a instrumental means-ends perspective.
In practice it is difficult to decide which intention prevails—speaker’s intention or
systemic intention (SEYFORT RUEGG). The Jains, too, have no other means for
judging sincerity of expression, or orientation towards objectivity, but previous
conduct. One has to investigate speech acts in context in order to understand the
selection and the specific strategic value of certain generalised pragmatic strategies
derived from general cultural value-orientations, and recurring functional impera-
tives. The analysis of isolated types of speech-acts has generally proved to be less
fruitful, because it only leads to the proliferation of examples.
(Ad 4) Jains have a keen interest in the actual functioning of their principles (of
speech) in particular contexts of speech and of action. Therefore they have added
not only meta-rules (concerning the actual observance of rules) but also contextual
examples (dåšþânta or udâharaòa) and regulations for specific situations to the gen-
eral principles, maxims, and generalised strategies or types of speech. And here, too,
we can find the discussion of the role of social norms and institutionalised contexts
of language usage, which force a certain direction of interpretation and execution of
unsaid social intentions of the speaker upon the hearer. GUMPERZ (1995: 130 ff.)
coined the term ‘contextualisation conventions’ to analyse processes of negotiation
of implicit socio-cultural presuppositions of different ‘activity types’ defined by a
purpose or goal. In the opening stages of any conversation, he observed,
                                             
317 One may talk about the ‘invention’ of the symbolical: of the poetic and of rhetorics in this
context.
POWER AND INSIGHT IN JAIN DISCOURSE 187
                                                                                                                                        
‘contextualisation cues’ are exchanged to create a platform for co-operation by sig-
nalling contextually relevant presuppositions and preferences regarding norm selec-
tion. These relational signals ‘are inherently ambiguous, i.e. subject to multiple
interpretations’, and may or may not be accepted:
‘Conversational inference is thus not a matter of assigning truth values
to instances of talk. An inference is adequate if it is (a) reasonable
given the circumstances at hand, (b) confirmed by information con-
veyed at various levels of signalling, and (c) implicitly accepted in the
course of conversational negotiation’ (GUMPERZ (1995: 208)).
The rhetorical and practical significance of examples has been recognised in the
Jain scriptures from early on. Examples function as arguments in intersubjective
negotiations of situation definitions. Different types of examples are distinguished
for instance in Þhâò 4.499–503. At the same time, the texts reflect the awareness that
general principles and rules cannot be legitimised with reference to examples alone.
Þhâò 4.499 and 10.95 point to the common fault (âharaòa-tad-dosa <âharaòa-tad-
doša>) of using too many examples and quotes during a debate, and to faulty ways of
relating example (udÿaraòa) and rule, amongst other mistakes in the way of speaking.
From a monological observer’s perspective, four paradigmatic contexts of pragmatic
‘religious’ speech discussed in Jain scriptures have been distinguished in this essay.
They all concentrate on language usage of ascetics, as paradigms of Jain culture, and
presuppose established co-operation: (a) religious debates at royal courts, (b) public
sermons of leading ascetics, (c) informal communication of an ascetic with non-ascet-
ics, and (d) communication between ascetics in the context of the monastic hierarchy. I
dealt with the third case thus far, and already discussed the implications of narratives
presented in public sermons elsewhere.318 For the purpose of the argument of this es-
say, it will suffice to briefly examine cases of hierarchical monastic communication
and of public debate to indicate the role of institutionalised normative expectations of
reading and fulfilling the social implications of formal language usage.
The discursive context which is most relevant for ascetics in day to day life is the
monastic hierarchy. It has three dimensions which sometimes, but not always,
overlap: seniority (dikkhâ-pariyâya <dîkšâ-paryâya>), guru-sîsa <guru-œišya>
relationship, and the administrative hierarchy.319 Qua rule, it is the duty of lower-
standing ascetics to serve higher-standing ascetics (as it is the duty of the laity to
serve the ascetics). Non-compliance with this norm is sanctioned by elaborated judi-
cial procedures which might lead to excommunication. That is, the social norms
                                             
318 FLÜGEL (1993). See also CARRITHERS (1992) on mind-reading.
319 FLÜGEL (2006a: 324).
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themselves tend to force an implicature upon the juniors, and restraint upon seniors
(ideally: silence). I have shown elsewhere in greater detail that a junior mendicant is
expected to read the implications of the speech and minute gestures and conversa-
tional clues of the guru, and obliged to serve him / her politely, that is, to perform sevâ,
as it is the duty of the householder to serve all mendicants.320 Hence, Jain house-
holders are called uvâsagas <upâsakas>, or servants of the samaòas <œramaòas>.321
Pragmatic intentions and demands are never stated openly within the œramaòa-
saógha. But it is a general rule that juniors are supposed to read the implications of
seniors and should try to fulfil their unstated wishes:
‘Guessing the teachers thought and the purport of his words, one should
express one’s assent, and execute (what he desires to be done). An ex-
cellent pupil needs no express directions, or he is (at least) quickly di-
rected; he always carries out his duties as he is told’ (Uttar 1.43 f.).322
The way of interpreting the implications of every gesture of superiors and serving
(veyâvacca <vaiyâvåttya>) them in accordance with the rules (vinaya), is defined as a
religious act of internal asceticism (abbhantara-tava <abhyantara-tapas>).323 Im-
mersing oneself in the mind of a senior and reading his / her unstated wishes is an act of
self-purification qua identification with an officially more advanced soul, taken as an
external symbolic manifestation of one’s own inner potential, just like a statue in a
temple. At the same time, the prestige of seniors who ‘get things done without ever
saying so’ is strengthened by this conventional procedure, which through use of im-
plicit language also reproduces a sense of in-group membership.324 This example is a
good illustration of the general fact that multi-functional public roles imply unforced
functional contributions from inferiors.325 The observation also applies to the laity’s
duty to serve the ascetics. The asymmetrical relationship between mendicants and laity
is conceptualised as a relationship between speakers and hearers—the laity are called
both uvâsagas <upâsakas>, servants, and sâvagas <œrâvakas>, hearers. In both cases,
as I have argued above, it is not a particular form of language usage, but the force of
the norms and sanctions of the speech situation which direct the Jains of lower status
                                             
320 FLÜGEL (1994: 324).
321 HOERNLE (1989: 1 n.1), in UD.
322 Cf. Vyavahâra-bhâšya 10.192, in JAIN (1981: 159).
323 Cf. Uttar 30.30–7.
324 ‘The more work … hearers do to supply meaning, the deeper their understanding and the
greater their sense of involvement with both text and author’ (TANNEN (1989: 23)).
325 Cf. VÂBh 1.927, 3, 2.54, 4–8, in BALBIR (1993: 267–9, 317–46).
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to infer and fulfil the pragmatic intentions of their religious superiors, which are con-
ventionally not openly expressed, but implicitly stated.
Speech situations for which Jain ascetics are especially trained are many. The two most
important forms of non-ritualised language usage a Jain ascetic has to learn are the public
sermon (pavayaòa <pravacana>) to the laity and the art of debate (paoga <prayoga>)
or disputation (vivâda) with other ascetics.326 Both forms of discourse are primarily
instruments of social influence, based on the idea of the superiority of the better argu-
ment in public discourse or agonistic dialogues, i.e. verbal battles. Polite formal ex-
changes within the context of a religious hierarchy (type d and c), by contrast, tend to
conform with an ideal of ‘speaking in concordance with the one who knows the truth’
(GAEFFKE (1970: 34–8)). Prayoga was/is important for gaining or maintaining social
influence at the royal courts etc., and played a major role in medieval South Asia. The
way in which this art was taught in the more advanced stages of monastic education327
resembles Aristotelian style rhetorical training, as the following citation from the Âyâra-
dasâo <Âcâra-daœâÿ> (ÂyârD), a Jaina Cheya-sutta (Cheda-sûtra) text, illustrates:
‘It is of four kinds: (a) application of one’s knowledge after a complete
assessment of one’s own powers in debate, (b) application of one’s
knowledge in debate after a full assessment of the parisâ (assembly),
(c) application of one’s knowledge in debate after a full appreciation
of the environment (khetta) of the debate, (d) application of one’s
knowledge in debate after a full estimation of the nature of the adjudi-
cators, the ability of the opponent and the attitude of the authorities,
etc. (vatthu)’ (ÂyârD 4.2, in TATIA–KUMAR (1981: 32)).
It is interesting to note the similarity between the four factors considered relevant
for strategy selection in public debate, and BROWN–LEVINSON’s (1978: 79 ff.) vari-
ables for the assessment of the seriousness of a FTA, that is, social distance and
relative power in particular. The view that South Asians traditionally knew only
poetry, but not rhetoric, because of the ‘absence of the institution of public speech’
(HACKER (1985: 13 f.)),328 must be doubted in the light of the evidence presented. I
would argue, on the contrary, that self-conscious pragmatic language usage, polite-
ness, and the art of persuasion via the construction of implicatures, is one of the
recognised arts of Jain ascetics (and laity).329
                                             
326 Þhâò 350b, 364b, ÂyârD 4.
327 Cf. CORT (2001: 339 f.).
328 Cf. GAEFFKE (1970).
329 See MATILAL (1999: 31) on rules and regulations for debates (kathâ or vâda) in Indian
philosophical texts.
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— VIII —
In this essay, I proposed a theoretical interpretation of syncretic processes as
forms of symbolic communication, broadly following Habermas’ analyses of sys-
tematically distorted and latent strategic action, predicated on the work of Grice and
sociolinguists such as Hymes, Gumperz, Fishman and Brown and Levinson. The
advantage of this perspective, compared to classical hermeneutics, is that social
processes within a religious tradition do not have to be understood in terms of an
enactment or actualising appropriation of textual meaning, or of rule-specification,
but can be investigated as open historical processes for which religious knowledge
and linguistic repertoire serves as cognitive resource, which can be used for the
pursuit of either power or insight. To the extent that cognition and discourse are
historically relevant, production of social meaning and co-operation can be under-
stood in terms of the conditions of acceptability of validity claims. Rarely do human
insight and instrumental rationality take precedence over habit and contingencies of
life. GADAMER’s (1993: 244) objection to Habermas’ ‘idealisation of the critical
power of reflection’ and reasons in discourse is therefore justified. However,
Habermas’ theory of communicative action is more narrowly concerned with a cri-
tique of both latent strategic action and mediated systemic forms of social reproduc-
tion, without illusions about the overwhelming factual role of power and indetermi-
nacy in contemporary social processes. FOUCAULT’s (1981: 56) more radical attack
on the repressive aspects of discourse as a form of power itself, especially dis-
courses informed by the ‘will to truth’ backed up by exclusionary mechanisms,
nevertheless puts its finger on a crucial problem in both moral philosophy and or-
ganised religion. Habermas’ theory of communicative action certainly does not
properly account for the poetic ‘world-disclosing’ function of language, nor for the
historical conditions of the theorisation of the ‘universal’ validity claims itself,
which it merely takes as a primitive given of ‘successful’ prosaic communication.
Both SEARLE (1993: 91 f., 99) and APEL (1993: 52 f.), despite their differences,
criticise the hidden essentialism of this approach as ‘functionalist’ (in an old-fash-
ioned sense), and suggest that the acceptance of validity conditions is a contingent
‘perlocutionary effect’ of the strategic attempt of getting the hearer to agree—an
attempt which initially only commits the speaker (as the Jain example shows).
Moreover, Habermas’ original approach privileges the educated classes, and ne-
glects empirical cases of reaching agreement or dissent through open strategic uses
of language. Yet, the alternative reduction of validity to an effect of universally
present ‘empirico-transcendental’ power in Foucault’s or similar theoretical scenar-
ios currently en vogue in Jaina Studies forecloses the possibility of problematising
legitimacy once and for all. This, however, seems unwise, not least because, empiri-
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cally, the sources of power and legitimacy often do not coincide. This is one of the
reasons why DUMONT’s (1980: xxxi) distinction between (political) power (pouvoir)
and (religious) potency (puissance) has gained currency in South Asia research.
Classical Jainism derives its legitimacy ontologically from the presumed direct
meditative insight of its omniscient prophets (tîrthaókara) into the eternal truth of
existence (sat), i.e. the difference between self (jîva) and non-self (ajîva). Those
who know, who have experienced direct insight, it is said, share an experiential
consensus which transcends discourse and rational argument. However, discourse
and argument is necessary for the dispersion of religious knowledge amongst the
ignorant, although, initially, it can only facilitate first experiences of insight
(samyag-darœana) by providing some of its conditions through instruction, but not
generate insight itself. For Jain doctrine, insight is a psychophysical event which is
unexplainable, a mysterious transformation of consciousness, which may or may not
occur, once karmic bondage is weakened and religious knowledge fuses with per-
sonal experience. Paradigmatic activating conditions of insight are temporary feel-
ings of peace accompanied with ‘instructing’ experiences of loss, suffering, or the
sight of a saint. Verbal instruction (upadeœa) and suggestion (dhvani) may also pro-
voke sudden insight (as a perlocutionary effect).330 In practice, it usually does so
only after a previous history of interaction, involving rational argument and agonis-
tic debate, which prepares the epistemic ground for ‘true’ or ‘dogmatic’ insight,
which may then be triggered circumstantially, for instance by fitting experiences.
I have not discussed the metaphysics and the psychological conditions of religious
experience in this essay,331 especially not the hypothetical experiences of the Jinas,
but confined myself to the analysis of the conditions of understanding and accepting
Jain religious claims as legitimate (Einsicht) and of fulfilment of their pragmatic
implications. My argument rests on the observation of a principal two-stage process
of Jain religious conversion: first, largely through agonistic discourse, based on
rational argument, and, second, largely through non-agonistic instruction.332 Al-
though, in principle, an initiated disciple ‘cannot say “no”’ (BLOCH (1975: 19)) to
transmitted Jain doctrine anymore after the ‘initial acceptance of the code’ (BLOCH
                                             
330 Uttar 28.16–27, JAINI (1979: 141 f.). Cf. UPADHYAYA (1987: 105–7) on Hemacandra’s ex-
amples of upâcara, secondary meaning of a word based on similarity.
331 See JAMES (1982), and footnotes 21, 28, 29, 61, 143, 286.
332 See FLÜGEL (1993, (1994: 217–346)). This scheme has been abstracted from documented
conversions to monkhood. It corresponds to the textual ideal (e.g. Uttar 23), but does not neces-
sarily cover the Jain cliché of lay conversion through miracle-working. Lay conversions are grad-
ual affairs, often starting with taking limited vows after public sermons and subsequently adding
more severe restrictions. Jain vows do not compel the adherent to reject his ancestral beliefs and
practices—unless they are wholly incompatible—but lead to a re-evaluation of these practices.
192 PETER FLÜGEL
                                                                                                                                        
(1975: 24)), and subsequently receives religious instruction from his seniors pre-
dominantly in the mode of unquestioned conformity to revealed fundamental
truth,333 debate and rational argument continue on the basis of the accepted onto-
logical and organisational principles (TS 9.25). In other words, although it is predi-
cated on the acceptance of the validity of ultimately incommunicable evidence or
feelings, Jain religious discourse, too, is confined to the level of conventional truth
(VN), because ‘whatever is beyond the province of speech is inexpressible (or un-
speakable)’ (TULSÎ (1985: 190)). According to the proposed model, Jainism appeals
to rationality and insight in different ways on both idealtypical developmental stages
of conversion, and constitutes a kind of therapeutic discourse, which thrives on the
interpretation of experience through a pedagogical scheme of explanation, which
runs contrary to everyday perceptions and opens up new perspectives, thus inevita-
bly generating ambiguity by ‘splitting the codes’ (TURNER (1986: 56))334 and thereby
producing the potential for a transformation of meaning and, subsequently, conduct.
Because the appeal to rationality is predominant in Jain discourse, which conven-
tionally contrasts the three jewels (ratna-traya) of right insight (samyag-darœana),
right knowledge (samyag-jñâna) and right conduct (samyak-câritra) to ‘blind ritu-
alism’,335 it seemed legitimate to privilege the perspective of the ascetics in this
essay, which are trained in Jain doctrine. The importance of their power of persua-
sion for the continuation of the Jain tradition is a universal topos of Jain narrative
and biographical literature. There, the problem of the moral ambivalence of relig-
ious rhetoric is explicitly addressed as a form of necessary violence (âvassaya-
hiôsâ <âvaœyaka-hiôsâ>), to be repented by means of the obligatory ascetic rites
(âvaœyaka). I have not discussed technical Jain theories of suggestion, implication,
figures of speech, or narrative genres, nor any particular linguistic exchange in the
manner of the ethnography of speaking, but concentrated on the principles of Jain
discourse itself, particularly the ones concerning the illegitimacy of ‘unnecessary vio-
lent’ (anâvassaya hiôsâ <anâvaœyaka-hiôsâ>) speech. In this way, I hope to have
shown how structures of traditional authority together with the constraints of given
circumstances directly or indirectly pre-empt processes of negotiated meaning by
channelling them in a certain direction. Even if the principles of rational inquiry are
upheld by Jain doctrine,336 open critical inquiry as defined by the theory of communi-
cative action in not possible within the confines of the traditional religious institutions.
                                             
333 Cf. GAEFFKE (1970: 34–8), BALBIR (1993: 40).
334 Cf. BLOCH (1975: 26 f.).
335 Statement of a young Jain in London in conversation with the present author.
336 Cf. BRONKHORST (1999).
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The comparison between the theory of communicative action and Jain discourse
ethics showed nevertheless significant similarities. Both approaches are rule-ori-
ented, not goal-oriented. That is, they are concerned with the general interest of
many, not with the eudaemonic perspective of a single actor, despite the fact that the
methods of universalisation are different. The respective ideals of consensus and
non-violence mutually implicate each other. Basic non-violence is presupposed by
communicative action, and the general interest of all is presupposed by universal
non-violence. Though the criterion of generalisability, equal interest, is not theo-
rised in Jain philosophy, and only touched upon with reference to specific negative
rights such as the privileged case of the universal interest in avoiding pain,337 the
scope of the moral universe is extended from humanity to all living beings, whose
essential spiritual equality is a fundamental principle of Jaina philosophy.338 The
vanishing points of both theories, the ideal consensus of an infinite community of
interpretation and the ideal omniscient observer, presuppose absolute knowledge
and absolute consensus. Yet, there are two significant differences. The main differ-
ence between the transcendental pragmatics of mutual recognition and the mo-
nadological Jain ethics of non-violence concerns the nature of the fundamental prin-
ciples. The former is predicated on positive norms and the latter on norms of prohi-
bition.339 The implicit method of universalisation of Jain ethics is the double nega-
tion, that is, the negation of non-generalisable statements. The resulting priority of
physical non-action as a theoretical limiting case (not as a practical maxim) unbur-
dens the doctrine of discussions of specific dilemmas of norm application, thus safe-
guarding both generalisability and contextual determinateness, while maintaining a
perspective of disengagement with the world and non-specific positive duties. The
second main difference between the two types of discourse ethics concerns the
moral division of labour presupposed by Jain norms of discourse, which does not
permit equal communicative freedom to take positions on validity claims, but
privileges institutionally verified competent speakers (âpta).340 Having emerged
                                             
337 Cf. GERT’s (1973) ‘minimal ethic’.
338 See DUMONT’s (1977), (1980) works.
339 The general difference of the two approaches has been pointedly expressed by
SCHOPENHAUER (1977: 262, § 121) in his critique of the formalism of Kant’s theory of morality
and of state-oriented positive concepts of law from a perspective of Indic conceptions of morality:
‘Der Begriff des R e c h t s ist nämlich, eben wie auch der der  F r e i h e i t ,  e i n
n e g a t i v e r :  sein Inhalt ist eine bloße Negation. Der Begriff des  U n r e c h t s  ist der
positive und ist gleichbedeutend mit  V e r l e t z u n g  im weitesten Sinne, also laesio. …
Hiernach sind dann die  M e n s c h e n r e c h t e  leicht zu bestimmen: Jeder hat das Recht,
alles Das zu thun, wodurch er Keinen verletzt.’
340 Habermas is often accused of the same for somewhat different theoretical reasons.
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under historical conditions of normative inequality, Jain discourse ethics is not at all
concerned with questions of human justice, only with negative individual freedom.
Dumont and Marriott posed the question whether Jainism, built from the same
materials as other South Asian religions, can be interpreted as a blueprint for the
formation of ‘strategic groups’, for instance by being connected with a set of spe-
cific procedures or dominant strategies, which are derived either from the structure
of its dominant ideological codes jîva / ajîva and ahiôsâ / hiôsâ and / or the charac-
teristic social position of its dominant lay-followers. Put in this way, any answer of
the question must be vulnerable to the critique of socio-cultural ‘essentialism’ as
‘ahistorical’ and ‘reductionist’. But to ask which principles and procedures the Jains
themselves regard as ‘essential’ for the validation of their own politics of cultural
synthesis remains indispensable. At least five derivative, and still accepted, para-
digmatic pragmatic orientations for contexts of interaction between mendicants and
non-mendicants can be isolated on the basis of the Âyâr and the DVS: (1) imper-
sonalisation, (2) nominalisation (objectivation), (3) degrees of non-speech, silence, and
selective non-interaction, and (4) avoiding disagreement by presupposing common
ground. All these strategies leave a speaker with a number of defensible interpretations
which are technically neither true nor false (satyâsatya) and therefore useful to gloss
over gaps between the often contradictory doctrinal and contextual implications of a
speech act. The first three strategy types are those of negative politeness, which gener-
ally emphasise the mutual autonomy and non-interference of the interlocutors, for
instance, by transforming directives into assertives. The last strategy type is a specific
instance of positive politeness strategies, which are used to avoid conflict (and thus
violence). For the same purpose off-record strategies are employed, which are consid-
ered as legitimate forms of symbolic violence, if used for the furtherance of religious
insight. The overall result of this preliminary investigation of Jain discourse resonates
with PAINE’s (1981: 3) and BRENNEIS’–MYERS’ (1984: 12) observation that in many
societies, especially in those without elaborated hierarchies or structures of open coer-
cion, conflict or contradiction, while often endemic, is rarely discussed openly, and
expressed confrontation or coercion avoided through indirect speech, oriented toward
the creation or maintenance of co-operation and the attainment of basic consensus,
without saying so. Of course, not only particular speech acts but even the Jain maxims
themselves can be read as generalised strategies, because they embody a certain direc-
tionality or orientation toward the world. The differentia specifica between the ele-
ments of Jain ontology and those of the culturally dominant religious systems of Hin-
duism, then, opens up negatively determined spaces for a distinct style of communica-
tive action and rhetorical manipulation with characteristic multiple ambiguities and
syncretic effects to be studied by future sociolinguistic investigations of Jain discourse.
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